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Just  as  biological  life  becomes  more  interesting  and  diverse  when  the  edges  of  
ecosystems  meet,  intellectual  life  crackles  with  energy  and  possibility  when  leaders  from  
different  disciplines  collaborate.  The  recent  emergence  of  behavioral  economics,  a  fusion  
of  economic  theory  with  psychological  cognitive  theory,  represents  the  best  of  what  can  
happen  when  different  fields  collide.  Behavioral  economists  combine  the  sophisticated  
and  nuanced  anthropology  articulated  by  cognitive  theorists  such  as  Nobel  laureate  
Daniel  Kahneman  with  classical  economic  theory  to  offer  more  realistic  models  and  
expanded  explanatory  power,  giving  particular  insight  into  why  humans  do  not  always  
behave  in  ways  that  are  purely  rational  and  self-­‐‑interested.  
I  will  show  that  theological  reflection  and  pastoral  leadership,  specifically,  have  
much  to  gain  by  undertaking  a  similar  ‘behavioral  turn’  and  exploring  the  insights  
cognitive  theory  offers.  By  exploring  the  nature  and  history  of  the  behavioral  turn  in  
economics  and  then  showing  the  relevance  to  Christology  and  theological  anthropology,  
I  will  lay  the  groundwork  for  a  ‘behavioral  theology’.  Behavioral  theology  sheds  light  on  
the  Chalcedonian  full  divinity  and  humanity  of  Christ  and  underscores  the  view  of  sin  
as  hubris.  Behavioral  theology  also  encourages  pastors  to  see  themselves  as  choice  
architects  responsible  for  making  decisions  that  help  busy  and  tired  congregants  be  the  
people  they  desire  to  be.  Finally,  I  will  demonstrate  the  experimental  spirit  of  behavioral  
    
v  
theology  in  a  study  of  one  facet  of  ecclesial  life:  church  numerical  growth  and  decline,  
using  an  approach  inspired  by  behavioral  game  theory.  With  the  permission  of  Duke’s  
Independent  Review  Board  I  observed  sessions,  local  church  governing  bodies  in  the  
Presbyterian  Church  (U.S.A.),  play  two  versions  of  a  public  goods  game  to  determine  
whether  the  willingness  and  ability  of  leaders  to  cooperate,  defect,  reward,  and  punish  




This  work  is  dedicated  to  all  of  the  men  and  women  faithfully  leading  Christ’s  
church  who  were  once  excited  enough  to  become  theologicons  but  have  allowed  the  
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1. The Behavioral Turn 
One  of  the  current  thought  leaders  in  behavioral  economics  and  behavioral  game  
theory,  Colin  Camerer,  defines  behavioral  economics  simply  as  increasing  “the  
explanatory  power  of  economics  by  providing  it  with  more  realistic  psychological  
foundations.”1  This  definition  is  important  as  much  as  for  what  it  does  not  say  as  for  
what  it  does.  While  popularly  understood  to  be,  at  the  Brobdingnagian  end  of  the  
spectrum,  a  revolution  upending  all  of  classical  economic  theory  as  we  know  it  or,  at  the  
Lilliputian  end,  merely  a  sub-­‐‑disciplinary  side  show,  Camerer  frames  behavioral  
economics  as  modestly,  but  powerfully,  aiding  the  discipline  of  economics  in  doing  
better  what  it  was  already  doing.  In  other  words  behavioral  economics,  in  Camerer’s  
view,  is  not  an  entirely  new  field  but  rather  a  way  of  restoring  to  economics  ways  of  
thinking  and  understanding  that  became  lost  over  time.  When  one  applies  the  insights  
of  behavioral  theory  to  theology  and  practical  ministry,  the  importance  of  this  
conservative,  institutional  way  of  understanding  the  behavioral  turn  cannot  be  
overstated.  Just  as  behavioral  economics  represents  more  of  a  restoration  than  a  
revolution  in  economic  theory,  the  behavioral  theological  turn  merely  improves  the  
church’s  ability  to  faithfully  discern  and  plan  together  by  providing  a  more  realistic  
Christology  and  theological  anthropology.  The  behavioral  turn  will  not  save  theology  or  
                                                                                                              
    1  Colin  Camerer,  George  Loewenstein,  and  Matthew  Rabin,  eds.,  Advances  in  Behavioral  Economics:  The  
Roundtable  Series  in  Behavioral  Economics  (Princeton:  University  Press,  2003),  417-­‐‑418,  Kindle.  
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the  church  anymore  than  any  human  endeavor  might  as  the  triune  God  was,  is,  and  ever  
shall  be  the  foundation  and  salvation  of  the  church.  
The  history  of  the  behavioral  turn  in  economics  is  complicated.  While  behavioral  
economics  combines  economic  theory  with  psychological  insight,  it  is  important  to  note  
that  economics  initially  started  out  combining  economics  and  psychology.  While  Adam  
Smith  is  better  known  for  the  invisible  hand  from  his  Wealth  of  Nations,  Smith  also  wrote  
The  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments  in  which  he  articulated  psychological  motivations  for  
human  behavior  that  some  argue  are  as  profound  as  his  economic  theory.2    Pioneering  
economists  like  Jeremy  Bentham,  the  founder  of  modern  utilitarianism,  developed  his  
notion  of  utility  from  the  psychological  concept  of  affect.3  Others  point  out  the  immense  
importance  John  Maynard  Keynes  placed  upon  psychology  citing  his  generous  use  of  
terms  such  as  psychological  laws,  psychological  effect,  the  psychology  of  the  
community,  and  other  similar  phrases.4  Yet,  while  economists  may  have  started  out  
combining  economic  theory  with  psychological  wisdom,  this  easy  relationship  did  not  
last.  
Eager  to  place  economics  on  a  more  solid  footing,  economists  after  the  turn  of  the  
twentieth  century  were  hopeful  to  create  in  economics  a  more  positivist,  rigorous,  and  
                                                                                                              
2  Nava  Ashraf,  Colin  Camerer,  and  George  Lowenstein,  “Adam  Smith,  Behavioral  Economist,”  Journal  of  
Economic  Perspectives  19,  no.  3  (Summer  2005):  132.  
3  Paul Slovic et al., “Rational actors or rational fools: implications of the affect heuristic for behavioral 
economics,” Journal of Socio-Economics 31 (2002): 331. 
4  Wesley  Pech  and  Marcelo  Milan,  “Behavioral  economics  and  the  economics  of  Keynes,”  The  Journal  of  Socio-­‐‑
Economics  38  (2009):  893.  
     3  
scientific  discipline.5  This  scientific  positivism  assumed  human  beings  to  be  rational,  
meaning  they  are  capable  of  accurately  assessing  probability  between  alternatives,  
ranking  these  alternatives  in  order  of  expected  payoff  value,  and  a  consistency  in  
choosing  the  most  likely  alternatives  that  maximize  self-­‐‑interest.6  Further,  mainstream  
economics  “deduces  principles  of  economic  behavior  from  features  of  human  nature  
assumed  to  be  valid  at  all  times  and  in  all  cultures.”7  The  wholly  rational  homo  
economicus  assumed  by  mainstream  economists  in  much  of  the  twentieth  century  is  
something  akin  to  the  imaginary  frictionless  planes  and  air-­‐‑free  landscapes  students  are  
asked  to  visualize  when  learning  elementary  Newtonian  mechanics.  While  such  abstract  
perfection  helps  students  learn  the  basics,  the  problem,  according  to  behavioral  
economists,  is  that  students  forget  how  different  the  real  world  might  actually  be.  
While  the  full  flower  of  the  behavioral  economics  movement  does  not  come  into  
bloom  until  the  1980s,  many  significant  breaks  from  the  mainstream  occur  as  early  as  the  
1950s  with  figures  such  as  George  Katona,  credited  with  coining  the  term  ‘behavioral  
economics’,  and  Nobel  laureate  Herbert  Simon.8  Teaching  at  the  University  of  Michigan,  
Katona  was  uneasy  with  the  lack  of  empiricism  present  in  economic  departments.  
Katona’s  empirical  survey  work  for  the  Federal  Reserve  in  the  1940s  gave  revolutionary  
                                                                                                              
5  John  F.  Tomer,  “What  is  Behavioral  Economics?”  The  Journal  of  Socio-­‐‑Economics  36  (2007):  467.  
6  Herbert  Simon,  “A  Behavioral  Model  of  Rational  Choice,”  The  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics  69,  no.  1  
(1955):  100.  
7  B.  Yang  and  D.  Lester,  “New  Directions  for  Economics,”  Journal  of  Socio-­‐‑Economics  24  (1995):  436.  
8  Hamid  Hosseini,  “The  arrival  of  behavioral  economics:  from  Michigan,  or  the  Carnegie  School  in  the  1950s  
and  1960s?”  The  Journal  of  Socio-­‐‑Economics  32  (2003):  393.  
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new  insight  into  the  importance  of  consumer  behavior.9    Prior  to  Katona’s  work,  
economists  relied  on  models  alone,  believing  that  the  human  element  did  not  need  to  be  
factored  into  the  equation.  Thanks  to  Katona  actually  studying  how  real  humans  
behaved,  the  standard  models  became  far  more  helpful.  This  intellectual  strategy  of  
testing  an  economic  model  to  see  if  live  humans  behave  the  way  they  are  predicted  to  
behave  became  a  staple  after  the  behavioral  turn.  Not  surprisingly,  real  human  beings  
did  not  behave  entirely  as  the  models  predicted.  
Concurrent  with  George  Katona’s  work,  Nobel  laureate  Herbert  Simon  also  
pushed  the  boundaries  of  the  classical  economic  model.  As  early  as  1947  Simon  began  to  
publish  serious  doubts  concerning  the  perfect  rationality  the  classical  model  takes  for  
granted.10    Noting  that  actual  human  beings  never  have  enough  information  and  time  to  
make  perfectly  rational  decisions  to  maximize  their  utility,  Simon  proposed  instead  a  
neologism:  ‘satisficing’.11  Satisficing  describes  the  actual  human  behavior  of  assessing  
available  options,  choosing  from  among  them,  and  then  learning  to  be  satisfied  with  the  
outcome  whether  it  was  the  best  choice  as  defined  by  perfectly  rational  self-­‐‑interest  or  
not.  This  realism  regarding  observed  human  behavior  led  to  Simon’s  greatest  concept  
known  as  ‘bounded  rationality’.  With  bounded  rationality  Simon  acknowledged  that  
                                                                                                              
9  Hamid  Hosseini,  “George  Katona:  a  founding  father  of  old  behavioral  economics,”  The  Journal  of  Socio-­‐‑
Economics  40  (2011):  979.  
10  Hosseini,  “The  arrival  of  behavioral  economics,”  401.  
11  Herbert  A.  Simon,  “Bounded  Rationality  and  Organizational  Learning,”  in  Organizational  Learning:  
Papers  in  Honor  of  (and  by)  James  G.  March,  special  issue  Organization  Science  2,  no.  1,  (1991):  125-­‐‑134.  
  
     5  
humans  are  rational  but  only  within  certain  limits.  While  Simon  focused  mainly  on  the  
limits  of  knowledge,  later  psychologists  expanded  on  this  idea  of  bounded  rationality  to  
show  that  it  is  not  merely  what  we  do  not  know  but  what  we  think  we  know  that  can  be  
problematic.  
While  credit  must  be  given  to  Katona  and  Simon  for  their  groundbreaking  work,  
it  would  take  the  unusually  close  teamwork  of  psychologists  Amos  Tversky  and  Daniel  
Kahneman  to  bring  about  widespread  change  in  how  economists  thought  about  people.  
Benefitting  from  the  significant  developments  in  the  fields  of  cognitive  psychology  in  
the  1960s,  Tversky  and  Kahneman  developed  a  sophisticated  model  for  understanding  
Simon’s  bounded  rationality.  To  be  described  in  more  detail  in  a  following  section,  
Tversky  and  Kahneman  show  again  and  again  how  the  brain  relies  on  dual  processes  for  
understanding  and  relating  to  the  world.  While  most  of  the  time  these  dual  processes  
function  smoothly  and  give  us  an  adequate  sense  of  the  world,  all  too  often  short  cuts,  
known  as  heuristics,  produce  predictable  biases.  Through  a  series  of  phenomenally  
clever  experiments  Tversky  and  Kahneman  trained  their  sights  on  the  economic  world  
by  testing  some  of  the  predictions  economists  made  about  how  people  should  behave.  In  
a  1974  paper  this  duo  laid  out  their  theory  for  how  heuristics  can  cause  problems  for  
people  making  predictions  about  how  probable  certain  events  are,  and  in  1979  Tversky  
and  Kahneman  published  a  paper  applying  their  theory  to  experimental  data  showing  
that  people  do  not  behave  according  to  fundamental  economic  prediction.  This  1979  
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paper  on  ‘prospect  theory’  became  one  of  the  most  widely  cited  articles  ever  published  
by  Econometrica,  a  mainstream  economics  journal.12  
The  research  of  Katona  and  Simon  provided  economists  with  a  sense  that  people  
did  not  always  behave  the  way  models  predicted  they  should.  With  Tversky  and  
Kahneman  economists  now  had  a  theory  that  could  predict  this  ‘irrational’  behavior.  
After  these  insights  behavioral  economics  began  to  take  off.  In  1986  the  Society  for  the  
Advancement  of  Behavioral  Economics  met  at  the  University  of  Chicago,  the  first  
conference  to  promote  behavioral  economics.  In  1994  David  Laibson  became  the  first  
person  granted  an  economics  Ph.D.  with  a  behavioral  focus  and  then  hired  by  a  major  
university,  Harvard  University.  This  event  caused  such  a  stir  the  economics  reporter  for  
the  New  York  Times  reported  that  in  1994  behavioral  economics  had  “finally  arrived.”13  
In  1997  behavioral  economics  became  so  mainstream  the  conservative  Quarterly  Journal  
of  Economics  published  a  special  issue  devoted  entirely  to  the  new  perspective.14  Today,  
while  detractors  still  exist,  nearly  every  student  graduating  from  a  major  school  of  
business  will  have  at  least  some  exposure  to  the  ideas  of  behavioral  economics.  In  a  very  
short  time  this  interdisciplinary  tree  has  borne  a  surprising  amount  of  fruit.
                                                                                                              
12  Camerer,  Lowenstein,  and  Rabin,  Advances  in  Behavioral  Economics,  Kindle  locations  498-­‐‑499.  
13  Louis  Uchitelle,  “Following  the  Money  but  Also  the  Mind,”  New  York  Times,  February  11,  2001,  accessed  
January  8,  2014,  http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/11/business/following-­‐‑the-­‐‑money-­‐‑but-­‐‑also-­‐‑the-­‐‑
mind.html.    
14  Camerer,  Lowenstein,  and  Rabin,  Advances  in  Behavioral  Economics,  Kindle  locations  501-­‐‑502.  
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2. Understanding Behavioral Theory 
One  of  the  core  principles  of  behavioral  theory  is  that  human  beings  are,  to  some  
degree,  strangers  to  themselves.  The  ‘I’  of  which  one  is  aware,  the  ‘I’  that  thinks  and  
reflects  and  makes  decisions:  this  ‘I’  does  not  tell  the  whole  story  according  to  behavioral  
theory.  While  scholars  diverge  over  various  aspects  of  this  theory,  I  will  adopt  the  dual  
cognitive  model  developed  first  by  Keith  Stanovich  and  Richard  West  and  later  honed  
by  Amos  Tversky  and  Daniel  Kahneman  given  this  model’s  degree  of  influence.1  
Kahneman  describes  the  brain  as  being  like  two  characters:  humans  have  a  reactive  
automatic  self  of  which  they  remain  almost  entirely  unaware;  and  humans  have  a  more  
reflective  self  of  which  they  are  conscious.  Stanovich  and  West  referred  to  these  dual  
functions  as  System  1  and  System  2.  Counter  to  common  perception,  the  system  
responsible  for  nearly  all  decision  making  is  not  the  system  of  which  humans  are  most  
conscious.  A  great  majority  of  decision  making  occurs  at  the  level  of  System  1,  the  
automatic  system.  Only  perceptions  and  decisions  that  confound  System  1  get  pushed  
up  to  the  level  of  consciousness  and  then  must  be  handled  by  System  2.  This  dual  
processing  system  allows  humans  to  function  in  an  incredibly  complicated  environment.  
System  1  constantly  assesses  the  surrounding  world  for  threats  and  opportunities,  all  the  
while  leaving  System  2  free  to  think.  
                                                                                                              
1  Keith  E.  Stanovich  and  Richard  F.  West,  “Individual  Differences  in  Reasoning:  Implications  for  the  
Rationality  Debate,”  Behavioral  and  Brain  Sciences  23  (2000):  645–65.  
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To  understand  System  1  Kahneman  gives  the  example  of  driving  a  car  on  a  
crowded  highway  at  a  high  rate  of  speed  while  having  a  conversation  with  a  passenger.  
On  the  one  hand  the  brain  is  processing  an  enormous  amount  of  data:  keeping  track  of  
where  the  car  is  in  the  lane,  watching  where  other  vehicles  are  in  relation,  and  a  million  
other  details  all  in  constant  flux.  Yet,  while  System  1  is  seamlessly  keeping  tabs  on  the  
world  rushing  by,  the  reflective  System  2  is  able  to  hold  a  conversation  with  the  person  
sitting  in  the  passenger  seat.  In  contrast  imagine  a  situation  in  which  a  person  is  asked  to  
perform  a  simple  multiplication  question  in  their  head.  Due  to  training  most  people  are  
able  to  answer  simple  multiplication  in  their  heads  without  really  giving  it  much  effort.  
But  if  challenged  to  factor  24  X  43  without  the  use  of  paper,  immediately  most  
individuals  will  feel  the  need  to  close  their  eyes,  cease  their  conversations,  and  focus  
entirely  on  the  problem  at  hand.2  The  automatic  System  1  is  not  up  to  this  task  and  
immediately  sends  it  to  System  2  for  a  solution.  
The  wondrous  thing  about  this  cognitive  arrangement  is  how  efficient  it  is  most  
of  the  time.  Much  of  the  time  this  arrangement  works  well,  and  most  human  beings  are  
able  to  allocate  perception  and  decision  making  to  System  1  and  allow  System  2  to  think  
about  whatever  is  on  the  mind  without  too  much  difficulty.  Unfortunately,  the  
downside  to  this  arrangement  is  that  while  System  1  is  able  to  process  an  enormous  
amount  of  information,  the  way  it  processes  is  to  trade  quality  for  quantity.  Through  
                                                                                                              
2  Daniel  Kahneman,  Thinking,  Fast  and  Slow  (New  York:  Farrar,  Straus,  and  Giroux,  2011),  23,  Kindle.  
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experiment  after  experiment  Tversky  and  Kahneman  and  others  have  shown  that  
human  automatic  systems  rely  on  what  they  call  heuristics  in  order  to  process  enormous  
amounts  of  data  quickly.  A  heuristic  is  a  simple  rule  employed  by  the  brain  to  render  a  
judgment  regarding  a  perception.3  These  simple  rules,  or  patterns,  allow  the  brain  to  
work  quickly,  but  these  heuristics  often  lead  to  predictable  errors,  referred  to  as  
cognitive  biases.  Behavioral  theorists  have  identified  several  key  heuristics  and  related  
biases.  
The  availability  heuristic  refers  to  the  way  the  brain  makes  a  judgment  about  
how  likely  it  is  a  certain  event  will  take  place.4  Availability  refers  to  the  ease  with  which  
the  brain  can  bring  an  event  to  mind.  The  more  often  an  individual  has  heard  of  an  
event  occurring  or  the  more  emotionally  charged  the  event,  the  more  likely  it  is  the  brain  
will  think  of  an  event  regardless  of  the  actual  numerical  rates  of  incidence.  On  a  recent  
family  vacation  a  guide  asked  members  of  our  group  whether  anyone  was  afraid  of  
sharks.  Only  a  few  honest  people  raised  their  hands,  and  they  were  commended  for  
being  forthright.  Then,  the  guide  asked  the  group  who  was  afraid  of  coconuts.  Smiles  
were  seen  and  laughter  was  heard.  The  guide  proceeded  to  tell  the  group  that  rational  
people  should  be  far  more  concerned  about  coconuts  than  sharks  because  falling  
                                                                                                              
3  Thomas  Gilovich,  Dale  Griffin,  and  Daniel  Kahneman,  Heuristics  and  Biases:  The  Psychology  of  Intuitive  
Judgment  (New  York:  Cambridge  Press,  2002),  Kindle  locations  145-­‐‑146,  Kindle.  
4  Kahneman,  Thinking,  Fast  and  Slow,  129.  
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coconuts  kill  several  times  the  annual  rate  of  people  compared  to  sharks.5  Yet,  storing  
this  information  in  System  2  will  not  help  when  an  individual  snorkeling  along  a  reef  
encounters  a  black  tip  shark  for  the  first  time.  System  1,  working  through  an  availability  
heuristic,  will  instinctively  recall  newspaper  stories,  movies,  or  a  certain  John  William’s  
score  and  feel  a  surge  of  adrenaline  that  a  coconut  will  simply  never  produce.  The  
significance  of  this  heuristic  transcends  snorkeling.  Even  people  who  agree  intellectually  
that  climate  change  poses  a  serious  threat  will  never  feel  an  equivalent  visceral  sense  of  
fear.  The  availability  heuristic  makes  it  easy  for  people  to  believe  intellectually  a  
situation  is  threatening,  but  without  the  physical  sensation  of  fear  they  may  easily  fail  to  
act  due  to  a  lack  of  internal  prompting.  
One  of  the  most  baffling  heuristics  is  the  anchoring  and  adjustment  heuristic,  
commonly  referred  to  just  as  anchoring.6  When  asked  to  estimate  an  unknown  number,  
System  1  uses  an  ‘anchor  and  adjust’  method.7  The  anchor  refers  to  the  most  available  
known  number  that  seems  plausible  to  the  brain.  Then,  comparing  the  unknown  
number  the  brain  will  adjust  the  guess  up  or  down  relative  to  the  anchor.  Individuals  
consciously  apply  this  strategy  constantly  when  determining  the  timeline  of  an  event.  
Individuals  often  use  the  available  anchor  of  a  well-­‐‑known  date  (i.e.,  many  people  
remember  exactly  where  they  were  when  John  F.  Kennedy  was  assassinated  or  when  
                                                                                                              
5  Peter  Barss,  “Injuries  Due  to  Falling  Coconuts,”  The Journal of Trauma 24, no. 11 (1984): 990-1.  
6  Dan  Ariely,  Predictably  Irrational,  Revised  and  Expanded  Edition:  The  Hidden  Forces  That  Shape  Our  Decisions  
(San  Franciso:  Harper  Collins,  2010),  27,  Kindle.  
7  Kahneman,  Thinking,  Fast  and  Slow,  120.  
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9/11  occurred)  and  then  will  place  the  unknown  event  in  relation  to  that  known  anchor.  
The  great  challenge  of  the  anchoring  heuristic  is  the  power  the  anchor  has  over  human  
estimates.  When  prompted,  ‘primed’  is  the  technical  term,  with  a  low  or  high  number,  
experiments  demonstrate  that  estimates  will  rise  or  decline  in  relation  to  this  prime.  In  
one  of  the  most  absurd  examples  students  were  asked  to  write  down  the  last  two  digits  
of  their  social  security  numbers  on  a  piece  of  paper.  Then,  the  students  participated  in  an  
auction.  The  students  who  wrote  down  higher  social  security  numbers  valued  items  
significantly  higher  than  did  students  with  lower  numbers.8  The  baffling  aspect  of  this  
experiment  is  that  when  asked  if  writing  down  their  social  security  number  affected  
their  estimates,  participants  were  adamant  that  it  did  not.  System  2  simply  is  not  always  
aware  of  the  decisions  System  1  is  making.  
The  representativeness  heuristic  is  similar  to  the  availability  heuristic  in  that  this  
heuristic  aims  to  help  an  individual  make  a  judgment  regarding  probability.  With  the  
representative  heuristic  System  1  divides  the  world  into  categories  and  then  makes  
decisions  regarding  how  well  an  individual  or  event  fits  into  that  category.  Kahneman  
provides  a  theoretical  example  of  how  likely  it  is  a  well-­‐‑dressed  stranger  on  a  subway  
reading  the  New  York  Times  holds  a  Ph.D.  System  1  views  either/or  questions  as  being  
equally  likely.  Therefore,  all  the  brain  can  do  is  compare  the  person  on  the  train  with  
preset  categories  to  decide  how  likely  it  is  that  this  stranger  does  or  does  not  fit  into  the  
                                                                                                              
8  Ariely,  Predictably  Irrational,  30-­‐‑31.  
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Ph.D.  category.  Given  that  the  attire  and  the  fact  that  the  person  is  reading  the  New  
York  Times  is  consistent  with  the  Ph.D.  category,  most  people  will  overestimate  how  
likely  it  is  that  the  person  holds  a  Ph.D.9  As  with  all  heuristics,  Kahneman  cautions  the  
wise  person  not  to  trust  their  gut  and  rely  on  System  1  to  make  a  probability  judgment  
in  cases  like  this  example.  
The  list  of  cognitive  biases  and  effects  stemming  from  these  and  other  heuristics  
is  voluminous.  The  most  important  biases  and  effects,  however,  bear  discussion.  Loss  
aversion  represents  one  of  the  most  powerful  and  prevalent  cognitive  biases.  Loss  
aversion,  simply  put,  refers  to  the  pain  humans  feel  regarding  losing  something  relative  
to  the  positive  feelings  they  experience  gaining  it.10  Through  experimentation  theorists  
demonstrate  that  the  pain  of  losing  something  is  double  the  experience  of  gaining  the  
same  thing.11  Given  that  a  perfectly  rational  person  should  value  equivalent  gain  and  
loss  as  being  equal,  loss  aversion  accounts  for  why  people  hold  on  to  underperforming  
investments  or  why  people  stay  in  bad  relationships  in  which  they  have  invested  time.  
Anecdotally,  every  pastor  knows  by  experience  how  much  easier  it  is  to  start  something  
new  at  a  congregation  than  it  is  to  shut  a  program  down.  Even  congregations  reluctant  
                                                                                                              
9  Kahneman,  Thinking,  Fast  and  Slow,  151.  
10  Dan  Ariely,  The  Upside  of  Irrationality:  The  Unexpected  Benefits  of  Defying  Logic  at  Work  and  at  Home  (San  
Francisco:  Harper  Collins,  2010),  Kindle  locations  423-­‐‑424,  Kindle.  
11  Daniel  Kahneman,  Jack  L.  Knetsch,  and  Richard  H.  Thaler,  “Anomalies:  The  Endowment  Effect,  Loss  
Aversion,  and  Status  Quo  Bias,”  The  Journal  of  Economic  Perspectives  5,  no.  1  (Winter,  1991),  200.  
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to  change  prefer  starting  a  new  ministry  to  ending  a  cherished  tradition  even  if  few  seem  
to  still  care  about  it.  
Status  quo  bias  describes  the  human  tendency  to  accept  default  settings.  Status  
quo  bias  can  create  massive  challenges  involving  choices  like  organ  donation  and  
retirement  savings.  The  United  Kingdom  and  the  Netherlands  have  an  organ  donation  
rate  of  only  17.7%  and  27.5%  respectively,  while  Belgium  and  France  boast  a  rate  of  98%  
and  99.91%.  While  many  will  speculate  regarding  cultural  or  religious  explanations,  the  
answer  is  that  countries  with  low  organ  donation  rates  like  Germany,  Denmark,  the  
United  Kingdom,  and  the  Netherlands  require  drivers  to  opt  in  to  organ  donation  at  the  
Department  of  Motor  Vehicles.12  The  default  choice  is  non-­‐‑donation.  However,  in  the  
countries  where  the  DMV  default  is  set  to  donation,  countries  see  nearly  100%  rates  of  
participation.  Status  quo  bias  is  quite  literally  a  matter  of  life  and  death  in  countries  
requiring  individuals  to  opt  in  to  organ  donation.  Cass  Sunstein  and  Richard  Thaler  
lamented  a  similar  problem  at  the  University  of  Chicago  where  they  teach.  Every  year  in  
November  employees  experienced  an  open  enrollment  season  when  they  made  
decisions  about  health  insurance  and  retirement.  Every  year  the  default  setting  went  
back  to  zero.  If  an  employee  had  been  participating  in  the  401K  plan,  every  November  
their  choice  reverted  to  non-­‐‑participation;  they  had  to  consciously  choose  to  opt  in  each  
year.  The  effects  were  predictably  abysmal.  Many  busy  professionals  assumed  they  were  
                                                                                                              
12  Eric  J.  Johnson  and  Daniel  G.  Goldstein,  “Do  Defaults  Save  Lives?”  Science  302  (2003),  1338.  
     14  
saving  for  their  future  when  in  fact  they  were  not.  Thanks  to  Sunstein  and  Thaler,  who  
presented  this  information  to  the  administrative  officers  of  the  University  of  Chicago,  
the  institution  has  now  changed  its  policy.  Every  November  rather  than  resetting  to  
zero,  the  choice  the  employee  made  in  the  previous  year  is  now  the  default  setting  for  
the  next  plan  year.  The  employees  are  always  free  to  opt  out,  but  now  it  is  non-­‐‑
participation  that  requires  an  active  choice.  
Framing  effects  refer  to  the  fact  that  how  the  way  a  choice  is  put  to  an  individual  
can  significantly  impact  what  an  individual  chooses.  Amos  Tversky  and  Daniel  
Kahneman  tested  the  framing  effect  asking  two  groups  to  make  a  choice  regarding  a  
hypothetical  medical  procedure.  The  information  they  used  with  both  groups  was  
numerically  equivalent,  but  they  framed  the  question  for  the  first  group  using  a  
‘survival’  frame,  and  they  framed  the  question  for  the  second  group  using  a  ‘mortality’  
frame.  Both  groups  must  choose  between  surgery  and  radiation.  The  first  group  is  told  
that  of  100  people  having  surgery  90  live  through  the  post  operative  period,  68  are  alive  
at  the  end  of  the  first  year,  and  34  are  alive  at  the  end  of  five  years.  Of  100  people  having  
radiation  therapy  all  live  through  the  treatment,  77  are  alive  at  the  end  of  one  year,  and  
22  are  alive  at  the  end  of  five  years.  In  the  mortality  frame  group  the  numerical  
information  is  exactly  the  same,  however  Tversky  and  Kahneman  invert  the  numbers  to  
describe  how  many  patients  died.  So,  out  of  100  patients  having  surgery,  10  died  in  the  
post-­‐‑operative  period,  32  are  dead  at  the  end  of  the  first  year,  and  66  are  dead  after  five  
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years.  The  numbers  are  equally  reversed  for  the  radiation  choice  in  the  mortality  frame.  
The  data  shared  is  exactly  the  same.  Yet,  focusing  on  the  number  of  those  who  lived  
versus  those  who  died  makes  an  enormous  difference  to  those  choosing  between  the  
two  options  with  the  mortality  frame  making  people  far  more  risk  averse.13  
Confirmation  bias  is  the  habit  of  noticing  information  that  affirms  the  beliefs  
people  already  hold  and  discounts  information  that  challenges  them.  In  Decisive  Chip  
and  Dan  Heath  cite  a  study  of  smokers  done  back  in  the  1960s.  Smokers  were  far  more  
likely  to  express  interest  in  reading  stories  in  the  newspaper  titled  “Smoking  Does  Not  
Lead  to  Lung  Cancer”  than  they  were  stories  titled  “Smoking  Leads  to  Lung  Cancer.”14  
Confirmation  bias  suggests  that  individuals  are  interested  in  the  opinions  of  others  just  
as  long  as  the  positions  support  what  they  already  think.  Thanks  to  cable  news,  the  
Internet,  and  confirmation  bias,  it  is  easier  than  ever  for  individuals  to  surround  
themselves  with  multiple  voices  offering  the  same  opinion  giving  people  the  mere  
illusion  of  being  well  informed.  Confirmation  bias  poses  a  unique  challenge  to  leaders.  
One  survey  confirms  that  leaders,  especially  successful  leaders,  are  more  likely  to  suffer  
from  confirmation  bias.  Matthew  Heyward  and  Donald  Hambrick  conducted  a  study  on  
CEOs  leading  companies  through  times  of  acquisition.15  Disturbed  by  the  fact  that  so  
                                                                                                              
13  Amos  Tversky  and  Daniel  Kahneman,  “Rational  Choice  and  the  Framing  of  Decisions,”  The  Journal  of  
Business  59,  no.  4,  part  2:  The  Behavioral  Foundations  of  Economic  Theory  (1986),  S254.    
14  Chip  Heath  and  Dan  Heath,  Decisive:  How  to  Make  Better  Choices  in  Life  and  Work  (New  York:  Crown  
Publishing,  2013),  Kindle  locations  185-­‐‑187,  Kindle.  
15  Heath  and  Heath,  Decisive,  Kindle  locations  1440-­‐‑1441.  
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many  CEOs  make  eye-­‐‑popplingly  expensive  deals  that  fail  to  produce  value,  Heyward  
and  Hambrick  suspected  that  hubris  and  confirmation  bias  might  be  partly  to  blame.  
They  surveyed  over  one  hundred  large  acquisitions  to  see  whether  the  success  of  the  
acquisition  was  conditioned  by  the  potential  for  confirmation  bias  in  the  CEO.  They  
looked  for  CEOs  who  were  praised  by  the  media,  could  boast  of  recent  high  corporate  
performance,  and  those  who  were  paid  significantly  more  highly  in  comparison  to  the  
people  who  worked  under  them.  Heyward  and  Hambrick  figured  that  CEOs  who  
scored  high  in  these  categories  would  have  ample  reason  to  think  highly  of  themselves,  
thus  falling  even  more  prey  than  normal  to  confirmation  bias.  And,  indeed,  they  were  
correct.  The  more  highly  CEOs  were  likely  to  think  of  themselves,  the  more  they  were  
willing  to  make  a  bad  deal,  presumably  thinking  they  were  seeing  something  no  one  
else  could.  
Priming  effects,  as  noted  under  the  anchoring  heuristic  above,  offer  some  of  the  
most  striking  examples  of  the  disconnect  that  can  occur  between  System  1  and  System  2  
thinking.  In  priming  studies  subjects  are  studied  to  see  what  influence,  if  any,  the  mere  
presence  of  a  number,  image,  or  phrase  can  have.  As  in  the  previous  example  of  
students  primed  with  the  last  two  numbers  of  their  social  security  number,  the  effects  of  
priming  can  be  disturbing  for  individuals  who  cherish  ideas  about  self-­‐‑control  and  
autonomy.  Priming  effects  demonstrate  just  how  suggestible  human  beings  can  be.  In  
one  particularly  fascinating  study  students  were  asked  to  walk  down  a  hallway.  
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Students  who  were  primed  with  words  that  suggested  old  age  walked  measurably  
slower  down  the  hall  than  students  who  were  primed  with  other  words.  Termed  the  
‘ideomotor’  effect,  priming  not  only  influenced  how  these  students  thought  but  also  
how  they  physically  moved.  
Ironically,  despite  all  of  the  evidence  of  human  limitation  another  pervasive  bias  
is  the  optimism  bias,  describing  the  pervasive  tendency  towards  exceptionalism:  others  
might  be  biased,  but  we  are  not.  Sunstein  and  Thaler  humorously  remark  that  when  it  
comes  to  judging  one’s  own  performance,  we  are  all  from  Lake  Wobegon:  we  see  
ourselves  as  all  above  average.16  In  one  study  90%  of  drivers  believed  they  were  above  
average  in  their  driving  abilities,  and  in  another  study  at  a  large  college  94%  of  
professors  believed  they  were  above  average  teachers,  stretching  the  meaning  of  average  
far  beyond  the  breaking  point.17  The  optimism  bias  carries  an  important  message  to  
decision  makers  in  two  ways.  First,  the  optimism  bias  stands  as  a  warning  to  decision  
makers  not  to  trust  in  their  optimistic  feelings  regarding  plans  and  decisions.  Decision  
makers  should  know  that  their  gut  will  often  feel  positively  about  a  plan  or  decision  
even  when  there  is  no  good  reason  for  this  sense  of  well-­‐‑being.  In  his  famous  study  that  
will  be  discussed  more  fully  in  a  later  section  Philip  Tetlock  found  that  when  experts  
expressed  100%  confidence  in  an  opinion,  they  turned  out  to  be  wrong  23%  of  the  time.  
                                                                                                              
16  Cass  R.  Sunstein  and  Richard  H.  Thaler,  Nudge:  Improving  Decisions  About  Health,  Wealth,  and  Happiness,  
(New  Haven:  Yale  University  Press,  2008),  32,  Kindle.  
17  Sunstein  and  Thaler,  Nudge,  32.  
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It  is  one  thing  to  be  wrong  when  you  do  not  feel  certain  about  an  answer,  but  to  feel  
absolutely  certain  you  are  right  and  still  be  wrong  nearly  one  out  of  four  times  is  
humbling  indeed.  
There  is  another  side  to  the  optimism  bias  that  has  to  do  with  messaging.  Leaders  
are  not  the  only  people  affected  by  the  optimism  bias.  The  people  being  led  by  decision  
makers  also  believe  their  judgment  is  above  average.  Leaders  who  fail  to  exercise  
caution  when  challenging  the  optimism  bias  will  suffer  the  consequences.  Jimmy  
Carter’s  1979  address  to  the  American  people,  popularly  referred  to  as  the  malaise  
speech,  offers  leaders  a  grim  warning  in  this  regard.  On  a  more  positive  note  leaders  
who  frame  messaging  in  light  of  the  optimism  bias  will  communicate  their  ideas  with  
great  effectiveness.  Robert  Cialdini  led  a  study  in  the  National  Petrified  Forest  to  
determine  the  most  effective  signage  for  reducing  the  incidence  of  people  removing  
petrified  wood  from  the  park.18  The  study  compared  the  effectiveness  of  signs  that  
emphasized  a  negative  message  versus  a  positive  one.  Negative  signs  expressed  how  
poor  behavior  had  deleterious  effects  on  the  park;  positive  signs  emphasized  how  
individual  compliance  made  a  difference.  Cialdini  theorized  that  the  positive  messaging  
would  be  more  effective,  and  his  hypothesis  proved  correct.  Church  leaders  should  
think  twice  before  attempting  to  shame  congregations  into  action  through  negative  
messaging;  it  is  likely  that  they  may  achieve  exactly  the  opposite  of  what  they  intend.  
                                                                                                              
18  Sunstein  and  Thaler,  Nudge,  67.  
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In  what  might  be  termed  an  affect  bias,  intense  emotional  states  themselves  have  
an  enormous  impact  on  human  cognition.  While  this  may  seem  like  common  sense,  
what  is  fascinating  is  how  little  understanding  individuals  have  of  their  motives  and  
likely  decision  making  from  one  emotional  state  to  another.  In  what  scholars  refer  to  as  
an  empathy  gap,  participants  in  experiments  designed  to  create  emotionally  cold  and  
hot  environments,  environments  privileging  System  2  and  System  1  respectively,  
participants  made  different  decisions  in  these  two  states.  Not  only  did  subjects  make  
different  decisions  in  these  emotional  states,  but  also  when  surveyed  afterwards  
participants  in  one  state  showed  little  comprehension  of  the  decisions  they  made  in  the  
other.  In  a  study  with  phenomenal  value  for  public  health  Dan  Ariely  asked  young  men  
a  series  of  questions  regarding  sexual  decision  making:  questions  such  as  condom  use  
and  whether  participants  would  consider  having  sex  with  someone  they  do  not  know  
well.  The  men  answered  these  questions  first  in  a  cold  state,  and  then  they  were  asked  to  
masturbate  while  looking  at  sexualized  images  and  answer  the  questions  again.19  Not  
surprisingly  the  men  were  far  less  risk  averse  in  the  hot  state.  What  was  significant  
about  the  study,  though,  was  the  response  of  the  participants  in  a  cold  state  when  they  
viewed  their  responses  recorded  in  a  hot  state.  Many  of  the  men  expressed  surprise,  and  
some  even  denied  that  they  could  have  answered  some  of  the  questions  in  the  way  they  
                                                                                                              
19  Ariely,  Predictably  Irrational,  121.  
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did.  It  was  as  if  the  men  in  one  state  simply  could  not  understand  the  person  they  
became  in  another.20  
Similar  to  the  way  in  which  changing  emotional  states  sway  perception  and  
judgment,  Dan  Ariely  studies  the  way  in  which  different  states  of  perceived  relatedness  
change  how  people  interact.  Referring  to  these  states  as  social  and  market  norms,  Ariely  
describes  the  difference  using  a  thought  experiment  he  does  not  personally  recommend.  
Ariely  asks  one  to  imagine  attending  a  Thanksgiving  feast  lovingly  prepared  by  one’s  
mother-­‐‑in-­‐‑law:  “The  festivities  continue  into  the  late  afternoon.  You  loosen  your  belt  
and  sip  a  glass  of  wine.  Gazing  fondly  across  the  table  at  your  mother-­‐‑in-­‐‑law,  you  rise  to  
your  feet  and  pull  out  your  wallet.  ‘Mom,  for  all  the  love  you’ve  put  into  this,  how  much  
do  I  owe  you?’  you  say  sincerely.  As  silence  descends  on  the  gathering,  you  wave  a  
handful  of  bills.  ‘Do  you  think  three  hundred  dollars  will  do  it?  No,  wait,  I  should  give  
you  four  hundred!’  This  is  not  a  picture  that  Norman  Rockwell  would  have  painted.  A  
glass  of  wine  falls  over;  your  mother-­‐‑in-­‐‑law  stands  up  red-­‐‑faced;  your  sister-­‐‑in-­‐‑law  
shoots  you  an  angry  look;  and  your  niece  bursts  into  tears.  Next  year’s  Thanksgiving  
celebration,  it  seems,  may  be  a  frozen  dinner  in  front  of  the  television  set.”21  In  the  social  
norm  people  give  and  receive  favors  without  asking  for  any  kind  of  immediate  payment  
in  a  fluid  system  of  reciprocity.  In  a  market  norm,  on  the  other  hand,  goods  and  services  
                                                                                                              
20  Ariely,  Predictably  Irrational,  127.  
21  Ariely,  Predictably  Irrational,  75-­‐‑76.    
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are  offered  in  exchange  for  payment.  In  contrast  to  the  social  norm,  little  is  fluid  in  a  
market  norm.  Economic  utility  demands  that  services  rendered  merit  fair  payment;  not  a  
penny  more,  but  not  a  penny  less,  either.  These  different  social  and  market  contexts  
change  how  humans  act  and  what  they  are  willing  to  do  for  one  another.  
Ariely  and  others  have  found  volunteers  in  laboratory  conditions  who  are  asked  
to  perform  simple  tasks  work  harder  and  are  more  willing  to  help  others  than  those  who  
perceive  themselves  to  be  paid.  Real  world  examples  of  this  phenomenon  abound  as  
well.  Ariely  cites  the  counterintuitive  experience  of  the  AARP  in  their  attempt  to  attain  
legal  help  for  their  membership.  At  first  leaders  in  the  AARP  asked  lawyers  to  offer  a  
low  rate  of  thirty  dollars  per  hour  to  needy  retirees.  Finding  very  few  lawyers  willing  to  
do  this,  the  AARP  changed  tactics  and  asked  lawyers  to  offer  their  services  for  free.  
When  asked  to  work  pro  bono  the  lawyers  overwhelmingly  obliged.22  Although  many  
think  one  gets  what  one  pays  for,  different  social  and  market  norms  demonstrate  that  
this  premise  is  often  far  from  the  case.  Given  the  complicated  ways  in  which  the  church  
mixes  social  and  market  economies  with  a  mix  of  paid  and  volunteer  staff,  ecclesial  
leaders  need  to  pay  especially  close  attention  to  how  the  market  or  social  norm  
established  will  nudge  congregational  behavior.  
Behavioralists  also  study  the  way  changes  in  context  affect  perception  itself.  The  
value  attribution  bias  describes  the  way  humans  value  people  and  objects  differently  
                                                                                                              
22  Ariely,  Predictably  Irrational,  79.  
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when  they  are  presented  in  different  settings.  Ori  and  Rom  Brafman  describe  a  vivid  
demonstration  of  value  attribution  that  took  place  in  2007.  In  the  L’Enfant  Plaza  subway  
station  in  Washington,  DC  commuters  streamed  past  a  man  dressed  in  jeans  and  a    
T-­‐‑shirt  playing  the  violin.  The  man  playing  the  violin  was  Joshua  Bell,  one  of  the  most  
well  known  and  in-­‐‑demand  living  violinists.  Yet,  this  hoard  of  commuters  walked  past  
Bell’s  impromptu  concert  of  Bach  sonatas  and  partitas  without  so  much  as  noticing.  Of  
the  1,097  people  who  walked  by  only  one  man  stopped  to  listen  for  a  few  moments,  two  
kids  gawked,  and  one  woman  who  recognized  the  famous  violinist  was  thrilled.  The  
reason  so  many  walked  past  this  man  they  would  otherwise  gladly  pay  money  to  hear  
play?  The  context  in  which  Bell  was  playing  and  the  way  he  was  dressed  did  not  signal  
the  people  walking  by  that  they  should  attribute  value.  Value  attribution  suggests  that  
presentation  plays  a  far  more  significant  role  than  performance  does,  in  spite  of  how  
humans  tell  their  children  never  to  judge  a  book  by  its  cover.23  
Closely  tied  to  value  attribution  is  inattentional  blindness,  the  name  given  the  
phenomenon  describing  what  happens  when  average  people  fail  to  perceive  what  is  
obvious  due  to  its  unexpected  nature.24  Such  events  include  mundane  appearances  of  
pedestrians  and  motorcycles  to  the  absurd  invisible  gorilla  made  famous  by  Christopher  
Chabris  and  Daniel  Simons.  Chabris  and  Simons  asked  subjects  to  watch  a  video  of  
                                                                                                              
23  Ori  Brafman  and  Rom  Brafman,  Sway:  The  Irresistible  Pull  of  Irrational  Behavior  (New  York:  Broadway  
Books,  2008),  49-­‐‑50.  
24  Christopher  Chabris  and  Daniel  Simons,  The  Invisible  Gorilla:  And  Other  Ways  Our  Intuitions  Deceive  Us  
(New  York:  Crown  Publishing,  2010),  6,  Kindle.  
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basketball  players  dressed  in  white  and  black  passing  a  ball  back  and  forth  counting  the  
number  of  passes  made  by  the  white  team.  In  the  middle  of  a  video  a  person  wearing  a  
gorilla  suit  enters  the  picture,  beats  its  chest,  and  leaves  the  screen.  At  the  conclusion  of  
the  video  participants  record  the  number  of  passes  made  by  the  white  team  and  then  are  
asked  whether  they  saw  a  gorilla.  In  this  study  as  well  as  in  repeated  studies  only  
around  50%  of  participants  report  seeing  the  gorilla.25  Even  more  remarkably,  Chabris  
and  Simons  collaborated  on  what  Chabris  and  Simons  call  the  door  study  in  which  an  
experimenter  pretends  to  ask  a  stranger  for  directions.  Then,  confederates  interrupt  the  
conversation  carrying  a  large  door  hiding  a  third  confederate.  As  the  door  passes,  the  
third  confederate  replaces  the  original  experimenter  who  was  asking  for  directions.  
Again,  roughly  50%  of  people  carry  on  giving  directions  with  this  new  face  oblivious  to  
the  fact  that  they  are  now  speaking  to  an  entirely  different  person.26  Chabris  and  Simons  
note  we  are  not  only  prone  to  inattentional  blindness  but  ‘change  blind’  as  well  and  
conclude  that  when  engaged  in  one  activity  average  people  simply  are  not  able  to  
adequately  perform  other  tasks.  Further,  when  people  are  not  expecting  to  see  
something  they  often  do  not,  even  when  it  is  right  in  front  of  their  eyes.  
Many  more  biases  exist,  but  these  examples  are  enough  to  provide  a  picture  of  
human  beings  that  radically  complicates  the  understanding  of  rationality,  will,  and  the  
                                                                                                              
25  Chabris  and  Simons,  The  Invisible  Gorilla,  6.  
26  Chabris  and  Simons,  The  Invisible  Gorilla,  59-­‐‑60.  
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self.  Whereas  humans,  seemingly  by  default,  identify  the  self  with  reflective  System  2  
thinking,  the  findings  of  behavioral  theory  suggest  that  System  1  is  far  more  involved  in  
our  decision-­‐‑making  processes  from  moment  to  moment.  Psychologist  Jonathan  Haidt  
strikingly  refers  to  how  human  beings  are  like  tiny  riders  on  enormous  elephants.27  The  
rational  System  2  part  of  the  human  brain  represents  the  tiny  riders  sitting  astride  the  
enormous,  reactive  System  1  elephants.  While  Haidt  and  others  do  not  go  so  far  as  to  say  
that  the  conscious,  reflective  human  selves  are  entirely  unable  to  influence  the  direction  
in  which  their  elephants  travel,  Haidt  argues  that  much  of  the  time  human  reflective  
selves  act  like  presidential  press  secretaries,  fashioning  after  the  fact  reasons  for  why  
elephantine  emotional  selves  feel  and  move  the  way  they  do.  
The  implications  of  this  work  for  the  practice  of  theology  and  ministry  are  vast  
with  potential  ramifications  for  Christology,  theological  anthropology,  soteriology,  and  
hamartiology  in  particular.  Since  Christians  claim  Christ  as  fully  God  and  fully  human,  
how  does  this  behavioral  understanding  of  humanity  impact  the  understanding  of  
Christ?  What  do  these  findings  mean  for  understanding  theological  anthropology,  how  
humans  relate  to  God?  Given  the  importance  of  volition  in  terms  of  some  
understandings  of  salvation  and  sin,  what  does  it  mean  to  make  a  choice  for  Christ  or  to  
sin  in  light  of  this  sustained  assault  against  what  is  commonly  referred  to  as  free  will?  
                                                                                                              
27  Jonathan  Haidt,  The  Righteous  Mind:  Why  Good  People  Are  Divided  by  Politics  and  Religion  (New  York:  
Random  House,  2012),  Kindle  locations  943-­‐‑945,  Kindle.  
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Moreover,  what  should  theology  and  the  practice  of  ministry  look  like  as  a  result?  Do  
current  methods  emphasizing  reason,  academics  or  pastors  laboring  over  a  text  alone  in  
their  studies,  provide  an  adequate  safeguard  against  the  predictable  irrationality  
stemming  from  cognitive  biases,  particularly  the  confirmation  bias?  
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3. The Chalcedonian Christ with a Rational Soul 
When  it  comes  to  understanding  human  beings,  Karl  Barth’s  words  continue  to  
ring  true:  “The  nature  of  the  man  Jesus  alone  is  the  key  to  the  problem  of  human  
nature.”1  As  significant  as  the  findings  of  cognitive  psychology  and  behavioral  
economics  are,  Jesus  Christ  is  the  appropriate  starting  place  for  Christian  theology.  If  the  
findings  of  behavioral  theory  fail  to  relate  to  Jesus  Christ  in  a  meaningful  way  or,  worse  
yet,  contradict  the  person  Christians  know  through  Scripture  by  the  power  of  the  Holy  
Spirit,  then  these  findings  might  be  interesting  to  the  church  but  would  constitute  at  best  
a  distraction.  The  question  that  has  to  be  answered  before  moving  toward  any  kind  of  
behavioral  theology  is  the  question  Jesus  asked  his  disciples  then  and  now:  “Who  do  
you  say  that  I  am?”  (Mark  8:29  NRSV).  
The  ecumenical  council  of  Chalcedon  provides  the  most  helpful  framework  for  
understanding  the  person  of  Jesus  Christ.  While  the  question  of  the  Son’s  relationship  to  
the  Father  was  at  least  politically  settled  at  Nicaea  with  the  church  accepting  the  Son  
being  homoousious,  consubstantial,  with  the  Father,  the  question  of  the  relationship  
between  Christ’s  humanity  and  divinity  remained  in  dispute.  The  Chalcedonian  formula  
that  emerges  succeeds  by  outlining  a  Holy  mystery.  At  Chalcedon  the  church  declares  
Christ  to  be  both  fully  divine  and  fully  human.  In  one  person,  being  consubstantial  with  
                                                                                                              
1  Karl  Barth,  Church  Dogmatics  Vol.  III:  The  Doctrine  of  Creation,  Part  2,  trans.  H.  Knight,  G.W.  Bromiley,  J.K.S.  
Reid,  and  R.H.  Fuller,  eds.  G.W.  Bromiley  and  T.F.  Torrance  (Peabody,  MA:  Hendrickson  Publishers,  2010),  
136.  
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the  Father,  Christ’s  humanity  and  his  divinity  are  separate  yet  inseparable;  they  are  
joined  but  not  confused.2  Athanasius  emphasizes  this  mysterious  union  of  divinity  and  
humanity:  “Thus,  even  while  present  in  a  human  body  and  himself  quickening  it,  he  
was,  without  inconsistency,  quickening  the  universe  as  well,  and  was  in  every  process  of  
nature.”3  Athanasius  particularly  lifts  up  how  while  in  his  divinity  Christ  is  unfettered,  
Christ’s  humanity  is  real  and  embodied  in  every  way:  “Accordingly,  when  inspired  
writers  on  this  matter  speak  of  him  as  eating  and  being  born  …  because  the  actual  body  
which  ate,  was  born,  and  suffered,  belonged  to  none  other  but  to  the  Lord:  and  because,  
having  become  man,  it  was  proper  for  these  things  to  be  predicated  of  him  as  man,  to  
show  him  to  have  a  body  in  truth,  and  not  in  seeming.”4  
The  Chalcedonian  formula  and  Athanasius  go  to  great  lengths  to  show  how  in  
the  person  of  Jesus  Christ  God  can  take  true,  human  flesh  and  remain  true  God.  Yet  the  
emphasis  of  the  council  is  that  Jesus  Christ  is  both  human  and  divine.  The  council  is  less  
helpful,  however,  when  it  comes  to  the  question  of  the  nature  of  Christ’s  humanity  itself.  
When  the  council  claims  Jesus  to  be  fully  human,  what  exactly  do  they  mean?  One  
concern,  the  issue  of  Jesus’  rationality,  raises  a  particularly  significant  question  in  light  
of  what  behavioralists  posit  about  the  limits  of  human  reason.  The  council,  in  
concurrence  with  the  earlier  Nicene  Creed,  describes  Christ  as  having  a  ‘rational  soul’,  a  
                                                                                                              
2  Richard  Norris,  The  Christological  Controversy  (Philadelphia:  Fortress  Press,  1980),  31.  
3  Edward  R.  Hardy,  ed.,  Christology  of  the  Later  Fathers  (Philadelphia:  Westminster  Press,  1954),  71.  
4  Hardy,  Christology  of  the  Later  Fathers,  72.  
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ψύύχες  λόόγικες  and  a  body.5  What  exactly  does  it  mean  to  be  rational,  and  what  does  it  
mean  to  say  that  Christ  has  a  rational  soul?  These  are  crucial  questions  upon  which  the  
usefulness  of  behavioral  theory  in  a  Christian  context  hangs.  
Divergent  views  swirl  over  how  best  to  define  rationality.  While  it  would  not  be  
appropriate  in  this  thesis  to  devote  time  to  an  exhaustive  treatment  of  the  many  and  
varied  understandings  of  rationality,  three  competing  notions  of  rationality  in  addition  
to  the  concept  of  bounded  rationality  discussed  earlier  demand  a  hearing:  the  
instrumental  rationality  underpinning  the  standard  economic  model,  the  nuanced  
Christological  ‘superrationality’  of  Sarah  Coakley,  and  the  two-­‐‑sided  ‘predictable  
irrationality’  creatively  researched  by  Dan  Ariely.  While  at  first  these  three  views  appear  
mutually  exclusive,  what  will  become  apparent  is  a  strong  disconnect  between  the  
instrumental  view  of  rationality  and  the  latter  two.  Further,  while  Coakley  and  Ariely’s  
views  upon  first  blush  seem  to  entirely  contrast  with  Coakley  defending  a  wider  view  of  
rationality  and  Ariely  reveling  in  human  predictable  irrationality,  I  will  show  a  
consonance  between  their  arguments  not  immediately  obvious.  
In  the  previous  discussion  concerning  the  behavioral  turn  attention  was  given  to  
Herbert  Simon’s  critique  of  the  assumptions  economists  were  making  regarding  human  
ability  to  intuitively  understand  how  to  maximize  utility  given  limited  knowledge  and  
finite  time  and  energy.  At  this  point,  it  is  worth  being  clearer  about  the  view  of  
                                                                                                              
5  Hardy,  Christology  of  the  Later  Fathers,  373.  
     29  
rationality  Simon’s  satisficing  and  bounded  rationality  challenged.  The  view  of  
rationality  prevalent  in  Simon’s  day  and  very  much  still  operative  forms  the  economic  
standard  model.  This  model  rests  on  three  foundations:  humanity  should  be  understood  
individually;  rational  individuals  are  self-­‐‑interested;  and  rational  individuals  always  
make  choices  that  maximize  their  utility.6  The  power  of  instrumental  rationality  must  
certainly  be  respected.  Free  markets  driven  by  individuals  pursuing  individual  
economic  interests  have,  in  many  instances,  created  conditions  in  which  jobs  paying  a  
living  wage  are  plentiful  and  families  have  access  to  much  needed  goods  and  services.  It  
is  not  hyperbole  to  celebrate  the  fact  that  the  Berlin  wall  crumbled  not  because  of  shots  
being  fired  but  because  free  Western  markets  proved  more  robust  than  those  in  the  
centrally  planned  East.  
Lamentably,  however,  the  strengths  of  a  free  market  driven  by  instrumental  
rationalism  also  carry  such  severe  defects  that  many  question  whether  the  bad  does  not  
outweigh  the  good.  Any  visit  to  a  thriving  city  in  the  United  States  demonstrates  not  
only  the  excesses  of  wealth  lavished  on  the  few  but  also  a  crushing  poverty  visited  upon  
the  many.  Too  often  the  rags  to  riches  story  instrumental  rationalism  promises  of  
individuals  being  free  to  pursue  their  interests  and  thriving  through  hard  work  and  
education  fails  to  match  reality.  In  Nickel  and  Dimed  journalist  Barbara  Ehrenreich  writes:    
                                                                                                              
6  Richard  H.  Thaler  and  Sendhil  Mullainathan,  "ʺBehavioral  Economics,"ʺ  The  Concise  Encyclopedia  of  
Economics,  in  the  Library  of  Economics  and  Liberty  Online,  ed.  David  R.  Henderson  (2008),  accessed  January  
9,  2014, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/BehavioralEconomics.html.  
     30  
“Something  is  wrong,  very  wrong,  when  a  single  person  in  good  health,  a  person  who  in  
addition  possesses  a  working  car,  can  barely  support  herself  by  the  sweat  of  her  brow.”7  
To  one  steeped  in  instrumental  rationality,  not  only  is  it  rational  to  strive  for  more  even  
when  one  already  has  enough,  but  also  striving  for  more  is  the  only  rational  strategy.  
Further,  instrumental  rationality  fails  even  where  it  seems  most  likely  to  succeed.  
Behavioral  finance  studies  show  how  pure  instrumental  rationality  not  only  fails  to  
create  the  conditions  for  all  to  flourish  through  an  invisible  hand,  but  as  seen  in  bubble  
after  bubble  and  most  clearly  in  the  2008  global  financial  collapse,  the  selfish  and  short-­‐‑
sighted  behavior  of  the  financial  leaders  who  were  supposed  to  be  the  most  rational  
ruined  many  and  threatened  the  global  financial  ecosystem.  George  Akerlof  and  Robert  
Shiller  in  Animal  Spirits  state:  “Economic  history  is  full  of  such  cycles  of  confidence  
followed  by  withdrawal.  Who  has  not  taken  a  hike  and  come  across  a  long-­‐‑abandoned  
railway  line—someone’s  past  dream  of  a  path  to  riches  and  wealth?  Who  has  not  heard  
of  the  Great  Tulip  Bubble  of  the  seventeenth-­‐‑century  Netherlands—a  country  famous,  
we  might  add,  for  its  stalwart  Rembrandt  burghers  and  often  caricatured  as  the  home  of  
the  world’s  most  cautious  people.  Who  does  not  know  that  even  Isaac  Newton—the  
father  of  modern  physics  and  of  the  calculus—lost  a  fortune  in  the  South  Sea  bubble  of  
                                                                                                              
7  Barbara  Ehrenreich,  Nickel  and  Dimed:  On  (Not)  Getting  By  in  America  (New  York:  Henry  Holt  and  
Company,  2010),  199,  Kindle.  
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the  eighteenth  century?”8  And,  when  it  comes  to  Jesus,  the  standard  economic  model  
provides  no  ground  on  which  Jesus’  life  marked  by  kenotic,  self-­‐‑offering  love  makes  any  
rational  sense  at  all.    
After  the  2008  financial  crisis  the  onus  rests  upon  instrumental  rationality  to  
prove  how  instrumental  it  really  is.  Theologian  Sarah  Coakley  mounts  an  impressive  
challenge  to  this  narrow  understanding  of  rational  choice  defined  as  self-­‐‑interest  and  
maximum  utility  not  by  questioning  the  practical  value  of  the  view,  but  by  pushing  on  
how  rational  in  fact  this  view  really  is.  Coakley  challenges  the  instrumental  rationality  
inherent  in  the  positivist  scientism  of  many  evolutionary  biologists  and  New  Atheists  
who  argue  religious  faith  is  by  definition  irrational.  In  particular  Coakley  vigorously  
attacks  the  Kantian  fact/value  distinction  whereby  science  trades  in  facts  and  religion  
deals  with  irrational  emotion  offering  mere  interpretation;  she  further  challenges  the  
unspoken  claim  that  rationality  entails  pure  self-­‐‑interest.    
In  Faith,  Rationality,  and  the  Passions  Coakley  compiles  a  series  of  articles  probing  
the  historic  connections  between  reason  and  emotion.  One  of  the  key  themes  of  all  the  
articles  is  that  the  rigid  distinction  between  reason  and  affect  is  recent,  a  product  of  
nineteenth  century  scientism;  thus,  instrumental  rationalism  is  also  a  recent  concept.  
While  the  main  thrust  of  the  book  is  to  recover  a  more  accurate  understanding  of  how  
                                                                                                              
8  George  A.  Akerlof  and  Robert  J.  Shiller,  Animal  Spirits:  How  Human  Psychology  Drives  the  Economy,  and  Why  
It  Matters  for  Global  Capitalism  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  2010),  13,  Kindle.    
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Enlightenment  thinkers  held  complicated,  nuanced  understandings  of  reason  and  affect,  
historically  the  work  touches  on  ancient  views  of  reason  as  well.  In  particular  Coakley  
showcases  Cathryn  Pickstock’s  brilliant  reading  of  Plato’s  Cratylus  demonstrating  the  
room  Plato  allows  for  reason,  passion,  and  embodiment  to  coexist.  The  thrust  of  
Coakley’s  argument  is  that  ancient  thinking  all  the  way  through  to  the  Enlightenment  
allowed  for  a  view  of  reason  that  wedded  reason,  emotions,  and  embodiment.  Only  
recently,  she  argues,  have  people  begun  to  tear  the  affective  realm  from  reason  in  a  way  
that  creates  the  possibility  of  a  new  atheist  or  a  cold,  calculating  homo  economicus.  
In  her  brilliant  2012  Gifford  Lectures  Sacrifice  Regained:  Evolution,  Cooperation,  and  
God,  Coakley  explores  what  she  refers  to  as  a  ‘chastened  natural  theology’  engaging  with  
the  game  theoretic  findings  of  her  Harvard  colleague  Martin  Nowak  arguing  that  
rationality  makes  room  for  sacrificial  self-­‐‑offering.  I  will  address  Nowak’s  work  in  
greater  detail  later  in  this  thesis,  but  for  now  what  is  significant  about  Nowak’s  work  is  
his  exploration  of  how  self-­‐‑giving  cooperation  features  as  a  main  engine  driving  
evolution  comparable  with  natural  selection  and  mutation.  In  stark  contrast  to  the  still  
influential  selfish  gene  theory  of  Sir  Richard  Dawkins,  Nowak’s  work  sheds  light  on  
sacrificial  behavior  in  the  animal  and  human  world  arguing  generous  acts  are  not  only  
reasonable  but  constitute  a  fundamental  aspect  of  biological  nature.  Coakley’s  
engagement  with  philosophical  historians  and  evolutionary  game  theorists  leads  her  to  
understand  Christ’s  ultimate  kenotic  outpouring  of  unselfish  love  as  ‘superrational’.  By  
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this  term  Coakley  means  that  Christ’s  sacrificial  death  is  rational,  consistent  with  
Nowak’s  view  and  in  absolute  opposition  to  an  instrumental  view;  but  Christ’s  
sacrificial  death  is  ‘super’  in  that  his  death  was  a  once  and  for  all  act  that  requires  
“participation  but  not  repetition.”9  
Dan  Ariely  offers  the  flip  side  of  Sarah  Coakley.  At  first  Ariely’s  view  of  human  
behavior  as  being  predictably  irrational  would  seem  to  be  in  stark  opposition  to  
Coakley’s  defense  of  superrationality.  Where  Coakley  turns  over  every  stone  to  widen  
the  definition  of  rationality  and  rescue  it  from  a  narrow  utilitarian  instrumentalism  to  
argue  that  emotion  and  unselfish  acts  can  be  perfectly  reasonable,  Ariely  at  first  seems  to  
be  articulating  just  the  opposite.  Agreeing  with  Coakley  in  her  stance  against  
instrumental  rationalism,  Ariely’s  cure  might  seem  in  her  view  to  be  worse  than  the  
disease  for  he  appears  to  simply  throw  in  the  towel  on  rationality  entirely:  “We  are  
really  far  less  rational  than  standard  economic  theory  assumes.  Moreover,  these  
irrational  behaviors  of  ours  are  neither  random  nor  senseless.  They  are  systematic,  and  
since  we  repeat  them  again  and  again,  predictable.”10  If  anything  Ariely  seems  to  revel  
in  human  irrationality,  signing  every  book  and  email  with  “Irrationally  yours,  Dan.”  
Yet,  despite  their  obvious  differences,  Coakley  and  Ariely  offer  views  of  rationality  that  
are  more  alike  than  they  are  different.  
                                                                                                              
9  Sara  Coakley,  “Reconceiving  ‘Natural  Theology’:  Meaning,  Sacrifice,  and  God”  (paper  presented  at  the  
Gifford  Lectures  at  the  University  of  Scotland  in  Aberdeen,  Scotland,  May  3,  2012).  
10  Ariely,  Predictably  Irrational,  317.  
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The  main  difference  between  Coakley  and  Ariely  rests  in  philosophical  strategy:  
where  Coakley  desires  to  expand  the  understanding  of  rationality  to  encompass  emotion  
and  self-­‐‑giving,  Ariely  accepts  the  instrumental  view,  what  he  refers  to  as  the  standard  
economic  view  of  rationality,  and  then  highlights  how  humans  predictably  stray.  But,  
here  is  where  Ariely  and  Coakley  come  together:  Ariely  expands  our  understanding  of  
irrationality  showing  us  not  only  how  irrationality  can  lead  to  error  but  how  there  is  
what  he  refers  to  as  an  upside  to  irrationality.  This  insight  is  how  Ariely’s  project  is  
similar  to  Sarah  Coakley’s  even  as  he  goes  about  it  in  the  opposite  way.  Whereas  
Coakley  challenges  a  narrow  definition  of  rationality,  Ariely  opens  up  a  new  range  of  
possibility  for  irrationality.  While  it  is  absolutely  true  that  human  predictable  
irrationality  can  lead  to  mistakes  that  harm  self  and  other,  it  is  also  in  our  irrationality,  
according  to  Ariely,  that  we  see  our  finest,  most  noble  humanity.  Resonating  with  
Ariely’s  position  ‘Wrongologist’  Kathryn  Schulz  writes:  “It  is  our  meta-­‐‑mistake:  we  are  
wrong  about  what  it  means  to  be  wrong.  Far  from  being  a  sign  of  intellectual  inferiority,  
the  capacity  to  err  is  crucial  to  human  cognition.  Far  from  being  a  moral  flaw,  it  is  
inextricable  from  some  of  our  most  humane  and  honorable  qualities:  empathy,  
optimism,  imagination,  conviction,  and  courage.  And  far  from  being  a  mark  of  
indifference  or  intolerance,  wrongness  is  a  vital  part  of  how  we  learn  and  change.”11  
                                                                                                              
11  Kathryn  Schulz,  Being  Wrong:  Adventures  in  the  Margin  of  Error  (New  York:  Harper  Collins,  2010),  5.  
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For  example,  the  standard  model  of  rationality  does  not  encompass  the  notion  of  
fairness  or  justice.  Wholly  rational  actors  make  choices  to  maximize  their  individual  
utility  even  if  some  wind  up  with  more  than  others.  Ariely’s  work  uncovers,  however,  
how  our  human  irrationality  drives  our  sense  of  fairness  and  justice.  The  ultimatum  
game  is  a  simple  game  with  two  players.  The  job  of  one  player  is  to  divide  a  pot  of  
money,  and  the  job  of  the  second  player  is  to  decide  whether  the  players  will  receive  the  
split  or  whether  to  decide  neither  player  gets  anything.  With  a  twenty  dollar  pot  the  first  
player  could  divide  the  money  unequally  giving  nineteen  dollars  to  herself  and  only  one  
dollar  to  her  partner,  or  she  could  divide  the  money  equally  or  in  any  other  split  she  
chooses.  If  both  players  were  perfectly  rational  according  to  the  standard,  instrumental  
self-­‐‑interested  definition  of  rationality,  the  first  player  would  be  wise  to  give  herself  
nineteen  dollars  and  give  her  partner  one  dollar.  One  dollar  is  not  much,  but  the  second  
player  would  choose  to  receive  the  money  because  one  dollar  is  better  than  nothing.  Yet,  
when  actual  human  beings  play  this  game,  not  only  do  very  few  people  try  splitting  the  
money  in  such  an  unfair  manner;  but  when  they  do,  the  second  players  would  rather  
have  nothing  than  see  the  first  player  walk  away  with  what  does  not  feel  fair.12  
In  most  cases,  the  word  “irrationality”  has  a  negative  connotation,  implying  
anything  from  mistakenness  to  madness.  If  we  were  in  charge  of  designing  
human  beings,  we  would  probably  work  as  hard  as  we  could  to  leave  
irrationality  out  of  the  formula;  in  Predictably  Irrational,  I  explored  the  downside  
of  our  human  biases.  But  there  is  a  flip  side  to  irrationality,  one  that  is  actually  
                                                                                                              
12  Ariely,  The  Upside  of  Irrationality,  Kindle  locations  3532-­‐‑3533.  
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quite  positive.  Sometimes  we  are  fortunate  in  our  irrational  abilities  because,  
among  other  things,  they  allow  us  to  adapt  to  new  environments,  trust  other  
people,  enjoy  expending  effort,  and  love  our  kids.  These  kinds  of  forces  are  part  
and  parcel  of  our  wonderful,  surprising,  innate—albeit  irrational—human  nature  
(indeed,  people  who  lack  the  ability  to  adapt,  trust,  or  enjoy  their  work  can  be  
very  unhappy).  These  irrational  forces  help  us  achieve  great  things  and  live  well  
in  a  social  structure.  The  title  The  Upside  of  Irrationality  is  an  attempt  to  capture  
the  complexity  of  our  irrationalities—the  parts  that  we  would  rather  live  without  
and  the  parts  that  we  would  want  to  keep  if  we  were  the  designers  of  human  
nature.  I  believe  that  it  is  important  to  understand  both  our  beneficial  and  our  
disadvantageous  quirks,  because  only  by  doing  so  can  we  begin  to  eliminate  the  
bad  and  build  on  the  good.13  
  
So,  Sarah  Coakley  and  Dan  Ariely  agree  that  the  standard,  instrumental  
definition  of  rationality  is  neither  helpful  nor  particularly  descriptive,  but  they  offer  
radically  divergent  solutions  for  how  rationality  should  be  understood.  Coakley  
expands  the  definition  of  rationality  itself,  complaining  that  proponents  of  instrumental  
rationality  defend  a  very  new  and  extremely  truncated  understanding  of  reason.  
Coakley’s  understanding  of  reason  provides  for  not  only  common  acts  of  self-­‐‑giving  but  
even  allows  for  the  superrational  act  of  Christ’s  sacrificial  death.  Ariely,  on  the  other  
hand,  moves  in  the  opposite  direction.  Ariely  allows  the  instrumental  definition  of  
rationality  to  stand  but  shows  that  while  people  are  often  calculating  and  self-­‐‑interested,  
they  also  manifest  a  predictable  irrationality.  Sometimes  this  irrationality  leaves  people  
worse  off  individually  and  collectively,  such  as  when  status  quo  bias  leads  to  extremely  
                                                                                                              
13  Ariely,  The  Upside  of  Irrationality,  Kindle  location  194.  
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low  organ  donation  rates.  But,  at  the  same  time  Ariely  sings  the  praises  of  irrationality,  
lifting  up  people’s  irrational  generosity  and  sense  of  fairness  and  justice.  
While  Coakley  and  Ariely  substantively  agree  in  their  critique  of  instrumental  
rationality,  the  rationalism  of  scientific  reductionism  and  the  economic  standard  model  
respectively,  their  different  solutions  demand  a  choice.  There  is  much  to  commend  both  
understandings.  Coakley’s  strategy  makes  particular  sense  given  her  deterministic  
evolutionary  foes  who  argue  that  religion  is  irrational  simply  by  virtue  of  being  
emotional  and  sacrificial.  To  cede  the  question  of  rationality  would  be  perhaps,  in  that  
fight,  to  give  up  too  much  ground.  The  challenge  with  Coakley’s  argument,  though,  is  
the  complexity  and  degree  of  difficulty  required  to  make  the  case  well.  Few  have  
Coakley’s  astounding  mastery  of  the  theological  tradition,  much  less  her  command  of  
the  western  philosophical  tradition  and  evolutionary  biology.  While  I  agree  with  
Coakley’s  argument  that  rationality  can  include  emotion  and  self-­‐‑giving,  Ariely’s  
acceptance  of  the  common  understanding  of  rationality  is  easier  to  follow.  Plus,  Ariely’s  
sophisticated  interpretation  of  irrationality’s  dual  nature  commends  itself  as  the  
working  understanding  of  rationality  in  a  behavioral  theological  context.    
Ultimately,  what  is  at  stake  here  is  the  right  understanding  of  what  it  means  to  
have  a  ψύύχες  λόόγικες,  a  rational  soul.  If,  as  some  might  naturally  suppose,  Jesus  has  a  
rational  soul  in  the  standard  instrumental  definition  of  rationality  and  is  perfect  in  his  
humanity  without  sin,  then  the  findings  of  cognitive  psychology  and  behavioral  
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economics  may  seem  irrelevant  to  a  properly  understood  Christology.  They  could  even  
be  seen  to  be  at  odds.  In  agreement  with  Coakley,  however,  Chalcedon  does  not  claim  
that  Jesus  has  a  perfect  rationality  in  any  kind  of  narrow  instrumentalist  sense  of  the  
word.  This  modern  sense  of  rationality  did  not  yet  exist.  Given  the  work  of  Coakley  and  
others  in  demonstrating  the  fluidity  the  term  rational  has  enjoyed  historically,  the  best  
understanding  of  ancient  rationality  looks  far  more  like  Simon’s  bounded  rationality  
than  the  instrumental  perfection  of  classical  economics.  Bounded  rationality  allows  for  
human  agency  and  will,  respects  the  role  of  the  reflective  System  2,  and  yet  allows  for  
the  predictable  irrationality  that  Dan  Ariely  suggests  is  a  result  of  organic  finitude.  This  
irrationality,  according  to  Ariely,  will  not  only  manifest  in  lamentable  error,  but  this  
irrationality  will  also  be  precisely  where  the  best  of  our  humanity  surfaces:  our  
compassion  and  sense  of  justice.  Such  a  nuanced  view  of  rationality  will  help  to  flesh  out  
what  the  conveners  of  Chalcedon  merely  sketched  in  referring  to  Christ’s  humanity  and  
rational  soul.  Given,  then,  this  nuanced  view  of  rationality  and  the  idea  that  Christology  
is  the  proper  starting  point  for  theological  anthropology  one  would  expect  to  see  
evidence  of  this  predictable  irrationality  in  the  behavior  of  Jesus  himself.  
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4. The Irrational Jesus 
By  describing  Jesus  as  irrational,  I  argue  that  the  evangelists  offer  portraits  of  
Jesus  honest  enough  to  show  the  presence  of  powerful  emotion,  physical  limitation,  
remarkable  lack  of  self-­‐‑interest,  and  a  limited  ability  to  foresee  the  future.  Consistent  
with  Simon’s  bounded  rationality,  I  am  not  arguing  that  Jesus  is  entirely  irrational,  
merely  that  in  his  humanity  Jesus  is  limited  by  time  and  place.  As  with  all  human  
beings,  Jesus  is  rational  to  the  extent  that  information,  cognitive  process,  and  time  allow;  
but  given  imperfect  information,  predictable  blind  spots  generated  by  heuristics  and  
biases,  and  the  pressure  of  limited  time,  it  is  not  only  fair  but  also  exegetically  helpful  to  
think  of  Jesus  as  being  partly  driven  by  deep  irrational  forces  at  times.  Moreover  in  
alignment  with  Dan  Ariely,  I  will  show  that  not  only  do  these  forces  lead  Jesus  to  make  
regrettable  statements,  but  also  it  is  in  this  very  irrationality  that  one  sees  his  
compassion  and  hunger  for  justice.  One  sees  Jesus  as  fully  human,  a  man  “who  in  every  
respect  has  been  tested  as  we  are,  yet  without  sin”  (Hebrews  4:15).  
Irrational  forces  play  strong  roles  in  the  life  of  Jesus  as  narrated  by  the  
evangelists.  This  irrationality  falls  into  five  major  categories:  there  is  the  presence  of  
strong  emotion  in  Jesus’  life;  the  Gospels  portray  Jesus  as  having  limited  knowledge;  
although  controversial  and  subject  to  interpretation,  Jesus  makes  mistakes  in  the  
Gospels;  some  of  the  actions  taken  by  Jesus  are  consistent  with  the  actions  behavioral  
theorists  would  expect  of  humans  subject  to  cognitive  limitations;  and  kenosis  marks  the  
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life  and  teachings  of  Jesus.  Jesus’  most  significant  act,  his  sacrificial  death,  merits  its  own  
discussion  in  this  regard.  
One  of  the  fundamental  tenets  of  behavioral  theory  is  that  strong  affect  plays  an  
enormous  and  often  overlooked  role  in  judgments  and  decisions.  Whereas  ‘econs’,  the  
term  designated  by  Cass  Sunstein  and  Richard  Thaler  to  describe  perfectly  rational  
Spock-­‐‑like  idealized  people,  will  make  decisions  unaffected  by  emotions,  feelings  do  
color  every  thought,  perception,  and  decision  for  actual  human  beings  swayed  by  
cognitive  limitations  such  as  framing,  status  quo  bias,  and  loss  aversion.1  Whereas  one  
simply  would  not  see  the  presence  of  strong  emotion  in  perfectly  rational  souls,  one  sees  
emotion  constantly  wash  over  human  beings  shaped  by  bounded  rationality.  In  the  
Gospel  descriptions  of  Jesus,  and  in  the  synoptic  narratives  in  particular,  the  evangelists  
show  Jesus  to  be  a  person  almost  constantly  affected  by  powerful  emotion.  
In  two  of  the  Gospels,  Matthew  and  John,  Jesus  initiates  ministry  in  ways  that  are  
deeply  emotional.  In  Matthew,  as  in  all  of  the  synoptic  accounts,  after  his  baptism  Jesus  
is  hurled  by  the  spirit  into  the  wilderness  to  be  tested  by  Satan.  While  Mark  simply  
acknowledges  this  account  and  Luke  portrays  Jesus  in  a  more  rational  and  philosophical  
mode,  Matthew  shows  Jesus  forcefully  denouncing  the  devil  after  the  third  temptation.  
After  offering  Jesus  all  of  the  kingdoms  to  rule,  Jesus  responds:  “Away  with  you,  Satan!  
for  it  is  written,  ‘Worship  the  Lord  your  God,  and  serve  only  him’”  (Matthew  4:10).  
                                                                                                              
1  Sunstein  and  Thaler,  Nudge,  7.  
     41  
While  the  reader  has  no  access  to  Jesus’  tone  and  volume,  it  is  hard  not  to  feel  a  sense  of  
anger  and  passion  in  Jesus’  words.  
Better  evidence  for  Jesus’  anger  comes  from  the  Gospel  of  John.  While  the  
cleansing  of  the  temple  occurs  toward  the  end  of  the  synoptic  accounts  after  Jesus  has  
entered  Jerusalem,  the  Johannine  witness  places  the  cleansing  of  the  temple  at  the  
beginning  of  Jesus’  ministry.  In  John  2  Jesus  takes  whips  and  cords  to  forcefully  expel  
those  exchanging  idolatrous  Roman  coinage  for  acceptable  Hebrew  currency.  John  
shows  Jesus  turning  over  tables  and  denouncing  those  selling  doves  as  turning  his  
Father’s  house  into  a  marketplace.  The  disciples  remark  on  Jesus’  zeal,  a  word  connoting  
powerful  emotion  indeed.  
Strong  emotion  does  not  just  mark  the  beginning  of  Jesus’  ministry,  but  
constantly  colors  it.  Several  times  different  evangelists  write  that  Jesus  is  filled  with  pity  
or  is  moved  by  pity.  In  Matthew  9:36  when  Jesus  looks  at  the  crowds  gathering  around  
him  in  the  wilderness,  he  is  moved  by  pity  seeing  how  they  were  like  a  sheep  without  a  
shepherd.  Later  in  Matthew  Jesus  heals  two  blind  men:  “Moved  with  compassion,  Jesus  
touched  their  eyes”  (Matthew  20:34).  In  these  and  other  examples  the  Greek  word  for  
moved  by  pity  is  σπλἑνγθοµμαι,  a  powerful,  Homeric  word  meaning  that  Jesus  was  
literally  moved  in  his  “inward  parts  or  entrails.”2  One  instance  is  especially  interesting.  
                                                                                                              
2  Walter  A.  Bauer  and  F.W.  Gingrich,  A  Greek-­‐‑English  Lexicon  of  the  New  Testament  and  Other  Early  Christian  
Literature,  2nd  ed.,  eds.  William  F.  Arndt  and  F.W.  Danker  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1979),  763.  
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In  Mark  1:40  a  leper  approaches  Jesus  seeking  healing.  The  manuscript  tradition  differs  
as  to  whether  Jesus  is  moved  with  pity,  σπλανγνίίσθεις  or  whether  he  is  angered,  
᾽ὀργίίσθεις.  Eugene  Boring  points  out  due  to  the  textual  rule  of  lectio  difficilior  many  
interpreters  prefer  the  reading  of  Jesus  being  angry  to  Jesus  being  moved  with  
compassion  even  though  the  textual  evidence  for  σπλανγνίίσθεις  is  more  robust.3  The  
salient  point  here  is  that  both  readings  indicate  Jesus  experiencing  a  deep  and  powerful  
emotional  state.  Another  example  includes  the  famously  short  verse  in  John  when  Jesus  
grieves  the  death  of  his  friend  Lazarus:  “Jesus  began  to  weep”  (John  11:35).  While  Luke  
and  John  mute  the  emotion  in  the  suffering  and  crucifixion  narratives,  Matthew  and  
Mark  both  describe  Christ  as  suffering  agony  in  the  garden  of  Gethsemane.  Matthew  
describes  Jesus  as  “grieved  and  agitated”  (Matthew  26:37),  going  back  and  forth  with  
God  over  his  impending  death.  Matthew’s  Jesus  even  sounds  like  a  behavioral  theorist  
when  he  tells  the  disciples:  “The  spirit  indeed  is  willing,  but  the  flesh  is  weak”  (Matthew  
26:41).  On  the  cross  itself  Jesus  cries  out:  “My  God,  my  God,  why  have  you  forsaken  
me?”  (Matthew  27:46).  While  some  have  argued  that  because  this  cry  of  dereliction  was  
quoting  Psalm  22  that  ends  as  a  call  to  trust,  this  cry  was  not  tortured  but  hopeful.4  
Given  the  strong  presence  of  emotion  in  Jesus’  life,  this  interpretation  seems  strained.  
The  picture  of  Jesus  that  emerges  in  the  earliest  Gospel  strata  is  not  a  perfectly  rational  
                                                                                                              
3  Eugene  Boring,  Mark,  A  Commentary:  The  New  Testament  Library  (Louisville:  Westminster  John  Knox  Press,  
2006),  70.  
4  Joel  Marcus,  The  Way  of  the  Lord:  Christological  Exegesis  of  the  Old  Testament  in  the  Gospel  of  Mark  
(Minneapolis:  Fortress  Press,  1992),  177-­‐‑182.  
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econ  quietly  and  with  total  equanimity  breezing  through  ministry  but  a  passionately  
emotional  man  given  to  deep  compassion,  blistering  anger,  and  sorrowful  tears.  
A  second  fundamental  component  of  Jesus’  irrationality  is  his  lack  of  perfect  
knowledge.  With  perfect  knowledge  rational  agents  can  sift  through  every  option  to  
make  the  best  possible  decision,  but,  as  behavioralists  note,  humans  simply  do  not  have  
access  to  all  this  information  and  even  if  they  did  would  not  be  able  to  process  it  
perfectly  due  to  cognitive  limitations.  Jesus,  as  a  fully  human  person,  manifests  lack  of  
perfect  knowledge  in  two  significant  ways:  first,  more  in  what  he  does  not  say;  and  
second,  in  what  he  does  say.  It  is  evident  through  what  he  does  not  say  that  Jesus  was  
indelibly  shaped  by  the  times  in  which  he  lived:  Jesus’  humanity  was  bound  by  
particularity;  he  lived  in  a  particular  time  and  a  particular  place.  Second,  the  Gospels  
leave  a  record  of  Jesus  openly,  if  rarely,  admitting  to  lack  of  knowledge.  
Jesus  was  a  man  of  his  time;  he  was  shaped  by  the  history,  geography,  language,  
and  culture  of  first  century  Palestine.  What  the  writers  of  the  Reformed  Confession  of  
1967  say  of  the  evangelists  is  true  also  of  Jesus:  he  was  “conditioned  by  the  language,  
thought  forms  …  reflecting  views  of  life,  history,  and  the  cosmos  which  were  then  
current.”5  Many  attempts  to  understand  the  first  century  Jesus  suffer  from  projecting  the  
worldview  of  the  author,  leading  to  the  famous  observation  made  by  George  Tyrrell  that  
                                                                                                              
5  “The  Confession  of  1967,”  in  The  Constitution  of  the  Presbyterian  Church  (U.S.A.):  Part  1  Book  of  Confessions,  
(Louisville,  KY:  The  Office  of  the  General  Assembly  of  the  Presbyterian  Church  (U.S.A.),  9.29,  257.    
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the  search  for  the  historical  Jesus  amounts  to  little  but  scholars  staring  into  a  deep  well  
only  to  find  their  own  reflection.6  However,  recently  far  more  attention  has  been  given  
to  the  ways  in  which  Jesus’  context  shaped  him.  As  Amy-­‐‑Jill  Levine  writes:    “Jesus  of  
Nazareth  dressed  like  a  Jew,  prayed  like  a  Jew  (and  most  likely  in  Aramaic),  instructed  
other  Jews  on  how  best  to  live  according  to  the  commandments  given  by  God  to  Moses,  
taught  like  a  Jew,  argued  like  a  Jew  with  other  Jews,  and  died  like  thousands  of  other  
Jews  on  a  Roman  cross.”7  More  specifically,  Luke  Timothy  Johnson  asserts  that  the  
Jewish  apocalyptic  worldview  of  the  first  century  profoundly  shaped  Jesus.8  Notably,  E.  
P.  Sanders  among  others  has  written  extensively  that  the  way  to  understand  Jesus  best  is  
to  place  him  within  the  first  century  apocalyptic  eschatology:  he  articulated  and  believed  
in  cosmic  dualism  as  well  as  an  apocalypse,  or  revelatory  moment,  that  would  usher  in  
an  imminent  end  to  the  age  in  which  he  was  living.9  Simply  put,  this  apocalyptic  
conceptual  framework  thoroughly  marked  and  shaped  Jesus’  humanity.  While  
Athanasius  worked  hard  to  remind  the  believer  that  Christ  in  his  divinity  was  not  
fettered  by  this  first  century  worldview,  a  behavioral  perspective  would  emphasize  how  
much  Jesus  was  indeed  shaped  by  his  surroundings.  Behavioral  Christologists  need  not  
disagree  with  Athanasius;  but  they  would  stress  that  while  Jesus  might  not  be  fettered  
                                                                                                              
6  George  Tyrrell,  Christianity  at  the  Crossroads  (1910)  (Whitefish,  MT:  Kessinger  LLC,  2013),  44.    
7  Amy-­‐‑Jill  Levine,  The  Misunderstood  Jew:  The  Church  and  the  Scandal  of  the  Jewish  Jesus  (New  York:  Harper  
Colllins,  2006),  51.  
8  Luke  T.  Johnson,  The  Writings  of  the  New  Testament  (Philadelphia:  Fortress  Press,  1986),  48.  
9  E.P.  Sanders,  The  Historical  Figure  of  Jesus  (London:  Penguin  Books,  1993),  95.  
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by  the  culture,  language,  and  apocalyptic  worldview  of  the  time,  it  is  impossible  to  
overstate  how  much  these  factors  did  shape  him.  Is  this  enculturation  limiting?  To  the  
extent  that  Jesus  in  his  humanity  could  not  think  of  the  world  other  than  in  the  thought  
forms  and  language  of  his  day,  this  enculturation  is,  by  definition,  limiting.  As  Derek  
Sivers  cleverly  puts  it:  “enculturation  is  like  one  fish  asking  another  fish  about  how  the  
water  is  and  the  second  saying,  ‘Water?  What’s  water?’”10  Jesus,  at  least  in  his  humanity,  
was  bound  as  all  human  beings  are  by  particularity.  Jesus  was  not  an  econ  with  perfect  
knowledge  but  a  human  who  lived  in  a  certain  place  at  a  certain  time.  
On  a  more  prosaic  level  Jesus  also  admits  in  at  least  two  clear  instances  to  not  
possessing  perfect  knowledge.  Each  of  the  Synoptics  narrates  the  story  of  Jesus  healing  a  
woman  with  a  hemorrhage.  Beautifully  intercalating  this  story  with  the  healing  of  Jairus’  
daughter,  the  author  of  Mark  describes  a  woman  who  pushes  through  the  crowd  to  
touch  the  hem  of  Jesus’  garment  believing  that  if  she  is  able  to  do  so  she  would  be  
healed.  As  so  often  is  the  case  in  Mark,  something  happens  immediately.  Mark  writes  
that  power  flows  from  Jesus  resulting  in  the  woman’s  healing.  What  is  interesting  in  this  
discussion  is  that  Jesus  is  unaware  of  exactly  what  happens.  Sensing  that  power  left  him  
Jesus  scans  the  crowd;  he  is  unsure  who  it  is  that  came  forward.  “Who  touched  my  
clothes?”  he  asks  the  disciples.  The  disciples,  not  depicted  by  Mark  as  being  especially  
                                                                                                              
10  Derek  Sivers,  “Fish  Don’t  Know  They’re  In  Water,”  June  6,  2011,  accessed  January  9,  2013,  
http://sivers.org/fish.  
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bright,  are  no  help  to  Jesus.  “You  see  the  crowd  pressing  in  on  you,”  they  protest.  “How  
can  you  say,  ‘Who  touched  me?’”  (Mark  5:21–34).  
Perhaps  one  might  respond  that  this  example  stems  from  a  small  and  relatively  
unimportant  instance.  One  might  argue  that  Jesus’  knowledge  of  what  happens  to  him  
minute  by  minute  need  not  be  perfect.  What  is  important  is  that  Jesus  has  perfect  
knowledge  of  truly  significant  events.  Yet  few  things  could  be  more  important,  
especially  to  a  man  with  an  apocalyptic  eschatology,  than  knowledge  regarding  the  
coming  of  the  kingdom.  However,  in  both  Mark’s  little  apocalypse  and  in  Matthew’s  
Gospel  Jesus  confesses  to  his  disciples  that  he  does  not  know  exactly  when  the  Son  of  
Man  will  come:  “But  about  that  day  or  hour  no  one  knows,  neither  the  angels  in  heaven,  
nor  the  Son,  but  only  the  Father”  (Mark  13:32;  Matthew  24:36).  Note  that  Jesus  does  not  
tell  the  disciples  that  he  possesses  this  information  but  chooses  not  to  share  it  with  them.  
Jesus  says  the  son  simply  does  not  know  when  this  time  will  take  place.  In  his  full  
humanity  even  Jesus  himself  is  not  entirely  clear  about  the  plan.  
In  addition  to  emotion  playing  a  strong  role  in  Jesus’  humanity  and  his  limited  
knowledge,  Jesus  also  appears  to  make  what  can  only  be  called  mistakes  from  time  to  
time.  One  common  criticism  leveled  against  Jesus  is  that  he  exhibits  botanical  ignorance  
when  he  claims  the  mustard  seed  to  be  the  smallest  of  seeds.  While  clever  plant  lovers  
jump  out  of  their  chairs  to  point  out  that  mustard  seeds  are  not,  in  fact,  the  most  
diminutive  seeds  in  the  world,  apologists,  anxious  to  defend  Jesus,  point  out  that  Jesus  
     47  
was  telling  a  parable  rather  than  giving  a  lecture  in  botany.11  Moreover,  those  desiring  to  
defend  Jesus  cite  first  century  sources  to  confirm  that  mustard  seeds  were  proverbially  
believed  to  be  the  smallest,  suggesting  that  while  Jesus  himself  may  have  known  the  
truth,  he  was  speaking  in  a  way  his  limited  contemporaries  would  understand.12  A  
behavioral  Christology  allows  the  interpreter  to  avoid  such  an  involved  exegetical  
contortion.  A  behavioral  Christology  can  admit  that  Jesus,  in  his  humanity,  was  indeed  
limited  in  his  understanding  of  botany,  and  then  move  on  untroubled,  able  to  focus  
more  on  the  meaning  of  the  parable  than  on  the  question  of  Jesus’  mistake.  
But  mistakes  occur  that  we  cannot  attribute  to  Jesus’  human  knowledge  simply  
being  bound  by  his  time.  In  Mark  2:25–26  Jesus  was  accused  of  breaking  Sabbath  laws  
when  he  and  his  disciples  ate  grain  they  picked  along  a  field  as  they  traveled.  Jesus,  
likening  himself  to  David,  reminds  his  interlocutors  that  the  great  king  himself  went  into  
the  temple  and  ate  the  loaves  of  offering  when  Abiathar  was  high  priest.  The  only  
problem  with  this  defense  is  that  Abiathar  was  not  high  priest  when  David  ransacked  
the  temple  for  the  Hebrew  equivalent  of  the  communion  bread.  In  1  Samuel  21:1  we  
learn  that  David  took  the  bread  when  Ahimilech,  Abiathar’s  father  was  priest  rather  
than  Abiathar  who  does  not  appear  for  another  chapter.  Is  it  possible  that  the  author  of  
Mark  made  an  error,  or  that  a  translation  error  occurred,  or  that  through  the  years  a  
                                                                                                              
11  Tremper  Longman  III  and  David  E.  Garland,  eds.,  The  Expositor’s  Bible  Commentary,  vol.  9  (Grand  Rapids,  
MI:  Zondervan,  2010),  762.  
12  Clifton  C.  Black,  Abingdon  Commentary  on  Mark  (Nashville:  Abingdon  Press,  2011),  127.  
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sleepy  monk  failed  to  transcribe  this  text  accurately?  All  of  these  explanations  are  
possible,  although  there  is  no  evidence  of  a  transmission  error  in  the  manuscript  
tradition.  The  simpler  possibility  is  that  Jesus,  in  his  humanity,  simply  made  a  small  
factual  error.  It  is  possible  that  Jesus,  like  all  human  beings,  committed  a  slip  of  the  
tongue.  While  unsettling  at  first  to  those  with  a  Docetic  view  of  Jesus,  this  simple  
interpretation  does  not  impinge  on  Christ’s  divinity  and  is  certainly  more  elegant  than  
having  to  conjure  up  a  tired  monk  when  no  history  of  a  manuscript  issue  exists.  
Jesus  is  not  merely  prone  to  relatively  insignificant  slips  of  the  tongue  either.  In  
Mark  8:22–26  Jesus  encounters  a  blind  man  in  Bethsaida.  Applying  saliva  to  the  man’s  
eyes  and  laying  his  hands  on  him,  Jesus  asks  the  man  if  he  can  see.  The  man  replies  that  
he  is  able  to  see  people  except  that  they  look  like  walking  trees.  Staring  at  the  man  
intently,  Jesus  lays  his  hands  on  the  man’s  eyes  a  second  time.  This  second  effort  does  
the  trick,  and  the  man  is  able  to  see  normally  again.  Interpreters  have  struggled  with  this  
partial  healing  since  the  first  century.  Some  argue  that  Jesus  healed  the  man  partially  on  
purpose  as  a  symbolic  gesture  to  indicate  how  the  disciples  see  and  understand  only  in  
part.13  Or,  it  is  possible  that  the  double  healing  refers  to  the  two  epochs  commonly  
envisioned  in  apocalyptic  dualism.14  But  again,  how  much  more  elegant  is  it  to  
acknowledge  that  in  his  humanity  Jesus  became  tired,  thirsty,  and  sometimes  made  a  
                                                                                                              
13  Joel  Marcus,  The  Anchor  Yale  Bible,  vol.  27A  (New  Haven:  Yale  University,  2009),  597.  
14  Marcus,  The  Anchor  Yale  Bible,  600.  
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mistake  even  in  something  as  important  as  his  healing  ministry?  Understanding  that  
Jesus  makes  mistakes  does  not  diminish  his  divinity;  minor  errors  like  this  partial  
healing  only  underscore  his  humanity.  What  kind  of  real  humanity  could  Jesus  have  
were  he  not  prone,  as  all  human  beings  are,  to  error?  
Even  greater  than  a  slip  of  the  tongue  and  more  damaging  than  a  two-­‐‑part  
healing  is  Jesus’  excruciating  encounter  with  the  Syrophoenecian  woman.  A  deeply  
troubling  text  for  lectionary  preachers  who  must  face  this  scripture  at  least  once  every  
three  years,  few  pericopes  in  the  New  Testament  inspire  more  defensiveness  and  
indignation  than  Jesus’  conversation  with  the  Syrophoenecian  woman.  Away  in  Tyre  a  
local  woman  with  a  suffering  daughter  discovers  Jesus  and  requests  his  help.  Jesus  
delivers  this  chilling  response:  “Let  the  children  be  fed  first,  for  it  is  not  fair  to  take  the  
children’s  food  and  throw  it  to  the  dogs”  (Mark  7:27).  Referring  to  the  children  of  Israel  
and  the  Gentiles,  Jesus  tells  the  woman  that  he  is  interested  in  helping  Jews  first.  It  is  
only  possible  to  understand  dogs  as  a  slur  referring  to  Gentiles.  
The  exegetical  gymnastics  inspired  by  this  ignominious  moment  testify  to  the  
anxiety  a  fully  human  Jesus  provokes.  One  of  the  more  daring  interpretations  is  that  
Jesus  was  not  actually  saying  anything  harsh  to  the  woman  at  all.  The  word  Jesus  uses  
for  dogs  here  is  τοῖς  κυναρίίοις,  the  diminutive  form.  In  this  reading  Jesus  is  not  calling  
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her  or  other  Gentiles  dogs  but  something  more  like  little  puppies.15  In  this  interpretation  
Jesus  is  really  just  using  a  literal  pet  name  for  the  woman,  which  should  be  heard  by  the  
reading  community  as  being  endearing.  The  notable  William  Barclay  hypothesized  that  
Jesus  was  playing  with  the  woman,  using  a  jesting  tone,  and  smiling  to  let  her  know  he  
was  not  intending  his  words  with  cruel  intent.16  Others  attempt  to  salvage  Jesus  by  
arguing  that  while  what  he  says  is  cruel,  he  only  means  it  to  test  the  woman.17  While  this  
interpretation  at  least  acknowledges  the  harsh  tone  by  Jesus,  scholars  like  David  Lose  
point  out  that  Jesus’  statement  bears  no  marker  of  being  a  test.  Rather,  his  statement  
appears  to  resemble  a  thoughtless  remark  offered  without  reflection,  something  all  
human  beings  are  prone  to  saying,  especially  when  discovered  while  hiding  out  on  
vacation.  
The  more  elegant,  simple  reading  is  that  Jesus  in  his  full  humanity  makes  a  
thoughtless  statement.  Perhaps  due  to  the  strong  short-­‐‑term  emotion  of  being  bothered  
while  lying  low  Jesus  speaks  rashly  and  angrily.  Perhaps  because  of  the  representative  
heuristic,  Jesus  falsely  assumes  this  Gentile  woman  was  not  intellectually  or  emotionally  
worth  his  time.  Perhaps  it  is  simply  because  Jesus  is  exhausted.  In  a  telling  study  of  an  
Israeli  parole  board  it  turns  out  that  the  most  significant  factor  in  whether  a  case  was  
                                                                                                              
15  Bas  Van  Iersal,  Mark:  A  Reader-­‐‑Response  Commentary  (Sheffield,  UK:  Sheffield  Academic  Press  LTD,  1998),  
250.  
16  William  Barclay,  The  Gospel  of  Mark,  The  New  Daily  Study  Bible  (Louisville,  KY:  Westminster  John  Knox  
Press,  2001),  207.  
17  Kelly  Iverson,  Gentiles  in  the  Gospel  of  Mark  (New  York:  T&T  Clark  International,  2007),  48-­‐‑54.  
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decided  positively  or  negatively  was  the  time  of  day  the  case  was  heard.  After  surveying  
over  1,000  cases  researchers  discovered  that  prisoners  facing  the  board  in  the  morning  
had  a  70%  chance  of  receiving  parole,  compared  to  just  10%  for  those  who  appeared  late  
in  the  day.18  Chalked  up  to  ‘decision  fatigue’,  psychologists  hypothesize  that  the  easily  
exhausted  System  2  yields  decision  making  ability  to  System  1,  which  in  this  case  is  far  
more  likely  to  see  prisoners  as  existential  threats.  
Whatever  the  reason,  the  woman  surprises  Jesus  and  the  reader  by  giving  back  
as  good  as  she  gets.  Called  an  unworthy  dog,  the  Syrophoenician  woman  spits  back:  
“Sir,  even  the  dogs  under  the  table  eat  the  children’s  crumbs”  (Mark  7:28).  The  woman  
deftly  accepts  the  label  of  dog  given  to  her  by  Jesus,  pointing  out  that  the  dogs  in  his  
analogy  are  still  fed.  Realizing  himself  bested,  what  else  can  Jesus  do  but  respond:  “For  
saying  that  you  may  go—the  demon  has  left  your  daughter”  (Mark  7:29).  At  this  point  
one  can  sense  Barclay  may  have  been  right  about  Jesus  smiling;  it  was  just  that  Barclay  
was  wrong  about  the  why  and  when  Jesus  smiled.  One  can  imagine  a  knowing  smile  
crossing  Jesus’  face  as  he  responds  to  this  woman’s  brilliant  riposte,  a  generous  
acknowledgment  of  his  mistake.  Peter  Hawkins  of  Yale  notes  the  full  humanity  of  Jesus  
on  display:  “There  is  one  occasion,  however,  that  stands  out  among  these  human  
moments—an  occasion  when  we  see  him  learn  something  new  and,  as  a  result,  become  
                                                                                                              
18  John  Tierney,  “Do  You  Suffer  from  Decision  Fatigue?”  The  New  York  Times,  August  21,  2011,  accessed  
January  9,  2014,  http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/21/magazine/do-­‐‑you-­‐‑suffer-­‐‑from-­‐‑decision-­‐‑fatigue.html.  
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someone  different;  as  recorded  by  Mark  as  well  as  Matthew,  Jesus  is  brought  up  short  by  
an  unexpected  truth.  Not  only  does  he  change  his  mind,  but  does  so  in  a  breathtaking  
180-­‐‑degree  turn.  Most  astonishing  of  all,  it  is  a  pagan  woman  who  makes  him  do  it.”19  
While  initially  it  may  be  difficult  to  accept  that  Jesus  in  his  full  humanity  is  capable  of  
weak  moments,  ultimately  it  makes  for  more  elegant  exegesis  with  a  strong  ability  to  
preserve  the  plain  sense  meaning  of  the  text.  
Not  only  does  a  behavioral  lens  elucidate  the  powerful  way  emotion  affects  
Jesus,  the  limited  knowledge  Jesus  possesses,  and  the  mistakes  he  appears  to  make  now  
and  again  in  the  Gospels,  but  a  behavioral  perspective  also  shows  that  patterns  Jesus  
employs  resonate  with  the  guidance  behavioral  theorists  offer  regarding  effective  ways  
to  cope  with  the  blind  spots  that  come  with  human  cognition.  One  of  the  easiest  patterns  
to  note  in  Jesus’  life  includes  his  constant  habit  of  retreat:  finding  solitary  places  to  pray;  
seeking  the  wilderness  places;  and  just  putting  distance  between  himself  and  those  
depending  on  him.  A  vast  amount  has  been  written  regarding  the  spiritual  wisdom  in  
this  pattern  of  time  with,  and  time  apart  from,  ministry.  Less  well  studied,  however,  is  
the  cognitive  necessity  of  getting  distance  from  emotionally  charged  situations.  
In  their  book  Decisive  Chip  and  Dan  Heath  offer  a  behavioral  framework  for  
decision  making.  When  it  comes  to  making  a  choice,  for  instance,  the  Heaths  lift  up  the  
problem  of  short-­‐‑term  emotion:  “Perhaps  our  worst  enemy  in  resolving  these  conflicts  is  
                                                                                                              
19  Peter  Hawkins,  “Dogging  Jesus,”  The  Christian  Century  122,  no.  16  (2005),  18.  
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short-­‐‑term  emotion,  which  can  be  an  unreliable  adviser.  When  people  share  the  worst  
decisions  they’ve  made  in  life,  they  are  often  recalling  choices  made  in  the  grip  of  
visceral  emotion:  anger,  lust,  anxiety,  greed.  Our  lives  would  be  very  different  if  we  had  
a  dozen  ‘undo’  buttons  to  use  in  the  aftermath  of  these  choices.  But  we  are  not  slaves  to  
our  emotions.  Visceral  emotion  fades.  That’s  why  the  folk  wisdom  advises  that  when  
we’ve  got  an  important  decision  to  make,  we  should  sleep  on  it.  It’s  sound  advice,  and  
we  should  take  it  to  heart.  For  many  decisions,  though,  sleep  isn’t  enough.  We  need  
strategy.”20  One  of  the  most  powerful  strategies  the  Heaths  recommend  is  simply  
putting  distance,  physical  and  emotional  distance,  between  people  and  a  difficult  choice  
environment.  This  distance  allows  human  beings  to  move  from  a  more  emotionally  
labile  hot  state  associated  with  the  automatic  system,  to  a  cooler  state  associated  with  the  
reflective  system.  In  other  words  distance  and  alone  time  does  not  just  allow  Jesus  time  
to  gather  his  thoughts  as  if  all  he  needed  were  time  to  rationally  assess  his  plan;  it  allows  
him  the  space  in  which  reflective  thought  is  actually  possible.  Without  space,  Jesus,  like  
all  human  beings,  would  be  acting  on  automatic,  and  as  already  discussed  regarding  the  
Syrophoenician  woman,  even  Jesus  is  capable  of  a  thoughtless  moment  when  acting  on  
impulse.  
Another  practice  somewhat  unique  to  Jesus,  at  least  in  the  manner  in  which  he  
goes  about  it,  is  the  way  he  gathers  disciples  around  him.  First,  not  all  ancient  teachers  
                                                                                                              
20  Heath  and  Heath,  Decisive,  Kindle  locations  2488-­‐‑2493.      
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and  healers  surrounded  themselves  with  students.  Jewish  mystics  like  Honi  the  Circle-­‐‑
Drawer21  and  Chanina  ben  Dosa22  famous  for  their  devotion  to  prayer  and  ability  to  
miraculously  change  the  weather  did  not  surround  themselves  with  disciples.  Itinerant  
Greek  healers  like  Apollonius  of  Tyana  was  said,  like  Jesus,  to  have  raised  a  little  girl  
from  the  dead,  but  he  did  not  call  disciples.23  Possible  reasons  abound  for  why  Jesus  
called  the  disciples.  Because  Jesus  gathered  twelve  disciples,  many  make  the  obvious  
connection  to  the  twelve  tribes  of  Israel.  With  the  twelve  disciples  Jesus  creates  a  
symbolic  new  Israel,  perhaps  a  sign  and  promise  of  the  reign  of  God  already  breaking  
into  the  present  age.  On  a  more  mundane  level,  though,  Jesus  gathered  the  disciples  
around  him  because  they  were  helpful.  While  much  is  rightly  made  of  the  questionable  
quality  of  the  twelve  (i.e.,  they  argued  among  themselves,  constantly  misunderstood  
Jesus’  teachings,  and  ultimately  betrayed  him),  Jesus  often  relied  on  them.  Jesus  leaned  
on  the  disciples  to  feed  and  care  for  the  crowds  at  the  miraculous  feeding,  saying  to  
them:  “You  give  them  something  to  eat”  (Matthew  14:16).  He  sends  the  disciples  out  two  
by  two  to  neighboring  towns  with  specific  instructions  regarding  their  dress  and  
behavior.  After  his  resurrection  he  commanded  the  disciples  to  carry  on  the  mission  he  
initiated  charging  them  to  hand  down  his  teachings  and  to  baptize  in  the  name  of  the  
                                                                                                              
21  Flavius  Josephus,  Complete  Works  of  Josephus  Flavius:  Wars  of  the  Jews,  Antiquities  of  the  Jews,  Against  Apion,  
Autobiography.  Interlinked  edition  incl:  maps,  timelines,  family  trees,  coinage  (New  York:  Mobi  Classics,  
2010),  Kindle  locations  22091-­‐‑22092,  Kindle.  
22  David  R.  Cartlidge  and  David  L.  Dungan,  eds.,  Documents  for  the  Study  of  the  Gospels  (Minneapolis:  
Augsburg  Fortress  Press,  1994),  157.  
23  Cartlidge  and  Dungan,  Documents  for  the  Study  of  the  Gospels,  227.  
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Father,  the  Son,  and  the  Holy  Spirit.  Indeed,  at  least  in  Matthew’s  account  Jesus  elevates  
Peter  as  a  kind  of  first  among  equals,  giving  him  the  “keys  to  the  kingdom”  (Matthew  
16:19).  
By  choosing  disciples,  equipping  them  for  ministry,  and  introducing  a  level  of  
organization  among  them  Jesus  created  at  least  the  rudiments  of  an  institution.  While  
bias  shapes  institutions  and  the  mere  fact  of  organizing  does  not,  in  and  of  itself,  mean  
better  decision  making,  Daniel  Kahneman  points  out  that  institutions  can  be  an  
extremely  helpful  tool  in  improving  our  thinking:  “Organizations  are  better  than  
individuals  when  it  comes  to  avoiding  errors,  because  they  naturally  think  more  slowly  
and  have  the  power  to  impose  orderly  procedures.  Organizations  can  institute  and  
enforce  the  application  of  useful  checklists,  as  well  as  more  elaborate  exercises,  such  as  
reference-­‐‑class  forecasting  and  the  premortem.”24  It  is  possible  that  Jesus  chooses  not  to  
go  it  alone  not  only  to  create  a  symbolic  new  Israel  or  for  the  simple  practical  help  that  
more  hands  offer.  It  is  possible  that  Jesus  surrounds  himself  with  disciples  as  a  
safeguard  to  his  own  full  humanity.  While  institutions  do  not  guarantee  good  decisions,  
and  the  disciples  certainly  made  their  share  of  mistakes,  gathering  more  voices  increases  
the  likelihood  of  disagreement,  a  key  behavioral  element  to  avoiding  confirmation  bias.  
And,  disagreement  certainly  presented  itself  between  Jesus  and  the  twelve.  While  some  
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lament  this  discord,  a  behavioral  perspective  suggests  productive  disagreement  is  
superior  to  unreflective  unanimity.  
The  most  significant  evidence  for  Jesus’  irrationality  appears  in  the  selflessness  
that  marks  his  life  and  teachings.  The  fundamental  underpinning  of  the  standard,  
instrumental  rationality  is  that  after  agents  sift  through  their  options  calculating  the  
most  advantageous  choice  for  them,  the  rational  actor  will  choose  this  path.  Rational  
actors  choose  what  is  best  for  them,  according  to  rational  choice  theory.  If  this  premise  is  
not  true,  then  the  theory  is  discredited.  On  this  point  Jesus’  irrationality  takes  our  breath  
away.  The  very  essence  of  Jesus’  life  and  teachings  stands  in  direct  opposition  to  the  
utility  maximization  of  instrumental  rationality.  It  scarcely  requires  mention  that  Jesus  
lived  and  died,  as  Dietrich  Bonhoeffer  put  it,  as  “the  man  for  others.”25  The  most  
consistent  feature  of  Jesus’  itinerant  ministry  around  the  Galilee  was  the  crowds  that  
massed  around  him  seeking  healing.  Almost  without  exception  Jesus  gave  himself  to  
these  others,  no  matter  their  state  of  ritual  cleanliness  or  whether  it  was  the  Sabbath.  
Crossing  lines  of  religion,  race,  and  gender  Jesus  constantly  poured  himself  out.  He  
healed  pagan  demoniacs  and  taught  women,  saying  of  Mary  that  she  “has  chosen  the  
better  part,  which  will  not  be  taken  away  from  her”  (Luke  10:42).  This  self-­‐‑giving  
behavior  is  what  many  Christians  hold  most  dear  about  Jesus.  
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This  kenosis  pervades  his  teachings.  What  could  be  less  rational  according  to  the  
standard  economic  model  than  Jesus’  description  of  the  landowner  in  the  parable  of  the  
laborers  in  Matthew  20:1–16?  The  kingdom  of  heaven  is  like  a  landowner  who  goes  out  
and  hires  laborers.  Some  of  these  laborers  are  hired  in  the  morning,  some  later  in  the  
day,  and  some  at  the  very  end,  and  yet  they  are  all  paid  the  same  wage.  Enraged,  they  
demand  that  the  landowner  pay  them  fairly.  The  landowner  tells  them  not  to  compare  
themselves  to  one  another  and  to  be  happy  with  what  they  have  been  given.  To  be  sure  
Jesus’  primary  point  here  is  theological  and  not  economical:  he  is  emphasizing  the  grace  
of  God  and  perhaps  making  room  for  latecomers  to  faith,  saying  it  does  not  matter  when  
someone  comes  to  faith  just  that  they  come  to  faith.  But,  one  cannot  help  but  be  
astonished  at  Jesus  asking  his  followers  to  imagine  a  world  driven  not  by  instrumental  
rationality,  fair  pay  for  a  fair  day’s  work,  but  a  world  driven  by  grace  and  generosity.  
This  thought  experiment  is  as  radical  today  as  it  was  when  it  was  first  uttered.  
And  what  about  the  entirety  of  Luke  15?  Being  accused  of  spending  time  with  all  
the  wrong  people,  Jesus  tells  the  Pharisees  and  scribes  the  parable  of  the  lost  sheep:  
“Which  one  of  you,  having  a  hundred  sheep  and  losing  one  of  them,  does  not  leave  the  
ninety-­‐‑nine  in  the  wilderness  and  go  after  the  one  that  is  lost  until  he  finds  it?”  (Luke  
15:4).  Jesus’  point  in  this  parable  is  the  joy  God  experiences  over  the  lost  being  found,  
but  the  instrumental  rationalists  have  to  be  scratching  their  heads  in  response,  thinking  
to  themselves  that  no  rational  person  would  leave  ninety-­‐‑nine  sheep  to  go  after  one.  
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According  to  the  standard  economic  model  a  rational  person  would  just  chalk  it  up  to  a  
frustrating  but  expected  loss,  a  kind  of  flock  depreciation.  As  if  seeing  they  were  not  
getting  it,  Jesus  continues  with  the  parable  of  the  coins,  switching  the  metaphor  from  
animals  to  money.  And  finally,  Jesus  offers  the  absolutely  stunning  parable  of  the  
prodigal  son,  perhaps  the  finest  articulation  of  grace  ever  offered.  A  man  with  two  sons  
faces  defection  from  the  younger,  who  asks  his  father  for  his  inheritance  and  runs  off  on  
a  spending  spree  that  leaves  him  at  rock  bottom.  Coming  up  with  a  clever  apology  to  
offer  his  father,  the  boy  is  shocked  to  find  his  father  standing  at  the  edge  of  the  horizon  
with  a  robe  in  one  hand  and  a  ring  in  the  other.  Before  the  boy  can  utter  his  self-­‐‑
interested  apology,  the  father  has  wrapped  the  boy  in  his  arms  and  called  for  the  party  
to  begin.  The  elder  brother,  an  instrumental  rationalist  through  and  through,  grumbles  
at  this  absurd  behavior  saying:  “Listen!  For  all  these  years  I  have  been  working  like  a  
slave  for  you,  and  I  have  never  disobeyed  your  command;  yet  you  have  never  given  me  
even  a  young  goat  so  that  I  might  celebrate  with  my  friends.  But  when  this  son  of  yours  
came  back,  who  has  devoured  your  property  with  prostitutes,  you  killed  the  fatted  calf  
for  him!”  (Luke  15:29–30).  The  elder  brother,  a  figure  living  inside  all  humans,  wants  to  
earn  his  father’s  love  in  a  rational  world  in  which  a  fair  amount  of  love  is  given  in  
exchange  for  a  fair  amount  of  obedience.  To  this  absurdity,  the  irrational  Jesus  can  only  
laugh.  
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As  important  as  Jesus’  life  and  teachings  are,  the  Gospels  concur  that  the  lens  
through  which  Jesus  becomes  intelligible  in  his  entirety  is  his  sacrificial  death  and  
subsequent  resurrection.  In  Jurgen  Moltmann’s  view  of  Jesus  we  discover  the  crucified  
God;  in  Karl  Barth’s  Christology  we  find  the  judge  judged  in  our  place.  The  centrality  of  
Jesus’  sacrificial  death  offers  nothing  less  than  a  hinge  around  which  everything  turns.  
But  how  does  one  understand  Jesus’  sacrifice?  Should  we  side  with  Rene  Girard  who  
views  Jesus’  death  as  an  act  of  original  mimetic  violence,  the  ultimate  act  of  negative  
irrationality?26  Perhaps  we  should  again  consider  following  the  wisdom  of  Sarah  
Coakley  who,  by  aligning  with  Martin  Nowak’s  new  game  theoretic  findings,  would  
claim  a  kind  of  rationality  for  Jesus’  self-­‐‑offering.  Or,  is  there  yet  another  way  of  
understanding  this  crucial  moment?  
Two  concepts  are  important  to  state  at  the  outset.  In  understanding  Jesus’  
sacrifice,  I  will  follow  the  more  biblical  view  that  Jesus  willingly  offered  his  life  in  
opposition  to  the  mechanistic  understanding  of  penal  substitution,  which  can  only  see  
Jesus  as  the  passive  victim  of  an  angry  Father.  In  John  Jesus  states  that  he  chooses  
sacrifice:  “I  lay  down  my  life  in  order  to  take  it  up  again.  No  one  takes  it  from  me,  but  I  
lay  it  down  of  my  own  accord,”  (John  10:17–18).  Implicit  in  the  synoptic  account  of  Jesus  
wrestling  with  this  decision  in  the  garden  of  Gethsemane  is  his  ability  to  choose  a  
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different  path,  but  after  struggling  to  the  point  of  sweating  blood  Jesus  chooses  
Golgotha.  Jesus’  agency  on  this  point  is  paramount,  for  if  there  is  no  choice  involved,  
there  is  no  question  of  rationality  or  irrationality.  
Second,  while  I  will  rely  heavily  on  Sarah  Coakley’s  brilliant  exposition  of  why  
sacrifice  is  such  a  challenging  belief  today,  I  will  continue  to  define  rationality  more  
narrowly  than  she  does.  Indeed,  I  am  well  aware  that  Coakley’s  project  largely  rests  in  
redefining  rationality  more  broadly  so  as  to  allow  for  a  new  appreciation  of  how  religion  
and  reason  cohere.  Again,  I  can  only  state  my  appreciation  for  her  work  and  agreement  
with  her  dissatisfaction  over  utilitarian  definitions  of  rationality,  but  I  will  continue  to  
follow  Ariely’s  strategy  of  undermining  the  standard  economic  model  of  rationality  on  
its  own  terms.  To  this  point  a  standard  understanding  of  rationality  as  fundamental  
emphasis  on  self-­‐‑interest  brands  sacrifice  irrational  by  definition.  In  a  standard  
understanding  of  rationality  Jesus’  sacrifice  may  be  seen  as  emotionally  compelling,  
foolish,  or  even  self-­‐‑destructive,  but  it  certainly  may  not  be  seen  as  rational.    
In  Sacrifice  Regained:  Reconsidering  the  Rationality  of  Religious  Belief,  Coakley’s  
inaugural  lecture  at  Cambridge  in  2009,  she  offers  a  brilliant  explication  of  why  the  very  
idea  of  sacrifice  has  fallen  on  such  hard  times  in  the  late  twentieth  century.  Beginning  
with  Immanuel  Kant,  Coakley  notes  how  the  great  philosopher  of  Konigsberg  expressed  
deep  reservations  over  the  usefulness  of  sacrifice  and  ritual  connected  with  sacrifice.  
Steeped  in  what  seemed  to  Kant  a  primitive  emotivism,  Kant  saw  little  room  for  sacrifice  
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in  the  rational  faith  of  the  Aufklarung.  At  most  Kant  allowed  for  the  possibility  that  the  
faithful  might  be  moved  by  rituals  connected  with  sacrifice  at  an  early  stage,  but  
progress  out  of  this  phase  through  maturity.27  Kant,  in  other  words,  found  sacrifice  too  
steeped  in  blood  to  be  of  use  to  the  rational  spirit  of  an  enlightened  age.  More  pointedly,  
Coakley  observes,  Rene  Girard’s  theory  of  sacrifice  as  mimetic  violence  took  Kant’s  
discomfort  a  step  further  and  argued  that  sacrifice  is  not  only  primitive  but  also  
suggestive  of  a  kind  of  original  violence.  In  short  Girard’s  understanding  of  sacrifice  
posits  two  individuals  desiring  the  same  object,  and  the  only  way  to  solve  their  struggle  
is  through  creating  a  sacrificial  scapegoat  in  the  form  of  a  third  person.  By  projecting  
their  mimetic  violence  onto  a  third  party,  they  are  able  to  release  this  violence  through  
sacrifice,  thus  able  to  create  stable  relationships  and  community.28  Sacrifice  in  Girard’s  
view  shows  humanity  at  its  worst.  Indeed,  Coakley’s  intellectual  foes  such  as  Sir  Richard  
Dawkins  concur  with  this  view  and  paint  all  religion,  particularly  sacrificial  religion,  as  
irreducibly  irrational  and  violent  and  best  viewed  as  a  dangerous  mental  illness.29  
Coakley  proposes  a  brilliant  solution  to  this  incredibly  dark  view  of  sacrifice;  she  
works  to  establish  room  for  what  the  Apostle  Paul  termed  λόόγικε  λατρείία,  or  rational  
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University  Press,  2012),  11.  
28  Coakley,  Sacrifice  Regained,  13.  
29  Richard  Dawkins,  The  Selfish  Gene:  30th  Anniversary  Edition-­‐‑-­‐‑with  a  new  Introduction  by  the  Author  (Oxford:  
Oxford  University  Press,  2006),  Kindle  location  6621,  Kindle.  
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sacrifice.30  From  her  partnership  with  Martin  Nowak,  Coakley  discovered  that  Dawkins’  
inherently  reductionist,  self-­‐‑interested  evolutionary  narrative  has  come  under  intense  
pressure  by  virtue  of  Nowak’s  use  of  game  theoretic  modeling.  Dawkins  cleverly  argues  
that  any  self-­‐‑sacrificial  willingness  to  cooperate  is  merely  a  disguised  form  of  self-­‐‑
interest.  In  contrast  Nowak’s  project,  which  I  will  discuss  in  detail  in  a  later  section,  
shows  convincingly  that  while  selfish  behavior  is  effective  for  individual  flourishing  in  
the  short  term,  it  is  destructive  to  the  overall  health  of  the  community  in  the  long  run.31  
Nowak  argues  that  a  seemingly  irrational  willingness  to  cooperate  in  the  animal  and  
human  world  is  so  built  in  and  predictable  as  to  comprise  a  third  foundation  of  
evolution  along  with  natural  selection  and  mutation.32  Without  resorting  to  a  naïve  
correlationism,  Coakley  does  see  in  Nowak’s  revolutionary  findings  something  of  an  
analog  to  faithful  self-­‐‑offering  and  argues  that  at  the  very  least  Nowak’s  work  
demonstrates  how  sacrifice  can  be  seen  as  rational  at  least  when  viewed  from  the  level  
of  the  community.  As  noted  in  the  previous  section  on  rationality,  Coakley  argues  Jesus’  
sacrificial  death  should  not  be  viewed  as  irrational  at  all  but  as  superrational.  His  self-­‐‑
offering  is  rational  in  that  self-­‐‑giving  follows  a  certain  line  of  reason,  especially  as  
articulated  by  Nowak,  and  it  is  super  in  both  the  excessive  nature  of  his  death  as  well  as  
                                                                                                              
30  Coakley,  Sacrifice  Regained,  2.  
31  Coakley,  Sacrifice  Regained,  23.  
32  Martin  Nowak  and  Sarah  Coakley,  eds.,  Evolution,  Games,  and  God:  The  Principle  of  Cooperation  (Cambridge,  
MA:  Harvard  University  Press,  2013),  110.  
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in  the  fact  that  it  is  a  death  once  and  for  all.  Jesus’  death  needs  no  repetition,  she  writes,  
but  rather  it  invites  participation.  
Despite  what  I  hope  is  my  obvious  admiration  and  indebtedness  to  Coakley’s  
groundbreaking  work,  I  maintain  that  Ariely’s  strategy  of  undermining  instrumental  
rationality  with  a  nuanced  understanding  of  irrationality  is  the  stronger  position.  To  
begin  with,  what  is  one  to  make  of  Coakley’s  term  superrational?  The  very  fact  that  she  
is  forced  to  come  up  with  an  awkward  neologism  suggests  that  Jesus’  sacrifice  at  the  
very  least  stretches  the  boundaries  of  rationality.  Further,  in  her  later  Gifford  lectures  
Coakley  herself  struggles  with  the  instrumental  rationality  implicit  in  Nowak’s  work.  
She  muses  over  Nowak’s  discomfort  with  the  title  of  his  own  book  Super  Cooperators,  the  
subtitle  of  which  mentions  using  altruism  for  success.  Surely  altruism  for  success  is  a  
strange  understanding  of  altruism.  Far  less  complicated  and  easier  to  understand  is  the  
behavioral  critique  of  rationality,  which  covers  the  reductionism  not  only  of  the  
economic  world  but  the  biological  and  game  theoretic  disciplines  as  well.  Ariely’s  deft  
move  of  accepting  the  common  self-­‐‑interested  understanding  of  rationality  to  then  
critique  it  is  as  unrealistic  and  undesirable  allows  us  to  view  Jesus’  sacrificial  self-­‐‑
offering  as  the  quintessential  act  of  human  irrationality  capable  of  a  sublime  upside.  The  
virtue  of  this  argument  is  that  there  is  much  room  for  agreement  so  that  theologians  and  
their  interlocutors  have  room  to  travel  together.  Theologians,  then,  can  put  their  stake  in  
the  ground  at  the  end  with  the  claim  that  Jesus’  crucifixion  is  indeed  by  definition  
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irrational,  and  that  this  irrationality  not  only  shows  his  connection  with  us  through  our  
full  humanity  but  shows  us  the  irrational  beauty  to  which  our  full  humanity  may  aspire.
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5. Cognitive Bias As Sin Or Full Humanity 
In  Predictably  Irrational  Dan  Ariely  juxtaposes  two  painful  stories  to  make  a  tragic  
observation.  Ariely  recounts  how  in  1987  the  world  followed  the  story  of  eighteen-­‐‑  
month-­‐‑old  Jessica  McClure  who  fell  into  an  abandoned  water  well  in  Midland,  Texas.  
While  the  ordeal  only  lasted  for  58  ½  hours,  Ariely  notes  the  media  coverage  made  it  
seem  as  it  if  lasted  for  months.  People  were  so  moved  by  the  story  of  this  little  girl  that  a  
TV  movie  was  made,  ballads  were  written,  and  the  McClure  family  received  an  
astounding  $700,000  in  donations.  Ariely  compares  this  story  with  an  event  that  
happened  just  a  few  years  later:  the  Rwandan  genocide.  Over  the  span  of  100  days  
around  800,000  people  were  brutally  murdered,  many  of  them  little  ones  every  bit  as  
young  and  defenseless  as  Baby  Jessica.  And,  the  world’s  response?  Were  people  800,000  
times  more  moved  by  what  unfolded  in  Rwanda?  The  response  was  not  even  close.  
News  outlets  such  as  CNN  provided  more  coverage  for  Baby  Jessica  than  for  the  entire  
Rwandan  atrocity.  Individual  Americans  gave  vastly  less  money,  ballads  were  not  sung,  
and  the  network  executives  decided  to  pass  on  any  made  for  TV  specials.  Both  the  world  
response  and  lack  of  response  pose  difficult  questions.  Why,  Dan  Ariely  asks,  “do  we  
jump  out  of  our  chairs  and  write  checks  to  help  one  person,  while  we  often  feel  no  great  
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compulsion  to  act  in  the  face  of  other  tragedies  that  are  in  fact  more  atrocious  and  
involve  many  more  people?”1  
While  racism  and  a  sense  of  being  overwhelmed  in  the  face  of  such  a  massive  
tragedy  no  doubt  play  a  factor,  Ariely  turns  to  experimental  data  for  an  explanation.  
Ariely  and  his  colleagues  conducted  an  experiment  in  which  people  were  given  a  small  
amount  of  money  for  completing  a  questionnaire  and  then  given  an  opportunity  to  
donate  some  of  this  newfound  largess.  One  group  was  presented  with  a  personal  story  
of  a  Malian  girl  named  Rokia.  Participants  were  told  their  gift  would  help  to  feed  her,  
educate  her,  and  provide  her  with  health  care.  A  second  group  was  presented  with  a  fact  
sheet  citing  statistics  regarding  food  shortages  in  Malawi  and  Zambia  affecting  millions.  
Still  a  third  group  was  presented  with  both  the  personal  story  and  the  statistics.  
Unsurprisingly,  participants  gave  twice  as  much  to  Rokia  as  they  gave  in  the  statistics  
only  condition.  What  was  surprising,  and  disturbing,  is  that  the  third  group,  the  group  
receiving  both  personal  and  statistical  information  gave  only  a  tiny  amount  more  than  
those  in  the  statistics  only  condition  (29%  compared  to  23%),  and  they  gave  far  less  than  
those  who  gave  to  Rokia  (29%  compared  to  a  whopping  48%).  Ariely’s  conclusion  from  
this  and  other  similar  studies  is  that  statistical  information  designed  to  appeal  to  our  
reason  backfires  when  it  comes  to  inducing  generosity.  Numbers  and  statistics  make  
most  people  less  likely  to  give  rather  than  more.  Ariely’s  response  to  this  conclusion  is  
                                                                                                              
1  Ariely,  The  Upside  of  Irrationality,  Kindle  locations  3131-­‐‑3148.  
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interesting.  Rather  than  lamenting  this  failing  or  vainly  trying  to  change  and  reform  this  
broken  aspect  of  our  humanity,  Ariely  suggests  decision  makers  must  acknowledge  this  
aspect  as  a  given  and  craft  their  appeals  accordingly.  
While  Ariely  himself  eschews  theological  language,  the  reality  he  describes  and  
his  response  raise  the  question  of  whether  the  behavioral  turn  accepts  sin  so  that  a  kind  
of  good-­‐‑enough  grace  might  abound.  Stated  clearly:  do  the  limiting  heuristics  and  biases  
outlined  by  cognitive  theory  simply  describe  human  sinfulness?  What  else  can  one  call  
the  indifferent  blindness  to  thousands  while  giving  excessively  to  one  already  privileged  
child  except  sin?  Since  bias  so  often  leads  to  mistakes,  risk  management  in  fields  as  
diverse  as  engineering  to  medicine  utilizes  the  study  of  heuristics  and  biases  to  prevent  
error,  a  word  whose  Latin  root  is  connected  to  sin.  Long  before  Descartes  penned  cogito  
ergo  sum,  Augustine  wrote,  “Si  enim  fallor,  sum,”  meaning,  “If  I  err,  or  sin,  I  am.”2  
Further,  does  Ariely’s  conclusion  that  decision  makers  should  accept  the  fact  that  people  
simply  are  not  moved  by  numbers  give  too  much  away?  Are  not  Christians  called  to  be  
different  and  follow  a  narrow  road?  Most  significantly,  if  I  have  convincingly  shown  
that  Jesus’  own  humanity  reflects  the  same  heuristics  and  biases  cognitive  theory  
describes,  does  a  proposed  behavioral  theology  suggest,  in  contradiction  with  the  
Christian  tradition,  that  Jesus  himself  is  not  without  sin?    
                                                                                                              
2  Augustine,  De  Civitate  Dei:  Everyman’s  Library,  trans.  Ernest  Barker,  ed.,  R.V.G.  Tasker  (London:  J.M.  Dent  
and  Sons,  1944),  Book  XXI,  Chapter  XXVI,  335.  
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These  questions  hinge  on  how  behavioral  theology  understands  sin.  Do  
heuristics  and  the  resulting  biases  simply  define  sin  with  experimental  precision,  or  is  
there  some  other  way  to  understand  these  phenomena?  Scripturally,  this  question  is  not  
easy  to  answer.  Holy  Scripture,  particularly  the  Old  Testament,  contains  a  rich  
vocabulary  of  sin.  The  New  Interpreters  Bible  commentary  notes  this  richness:  “The  
vocabulary  used  for  problematic  behavior  within  the  OT  indicates  some  of  the  
complexity.  The  most  common  terms  for  such  behavior  are  ‘sin’  or  ‘missing  the  mark’  
(khatta’th  האָט ַח;),  ‘transgression’  (pasha’   ַשׁע ָפ),  ‘iniquity’  (‘awon   ָעןוֹ),  ‘rebellion’  (meri   ְמיִר),  
or  simply  ‘evil’  (ra’  עַר).”3  
While  the  notion  of  האָט ַח  as  missing  the  mark  might  seem  in  keeping  with  
heuristics  leading  to  bias  and  error,  the  vast  majority  of  the  terms  for  sin  in  the  Old  
Testament  refer  not  to  human  error  per  se,  but  to  unjust,  broken  relationships  and  false  
religion.  The  prophets  in  particular  reserve  their  harshest  condemnations  for  a  nation  
and  individuals  breaking  covenant  with  God  by  their  treatment  of  the  poor.  Isaiah,  
using  a  broad  range  of  language  for  sin,  laments  ‘transgression’,   ַשׁע ָפ;  ‘sin’,  האָט ַח;  and  
‘iniquity’,   ָעןוֹ  of  the  people  as  seen  particularly  in  their  oppression  of  the  poor  and  in  the  
corruption  of  justice.  While  the  prophets  also  include  hard  words  for  covenant  infidelity,  
Leviticus  places  the  accent  on  sin  as  breaking  covenant  with  God  in  the  form  of  religious  
                                                                                                              
3  Harold  W.  Attridge,  “Sin,  Sinners,”  New  Interpreters  Bible  Dictionary,  vol.  5,  ed.  Katherine  Doob  Sakenfeld  
(Nashville:  Abingdon  Press,  2009),  263.  
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violation.  Leviticus  offers  an  extended  account  of  the  sacrifices  to  be  offered  for  ‘sin’,  
האָט ַח.  While  there  is  certainly  a  component  of  social  justice  to  be  found  in  the  Levitical  
conception  of  sin,  especially  justice  for  the  stranger,  the  greater  emphasis  in  Leviticus  
falls  on  sin  as  violation  of  religious  law:  uncleanness  from  contact  with  death,  blood,  and  
other  acts  leading  to  religious  pollution.4  A  more  thorough  analysis  of  the  Old  
Testament  would  certainly  add  greater  nuance  to  the  Hebrew  understanding  of  sin,  but  
the  conception  of  sin  as  lack  of  human  perfect  reason  or  will  seems  to  be  almost  wholly  
absent.  
Less  clear,  however,  is  the  understanding  of  sin  in  the  New  Testament.  To  begin  
with  the  vocabulary  for  sin  is  more  narrow  with  only  three  possibilities:  ‘lawlessness’,    
ἥ  ἀνοµμίία;  ‘evil’,  ἡ  κακόός;  and,  the  most  well  known,  ‘sin’,  ἡ  ἁµμαρτίία.  Sin  as  ἡ  ἁµμαρτίία  
represents  an  archery  metaphor  and  means  to  miss  the  mark.  This  sense  of  mistake  and  
error  certainly  seems  consistent  with  cognitive  bias.  The  difference  between  the  Old  
Testament  and  New  Testament  contexts  is  that  while  the  Hebrew  term  האָט ַח  also  conveys  
the  meaning  of  missing  the  mark,  ἡ  ἁµμαρτίία  dominates  the  New  Testament  vocabulary  
for  sin  in  a  way  that  האָט ַח  does  not  in  the  Old  Testament.  As  in  the  Old  Testament  
examples,  the  use  of  the  word  ἡ  ἁµμαρτίία  in  context  will  offer  the  best  sense  of  whether  
the  New  Testament  might  link  sin  with  bias.  
                                                                                                              
4  Attridge,  “Sin,  Sinners,”  New  Interpreters  Bible  Dictionary,  267.  
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The  meaning  of  sin  in  relationship  to  Jesus’  life  and  ministry  pairs  well  with  the  
way  sin  appears  in  the  prophets  as  Jesus  refers  to  sin  both  in  a  social  and  a  religious  
context.  In  terms  of  a  social  critique  Jesus,  like  the  prophets,  reserves  harsh  words  for  the  
sins  of  the  elite.  Sounding  like  the  prophet  in  Ezekiel  34  complaining  that  the  priests  of  
his  day  were  like  shepherds  feasting  on  their  sheep,  Jesus  goes  after  the  scribes  and  the  
Pharisees  with  gusto.  In  Matthew  23  Jesus  lays  out  the  many  sins  of  the  Pharisees:  laying  
heavy  burdens  on  those  in  their  care,  loving  the  appearance  of  being  holy  without  
actually  being  holy;  confusing  unimportant  matters  with  weighty  matters;  and  
neglecting  justice  and  mercy.  Strikingly,  in  Matthew  23  Jesus  also  refers  to  the  Pharisees  
as  being  like  whitewashed  tombs  that  look  good  on  the  outside  but  are  full  of  dead  
men’s  bones  on  the  inside.  What  is  important  to  note  is  that  while  the  Pharisees  are  in  
some  sense  making  mistakes,  what  Jesus  is  criticizing  is  not  their  imperfect  reason  or  
will  but  their  imperfect  and  unfair  treatment  of  those  in  their  power.  In  a  religious  
context  while  Jesus  certainly  challenges  the  Levitical  understanding  of  cleanliness  on  
many  occasions,  Jesus  still  links  sin  with  illness  and  the  religious  establishment  of  the  
day.  Jesus  often  links  sin  with  illness  and  the  forgiveness  of  sin  with  healing  and,  in  
many  of  these  instances,  directs  the  recipient  of  healing  to  go  and  show  themselves  to  
the  priests.  Even  in  John’s  Gospel  when  Jesus  heals  the  man  born  blind  from  birth  in  
Chapter  9  and  argues  that  the  man  was  not  born  blind  due  to  sin,  Jesus  still  links  the  
man’s  healing  to  a  religious  epiphany  of  demonstrating  Jesus  as  the  Christ.  While  the  
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concept  of  sin  in  the  life  and  work  of  Jesus  is  more  complicated  than  what  can  be  
presented  here,  it  is  enough  to  point  out  that  when  Jesus  uses  the  term  ἡ  ἁµμαρτίία,  there  
is  no  sense  that  the  mark  being  missed  is  imperfect  reason  or  will.  
Also,  sin  appears  to  be  subject  to  volition  in  Jesus’  understanding.  After  Jesus  
heals  a  man  on  the  Sabbath  in  John  5,  he  approaches  the  man  saying,  “You  have  been  
made  well!  Do  not  sin  any  more,  so  that  nothing  worse  happens  to  you”  (John  5:14).  In  
the  floating  pericope  of  John  8  Jesus  memorably  tells  the  woman  caught  in  adultery  to  
“Go  your  way,  and  from  now  on  do  not  sin  again”  (John  8:11).  While  the  theology  of  
Jesus,  who  never  claimed  to  be  a  systematic  theologian,  is  mediated  through  the  
evangelists,  it  is  clear  that  in  some  instances  Jesus  disagreed  with  Paul  Tillich’s  
existentialist  view  that  the  church  should  think  of  sin  as  a  state  of  estrangement  rather  
than  an  act  of  disobedience.5  At  times  for  Jesus  ἡ  ἁµμαρτίία  was  not  only  an  action  but  
also  an  action  subject  to  human  volition.  Sin  was  something  people  could  choose  or  not.  
Such  an  understanding  of  sin  both  in  the  Old  and  New  Testaments  at  this  point  
is  at  odds  with  a  behavioral  understanding  of  heuristics  and  biases.  This  point  of  
volition  is  particularly  significant.  The  heuristics  and  biases  that  shape  human  cognition  
are  not  subject  to  volition.  Simply  knowing  that  humans  are  subject  to  confirmation  bias  
does  not  mean  they  will  not  continue  to  seek  out  information  that  supports  the  position  
                                                                                                              
5  Paul  Tillich,  Systematic  Theology  Vol.  II  The  Existence  and  The  Christ  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  
1957),  46.  
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with  which  they  already  agree.  Behavioral  theorists  liken  heuristics  and  biases  to  optical  
illusions  in  which  people’s  minds  can  intellectually  understand  that  their  eyes  are  being  
misled,  but  this  information  fails  to  change  the  fact  that  their  eyes  continue  to  be  misled.  
So,  up  to  this  point  it  is  possible  to  argue  that  being  shaped  by  cognitive  
limitations  should  not  be  understood  as  being  sinful.  Being  shaped  by  cognitive  
limitations  means  we  are  fully  human,  and  fully  human  means  we  are  finite.  While  we  
can  accept  the  fact  that  this  finitude  means  that  our  culture,  gender,  and  social  class  
color  our  perceptions  of  the  world,  behavioral  theory  means  that  we  have  to  add  
cognitive  limitations  to  this  list  of  conditioning  factors  as  well.  Being  biased  by  itself  is  
not  sinful,  but  deceiving  ourselves  that  we  could  somehow  mentally  or  spiritually  form  
ourselves  to  be  beyond  heuristics  and  biases  might  well  be.  One  of  the  most  traditional  
understandings  of  sin  is  hubris  or  pride.  Hubris  is  the  sin  of  trying  to  reach  beyond  
humanity  to  barnstorm  the  kingdom  of  God.  Sin,  behavioral  theology  could  argue  at  this  
point,  is  not  being  biased.  Sin,  then,  is  willfully  failing  to  adjust  for  these  ever-­‐‑present  
biases,  perhaps  out  of  pride  (thinking  others  might  be  biased,  but  we  are  not)  or  out  of  
simple  sloth.  
However,  with  the  Apostle  Paul,  the  picture  of  sin  in  the  New  Testament  
changes  dramatically.  While  Paul  joins  with  other  Hellenistic  moralists  of  the  times  by  
sometimes  simply  generating  lists  of  do’s  and  sinful  don’ts,  Paul  also  offers  the  most  
sophisticated  theological  treatment  of  sin  in  the  New  Testament.  Particularly  in  Romans,  
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Paul  expands  the  sense  of  sin  as  being  a  social  or  religious  violation  to  sin  being  
something  more  approaching  a  state  of  being.  Quoting  sections  of  the  Psalms,  Paul  
establishes  that  sin  means  to  fall  short  of  the  glory  of  God,  something  shared  by  Jews  
and  Greeks  alike  in  his  view.  Paul  builds  his  hamartiology  to  a  climax  in  Romans  7  in  
which  he  shows  that  while  the  law  is  good,  it  is  insufficient  due  to  the  weakness  of  
human  flesh.  Paul  ostensibly  argues  that  sin  is  a  fundamental  weakness  of  human  
nature,  inherited  through  Adam,  in  which  the  human  being  can  know  the  good  but  is  
unable  to  will  the  good.  What  could  be  more  poignant  than  Paul’s  description  of  the  
sinful  human  condition:  “I  can  will  what  is  right,  but  I  cannot  do  it.  For  I  do  not  do  the  
good  I  want,  but  the  evil  I  do  not  want  is  what  I  do.  Now  if  I  do  what  I  do  not  want,  it  is  
no  longer  I  that  do  it,  but  sin  that  dwells  within  me”  (Romans  7:18b–20).  
This  powerful,  sweeping  view  of  sin  in  Paul  poses  a  challenge  to  a  behavioral  
theological  understanding  of  heuristics  and  biases.  While  the  majority  of  the  biblical  
witness  does  not  view  sin  as  a  human  condition  that  impairs  human  reason  and  will,  
Paul  develops  this  idea  in  a  way  that  certainly  makes  it  sensible  to  view  imperfect  
human  reason  and  will  as  sin  itself.  In  Paul’s  understanding  of  sin  “the  fundamental  
character  of  human  nature,  ‘the  flesh’…  is  beset  by  the  force  of  passionate  desire  that  
overcomes  the  rational  recognition  of  what  is  right.”6  In  this  conception  of  sin  heuristics  
and  biases  offer  evidence  of  sin  even  if  they  are  not  viewed  as  sin  itself.  And,  as  
                                                                                                              
6  Attridge, “Sin, Sinners,” New  Interpreters  Bible  Dictionary,  277.  
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previously  discussed,  viewing  heuristics  and  biases  as  sin  rather  than  as  full  humanity  
represents  an  enormous  challenge  to  a  behavioral  theological  argument  that  the  church  
needs  to  learn  more  about  cognitive  limitations  and  make  changes  in  light  of  them.  As  a  
further  complication  to  behavioral  theology,  Paul’s  notion  of  sin  as  this  state  of  
imperfect  will  gets  picked  up  and  developed  by  Calvin.  
An  astute  observer  of  the  human  condition,  Calvin  lamented  the  condition  of  
human  perception  in  a  statement  with  which  any  behavioral  theorist  could  agree:  “For  if  
it  is  considered  disgraceful  for  us  not  to  know  all  that  pertains  to  the  business  of  human  
life,  even  more  detestable  is  our  ignorance  of  ourselves,  by  which,  when  making  
decisions  in  necessary  matters,  we  miserably  deceive  and  even  blind  ourselves.”7  Self-­‐‑
deception  and  blindness  are  precisely  the  problems  that  behavioralists  argue  mark  
human  decision  making.  Moreover,  before  any  psychologist  came  up  with  the  term  
‘optimism  bias’,  Calvin  had  already  observed  that  this  behavior  is  endemic  to  humanity:  
“There  is,  indeed,  nothing  that  man’s  nature  seeks  more  eagerly  than  to  be  flattered.  
Accordingly,  when  his  nature  becomes  aware  that  its  gifts  are  highly  esteemed,  it  tends  
to  be  unduly  credulous  about  them.  It  is  thus  no  wonder  that  the  majority  of  men  have  
erred  so  perniciously  in  this  respect.  For  since  blind  self-­‐‑love  is  innate  in  all  mortals,  they  
are  most  freely  persuaded  that  nothing  inheres  in  themselves  that  deserves  to  be  
                                                                                                              
7  John  Calvin,  Institutes  of  the  Christian  Religion:  Volumes  XX  and  XXI  The  Library  of  Christian  Classics,  trans.  
Ford  L.  Battles,  ed.  John  T.  McNeil  (Philadelphia:  Westminster,  1960),  II.i.1.  
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considered  hateful.”8  Five  hundred  years  before  Sunstein  and  Thaler  wryly  pointed  out  
how  most  people  believe  themselves  to  be  above  average,  Calvin  already  recognized  
how  easy  it  is  for  humans  to  believe  in  themselves  and  how  difficult  it  is  for  humans  to  
be  persuaded  that  anything  inheres  in  them  that  might  be  considered  less  than  
wonderful.  
Calvin  raised  objections  to  the  optimistic  anthropologies  he  saw  in  two  schools  of  
thought  influential  in  his  day:  humanistic  philosophy  and  Thomist  Roman  Catholic  
theology.  Where  the  philosophers  held  an  elevated  view  of  human  reason,  the  Roman  
Catholic  theology  of  Calvin’s  day  emphasized  human  will.  Calvin  held  a  dim  view  of  
both.  “This  [error]  we  observe  has  happened  to  certain  philosophers,  who,  while  urging  
man  to  know  himself,  propose  the  goal  of  recognizing  his  own  worth  and  excellence.  
And  they  would  have  him  contemplate  in  himself  nothing  but  what  swells  him  with  
empty  assurance  and  puffs  him  up  with  pride.”9  Even  more  pointedly,  Calvin  argues  
that  the  philosophers  sought  in  vain  when  they  looked  to  humanity  for  a  model  to  
define  reason  and  rationality:  “Hence  the  great  obscurity  faced  by  the  philosophers,  for  
they  were  seeking  in  a  ruin  for  a  building,  and  in  scattered  fragments  for  a  well-­‐‑knit  
structure.”10  While  grateful  for  the  humanist  renaissance  of  classical  study  providing  a  
                                                                                                              
8  Calvin,  Institutes  of  the  Christian  Religion,  II.i.2.  
9  Calvin,  Institutes  of  the  Christian  Religion,  II.i.1.  
10  Calvin,  Institutes  of  the  Christian  Religion,  I.xv.8.  
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method,  ad  fontes,  to  recover  crucial  elements  of  the  early  faith,  Calvin  resists  a  humanist  
spirit  that  would  make  of  the  human  the  center  of  all  things.  
At  the  same  time  as  Calvin  worked  to  fence  out  an  overestimation  of  human  
reason  present  in  the  philosophical  spirit  of  the  age,  Calvin  equally  resisted  the  
optimism  he  saw  present  in  the  Scholastic  theology  of  the  church.  In  particular  Calvin  
objected  to  the  notion  of  cooperative  grace  articulated  by  Peter  Lombard:  “The  Master  of  
the  Sentences  meant  to  settle  this  point  when  he  taught:  ‘We  need  two  kinds  of  grace  to  
render  us  capable  of  good  works.’    He  calls  the  first  kind  ‘operating,’  which  ensures  that  
we  effectively  will  to  do  good.  The  second  he  calls  ‘co-­‐‑operating,’  which  follow  the  good  
will  as  a  help  …  while  he  attributes  the  effective  desire  for  good  to  the  grace  of  God,  yet  
he  hints  that  man  by  his  very  own  nature  somehow  seeks  after  the  good—though  
ineffectively.”11  Quoting  from  Augustine  against  this  elevation  of  human  will,  Calvin  
writes  that  human  will  is  free  only  to  prevent  blaming  sin  on  God:  “Only  let  no  one  so  
dare  to  deny  the  decision  of  the  will  as  to  wish  to  excuse  sin.”12    Yet  for  Calvin,  human  
will  is  only  truly  free  to  choose  the  good  when  the  Spirit  of  the  Lord  is  present.13    To  
claim  anything  more  for  the  will  is  to  “usurp  God’s  honor,  and  thus  become  guilty  of  
monstrous  sacrilege.”14  By  sacrilege,  Calvin  means  what  is  at  stake  is  nothing  less  than  a  
                                                                                                              
11  Calvin,  Institutes  of  the  Christian  Religion,  II.ii.6.  
12  Calvin,  Institutes  of  the  Christian  Religion,  II.ii.8.  
13  Calvin,  Institutes  of  the  Christian  Religion,  II.ii.8.  
14  Calvin,  Institutes  of  the  Christian  Religion,  II.ii.10.  
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complete  understanding  of  salvation  by  grace  itself:  who  needs  grace  when  they  have  
enough  will  power  to  make  a  choice  for  Christ?  
To  be  fair  as  dim  as  Calvin  appears  to  be  regarding  human  reason  and  will,  he  is  
not  as  dour  as  one  might  expect.  Calvin  acknowledges  that  hints  and  fragments  of  
reason  and  will  remain  in  humanity:  “In  short,  the  many  pre-­‐‑eminent  gifts  with  which  
the  human  is  endowed  proclaim  that  something  divine  has  been  engraved  upon  it;  all  
these  are  testimonies  to  an  immortal  essence.”15  Further,  Calvin  describes  the  workings  
of  the  human  mind  as  being  often  capable  of  “nimbleness  in  searching  out  heaven  and  
earth  and  the  secrets  of  nature.”16  Indeed,  Calvin  grants  that  a  glimmer  of  God’s  image  
remains  in  humanity  and  that  “God’s  image  was  not  totally  annihilated  and  destroyed  
in  him.”17  The  problem,  according  to  Calvin,  is  that  while  glimmers  and  traces  of  reason  
and  will  remain  in  humanity,  they  are  nothing  compared  to  what  they  once  were  before  
the  Fall  and  what  they  are  as  viewed  in  the  restoration  of  humanity  embodied  in  Jesus  
Christ.  
Calvin’s  anthropology  relies  entirely  on  a  strong  and  all-­‐‑encompassing  view  of  
the  Fall:  “We  cannot  have  a  clear  and  complete  knowledge  of  God  unless  it  is  
accompanied  by  a  corresponding  knowledge  of  ourselves.  This  knowledge  of  ourselves  
is  twofold:  namely,  to  know  what  we  were  like  when  we  were  first  created  and  what  our  
                                                                                                              
15  Calvin,  Institutes  of  the  Christian  Religion,  I.xv.2.  
16  Calvin,  Institutes  of  the  Christian  Religion,  I.xv.2.  
17  Calvin,  Institutes  of  the  Christian  Religion,  I.xv.4.  
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condition  became  after  the  fall  of  Adam.”18  In  Adam  Calvin  argues  that  reason  and  will  
were  intact:  “Man  in  his  first  condition  excelled  in  these  pre-­‐‑eminent  endowments,  so  
that  his  reason,  understanding,  prudence,  and  judgment  not  only  sufficed  for  the  
direction  of  his  earthly  life,  but  by  them  men  mounted  up  even  to  God  and  eternal  
bliss.”19  Calvin  exceeds  even  the  philosophers  and  the  poets  in  his  exultation  of  human  
capacity,  except  that  Calvin  is  praising  humanity  in  what  he  sees  as  a  ‘first  condition’:  a  
hypothetical  perfectly  rational  being  who  existed  before  the  Fall.  In  this  sense  Calvin  
argues  that  originally  humanity  did  not  suffer  from  limiting  heuristics  and  predictable  
blind  spots  generated  by  biases,  while  at  the  same  time  observing  that  in  his  day  gross  
irrationality  abounded.  
What  keeps  Calvin’s  anthropology  from  being  tragic  is  Jesus  Christ.  While  
christologically  Calvin  views  Jesus  as  fully  God  and  fully  human,  one  senses  a  certain  
anxiety  regarding  Jesus’  humanity  as  it  pertains  to  his  divinity.  Refuting  what  he  calls  
the  Manichaean  error  of  claiming  too  strong  a  link  between  God’s  nature  and  humanity,  
Calvin  writes:  “For  if  man’s  soul  be  from  the  essence  of  God  through  derivation,  it  will  
follow  that  God’s  nature  is  subject  not  only  to  change  and  passions,  but  also  to  
ignorance,  wicked  desires,  infirmity,  and  all  manner  of  vices.  Nothing  is  more  inconstant  
than  man.  Contrary  motions  stir  up  and  variously  distract  his  soul.  Repeatedly  he  is  led  
                                                                                                              
18  Calvin,  Institutes  of  the  Christian  Religion,  I.xv.1.  
19  Calvin,  Institutes  of  the  Christian  Religion,  I.xv.1.  
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astray  by  ignorance.  He  yields,  overcome  by  the  slightest  temptation.  We  know  his  mind  
to  be  a  sink  and  lurking  place  for  every  sort  of  filth.  All  these  things  one  must  attribute  
to  God’s  nature,  if  we  understand  the  soul  to  be  from  God’s  essence  …  who  would  not  
shudder  at  this  monstrous  thing?”20  By  acknowledging  that  humanity  is  made  in  God’s  
image,  Calvin  is  not  saying  one  can  look  at  humanity  and  discover  God.  A  trace  of  the  
image  remains,  but  the  fallen  human  being  is  too  marked  by  Calvin’s  unpleasant  list  of  
attributes  to  discern  God  in  humans.  But,  what  of  Jesus?  What  of  his  humanity?  If  one  
claims  that  Jesus  is  fully  human  and  fully  divine,  does  one  involve  God  in  error  and  
filth?  Is  one  saying  a  monstrous  thing?  
Calvin  avoids  this  difficulty  by  viewing  Jesus  as  being  fully  human,  yes,  but  not  
bearing  a  humanity  tainted  by  the  Fall.  Jesus  Christ,  to  Calvin,  represents  true  humanity  
as  it  existed  before  the  Fall:  “Consequently,  the  beginning  of  our  recovery  of  salvation  is  
in  that  restoration  which  we  obtain  through  Christ,  who  also  is  called  the  Second  Adam  
for  the  reason  that  he  restores  us  to  true  and  complete  integrity.”21  Therefore,  all  of  the  
qualities  of  perfect  reason,  understanding,  and  will  that  Calvin  attributes  to  humanity  in  
the  first  state  before  the  Fall  Calvin  attributes  to  Jesus  Christ’s  humanity.  In  this  way  
Calvin  is  able  to  affirm  Christ’s  divinity  and  at  the  same  time  safeguard  God’s  majesty  
from  humanness  by  claiming  that  Jesus’  humanity  is  not  really  equivalent  to  observable  
                                                                                                              
20  Calvin,  Institutes  of  the  Christian  Religion,  I.xv.5.  
21  Calvin,  Institutes  of  the  Christian  Religion,  I.xv.4.  
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humanity  after  the  Fall.  Calvin  admits  to  Christ  bearing  some  marks  of  humanity:  Christ  
is  born  of  a  woman,  and  is  “subject  to  hunger,  thirst,  cold,  and  other  infirmities  of  our  
nature.”22  And  yet,  Calvin  maintains  that  in  Christ’s  virgin  birth  Jesus  was  so  sanctified  
by  the  Holy  Spirit  that  he  “might  be  pure  and  undefiled  as  would  have  been  true  before  
Adam’s  fall.”23  
To  sum  up  a  Calvinist  view  of  cognitive  limitations  then,  heuristics  and  their  
resulting  biases  stem  from  the  fallen  nature  of  humanity.  Before  the  Fall  men  and  
women  perfectly  reflected  the  image  of  God  and  as  such  were  endowed  with  perfect  
reason,  understanding,  and  will.  Then,  as  a  result  of  the  Fall,  the  marred  image  of  Adam  
blemished  all  of  humanity.  Thus,  humanity  may  be  said  to  have  some  reason  and  will,  
but  ultimately  these  faculties  are  systemically  and  fatally  flawed.  In  this  sense  the  
behavioralists  of  today  should  be  viewed  from  the  perspective  of  Calvin  as  merely  
sketching  out  the  defects  of  sin.  These  heuristics  and  biases  describe,  in  other  words,  the  
sinful  division  Paul  describes  between  the  human  capacity  to  know  the  good  and  the  
inability  to  do  the  good.  The  Apostle  Paul  describes  the  body  of  sin:  “I  can  will  what  is  
right,  but  I  cannot  do  it.  For  I  do  not  do  the  good  I  want,  but  the  evil  I  do  not  want  is  
what  I  do”  (Romans  7:18b–19).  The  lists  of  heuristics  and  biases  in  this  view  are  akin  to  
the  catalogue  of  demons  the  desert  fathers  and  mothers  collected  in  the  Egyptian  
                                                                                                              
22  Calvin,  Institutes  of  the  Christian  Religion,  II.xiii.1.  
23  Calvin,  Institutes  of  the  Christian  Religion,  II.xiii.4.  
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wilderness.  While  the  behavioralists  should  be  applauded  for  their  honest,  humble  
acknowledgment  of  human  fallibility,  the  behavioralist  view  regarding  the  permanence  
of  these  failures  and  guidance  regarding  just  accepting  these  biases  would  be  deeply  
suspect  from  a  Calvinist  conviction.    
If,  then,  heuristics  and  biases  describe  sin,  the  consistent  argument  from  
behavioral  theorists  that  one  must  just  accept  these  heuristics  and  biases  as  givens  
appears  to  accept  the  defeat  of  sin  rather  than  living  in  joyous,  proleptic  anticipation  of  
the  victory  of  Christ.  In  this  view  a  behavioral  theology  might  have  descriptive  but  not  
prescriptive  value:  behavioral  theology  might  be  helpful  in  identifying  and  predicting  
areas  of  brokenness  with  a  high  degree  of  accuracy,  but  then  spiritual  disciplines  such  as  
common  worship,  prayer,  and  devotional  reading  should  be  engaged  to  heal  these  
twisted,  defective  aspects  of  human  nature.  Thus,  by  the  power  of  the  Holy  Spirit  
humans  might  be  conformed  more  by  the  will  of  God  than  by  their  biases.  Moreover,  as  
I  have  tried  to  show,  a  behavioral  description  of  Jesus  regardless  of  its  explanatory  value  
must  be  rejected  as  standing  in  contradiction  to  Paul’s  view  of  Christ:  “For  our  sake  he  
made  him  to  be  sin  who  knew  no  sin”  (Second  Corinthians  5:21)  and  the  perspective  of  
the  author  of  Hebrews:  “For  we  do  not  have  a  high  priest  who  is  unable  to  sympathize  
with  our  weaknesses,  but  we  have  one  who  in  every  respect  has  been  tested  as  we  are,  
yet  without  sin”  (Hebrews  4:15).  
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Fortunately  for  the  prospect  of  behavioral  theology,  while  Calvin’s  two-­‐‑state  
solution  may  solve  Calvin’s  dilemma  over  whether  God  could  take  flesh  without  fully  
assuming  the  fallen  human  condition,  Calvin’s  solution  comes  at  the  cost  of  God’s  
freedom  and  Christ’s  full  humanity.  Karl  Barth’s  respectful  critique  of  Calvin’s  
anthropology  outlines  a  God  freely  capable  of  assuming  humanness  in  all  its  brokenness  
merely  because  God  is  God  and  delineates  a  fully  human  Jesus  in  whom  God  and  
humanity  become  partners.  Barth’s  emphasis  on  the  divine  initiative  and  his  
acknowledgment  that  limitation  is  not  sin  frees  behavioral  theology  to  understand  
cognitive  systems,  heuristics,  and  biases  not  as  sin  but  as  the  finitude,  the  limitation,  of  
full  humanity.  While  it  is  challenging  to  accept  that  human  ability  to  perceive  the  world  
is  limited  and  conditioned  by  cognitive  processes,  these  limiting  processes  are  not  sinful  
in  and  of  themselves.  Barth  will  also  offer  a  pathway  to  see  that  while  human  finitude  is  
not  sin,  how  humans  respond  to  this  finitude  may  well  be.  
First,  an  acknowledgment  must  be  made  that  Barth  may  initially  seem  like  an  
unusual  choice  for  a  theology  seeking  to  relate  the  Christian  tradition  to  social  science.  
After  all,  it  is  Barth  who  responded  to  Bruner’s  mild  attempt  at  a  chastened  natural  
theology  with  his  famous  “Nein!”  It  is  Barth  who  describes  the  entirety  of  nineteenth  
century  theology  as  “religionistic,  anthropocentric,  and  in  this  sense  humanistic  …  to  
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think  about  God  meant  to  think  in  a  scarcely  veiled  fashion  about  man.”24  Wolf  Krotke  is  
correct  to  write:  “For  Barth,  in  fact,  means  that  if  we  want  to  know  who  and  what  the  
human  being  is,  we  are  not  in  the  first  place  to  look  to  ourselves.  Nor  are  we  to  begin  
with  what  the  empirical  sciences  say  about  the  human  being;  nor  are  we  to  orient  
ourselves  to  the  phenomena  of  human  existence  past  and  present  in  an  attempt  to  
interpret  the  experiences  which  are  there  expressed.”25  To  be  sure  Barth  himself  would  
have  had  little  if  any  interest  in  what  behavioral  theory  has  to  say  about  humanity,  at  
least  as  a  primary  source  of  constructing  a  theological  anthropology.  However,  the  word  
primary  is  key.  While  Barth’s  theology  itself  is  not  behavioral  in  any  sense  of  the  term,  
his  critique  of  Calvin  and  Barth’s  understanding  of  what  he  calls  “the  humanity  of  God”  
open  a  pathway  in  which  the  church  can  primarily  understand  anthropology  stemming  
from  God’s  desire  to  be  with  and  for  humanity.  Secondarily,  the  church  can  freely  turn  
to  social  science  for  additional  insight  into  the  particularity  of  the  human  experience.    
While  brimming  over  with  respect  for  “Master  Calvin,”  Barth  offers  not  only  a  
critique  of  Calvin’s  understanding  of  predestination,  but  Barth  offers  an  explicit  
correction  to  Calvin’s  Christology  and  anthropology  as  well.  Barth’s  main  challenge  to  
Calvin’s  anthropology  is  Calvin’s  starting  point.  Understandably,  Calvin  starts  his  
investigation  of  anthropology  with  humanity:  “We  must  now  speak  of  the  creation  of  
                                                                                                              
24  Karl  Barth,  The  Humanity  of  God,  trans.  John  Newton  Thomas  and  Thomas  Wieser  (Philadelphia:  John  
Knox  Press,  1960),  39.  
25  Wolf  Krotke,  The  Humanity  of  the  Human  Person  in  Karl  Barth’s  Anthroplogy:  The  Cambridge  Companion  to  Karl  
Barth,  ed.  John  Webster  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2000),  159.  
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man  …  this  knowledge  of  ourselves  is  twofold:  namely,  to  know  what  we  were  like  
when  we  were  first  created  and  what  our  condition  became  after  the  fall  of  Adam.”26  
While  starting  with  humans  to  understand  humanity  seems  like  a  sensible  beginning,  
Barth  attacks  this  approach  again  and  again  insisting  that  the  only  starting  place  for  
theological  anthropology  is  with  God  in  Jesus  Christ:  “The  ontological  determination  of  
humanity  is  grounded  in  the  fact  that  one  man  among  all  others  is  the  man  Jesus.  So  
long  as  we  select  any  other  starting  point  for  our  study,  we  shall  reach  only  the  
phenomena  of  the  human.”27  Calvin’s  anthropological  starting  point  is  human  beings:  
specifically  the  dual  nature  of  humans  pre  and  post  Fall.  By  changing  the  starting  point,  
Barth  opens  up  octaves  of  possibility  closed  to  Calvin.  
Specifically,  when  Jesus  Christ  is  the  starting  point  in  understanding  humanity,  
then  the  good  news  of  grace  is  the  ultimate  frame  as  opposed  to  the  judgment  of  the  fall.  
Wolf  Krotke  interprets:  “In  the  man  Jesus,  the  eternal  triune  God  has  elected  all  human  
beings  as  his  covenant  partners  in  a  free  act  of  the  overflowing  of  his  love.”28  In  this  
grace  and  because  of  God’s  divine  freedom  Barth  sees  no  essential  conflict  between  the  
divine  and  the  human  as  does  Calvin.  Because  God  is  God  to  Barth,  God  can  freely  
assume  humanity  without  in  any  way  compromising  God’s  nature,  which  is  love  and  
freedom:  “God’s  deity  is  thus  no  prison  in  which  He  can  exist  only  in  and  for  Himself.  It  
                                                                                                              
26  Calvin,  Institutes  of  the  Christian  Religion,  I.xv.1.  
27  Barth,  Church  Dogmatics  Vol.  III:  The  Doctrine  of  Creation,  Part  2,  132.    
28  Krotke,  The  Humanity  of  the  Human  Person  in  Karl  Barth’s  Anthroplogy,  163.  
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is  rather  His  freedom  to  be  in  and  for  Himself  but  also  with  and  for  us,  to  assert  but  also  
to  sacrifice  Himself,  to  be  wholly  exalted  but  also  completely  humble,  not  only  almighty  
but  also  almighty  mercy,  not  only  Lord  but  also  servant,  not  only  judge  but  also  Himself  
the  judged,  not  only  the  man’s  eternal  king  but  also  his  brother  in  time.  And  all  that  
without  in  the  slightest  forfeiting  His  deity!”29  
Moreover,  because  of  this  divine  freedom,  there  is  no  tension  between  God  and  
humanity,  and  there  is  no  tension  in  the  person  of  Jesus  Christ  between  Christ’s  divinity  
and  his  full  humanity.  While  Calvin  offers  a  vision  of  postlapsarian  Jesus  so  perfect  in  
reason  and  will  as  to  be  scarcely  recognizable  as  a  human  being,  Jesus  Christ  in  Barth’s  
view  is  fully  human  in  every  way:  “Is  it  not  true  that  in  Jesus  Christ,  as  He  is  attested  in  
the  Holy  Scripture,  genuine  deity  includes  in  itself  genuine  humanity?  There  is  the  
father  who  cares  for  his  lost  son,  the  king  who  does  the  same  for  his  insolvent  debtor,  
the  Samaritan  who  takes  pity  on  the  one  who  fell  among  robbers  and  in  his  
thoroughgoing  act  of  compassion  cares  for  him  in  a  fashion  as  unexpected  as  it  is  liberal.  
And  this  is  the  act  of  compassion  to  which  all  these  parables  as  parable  of  the  Kingdom  
of  heaven  refer.  The  very  One  who  speaks  in  these  parable  takes  to  His  heart  the  
weakness  and  the  perversity,  the  helplessness  and  the  misery,  of  the  human  race  
surrounding  Him.  He  does  not  despise  men,  but  in  an  inconceivable  manner  esteems  
                                                                                                              
29  Barth,  The  Humanity  of  God,  49.  
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them  highly  just  as  they  are,  takes  them  into  His  heart  and  sets  Himself  in  their  place.”30  
Barth  is  also  careful  to  point  out  that  God’s  assumption  of  full  humanity  is  not  only  in  
keeping  with  God’s  majesty,  but  it  maintains  the  authentic  nature  of  humanity.  
Describing  what  happens  in  baptism  when  the  baptized  dies  to  self  and  rises  in  Christ,  
Barth  views  the  new  creature  as  “not  engulfed  and  covered  as  by  a  divine  landslide  or  
swept  away  as  by  a  divine  flood.”31  
What  is  sin,  then,  for  Barth?  In  his  characterization  of  sin  Barth  veers  the  furthest  
from  Calvin.  For  Barth  sin  is  not  a  lack  of  perfect  reason,  understanding,  and  will  
exhibited  by  a  second,  post-­‐‑Fall  humanity.  For  Barth,  as  for  Augustine,  sin  is  
nothingness,  an  “ontological  impossibility.”  Wolf  Krotke  expands  on  Barth’s  position:  
“Over  against  this,  everything  sinful  in  human  being  is  without  meaning  or  ground.  It  
cannot  be  derived  either  from  God’s  determination  of  the  human  or  from  God’s  conduct  
toward  the  human.  It  has  no  ground  whatsoever.  It  is  absurd.  That  is  why  it  does  not  
belong  in  an  anthropology  that  deals  with  God’s  elected,  ontologically  good  creature.”32  
For  Barth,  then,  sin  is  not  a  lack  of  human  perfection  compared  to  the  light  of  Jesus  
Christ  or  some  kind  of  imagined  pre-­‐‑Fall  existence.  Sin  is  the  human  freedom  to  respond  
to  God’s  desire  for  partnership,  the  divine  Yes,  with  a  sad,  meaningless  no.  This  no  is  
                                                                                                              
30  Barth,  The  Humanity  of  God,  51.  
31  Karl  Barth,  Church  Dogmatics  Vol  IV:  The  Doctrine  of  Reconciliation,  Part  4,  trans.  H.  Knight,  G.W.  Bromiley,  
J.K.S.  Reid,  and  R.H.  Fuller,  eds.  G.W.  Bromiley  and  T.F.  Torrance  (Peabody,  MA:  Hendrickson  Publishers,  
2010),  163.  
32  Krotke,  The  Humanity  of  the  Human  Person  in  Karl  Barth’s  Anthropology,  165.  
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meaningless  because  the  human  no  can  never  negate  God’s  divine  Yes,  which  provides  
the  very  ground  of  human  existence.  Further,  sin  is  also  hubris  to  Barth.  Whereas  Christ  
emptied  himself  taking  the  form  of  a  slave,  human  sin  rejects  this  freely  chosen  
limitation;  humans  choose  instead  a  false,  Promethean  understanding  of  freedom.  God’s  
freedom  in  Jesus  Christ  is  the  freedom  to  love;  and  because  of  this  freedom  to  love,  Jesus  
Christ  freely  accepts  the  limitations  and  finitude  of  human  creatureliness.  Human  sin  
qua  hubris  rejects  the  very  idea  of  limitation,  wanting  to  assert  itself  against  every  
possible  line.  Barth’s  devastating  critique  against  the  human  desire  to  elevate  itself  
without  the  help  of  God,  no  doubt  aimed  at  the  Romantic  liberalism  of  his  youth,  seems  
incredibly  consistent  with  the  behavioral  insistence  that  humans  are  often  less  aware  of  
what  is  motivating  them  and  their  thinking  than  they  know.  
Ultimately,  Barth’s  theological  anthropology  offers  such  a  contrast  to  Calvin’s  
understanding  that  Barth  could  only  lament,  if  somewhat  humorously,  over  Calvin’s  
half  measures:  “It  is  when  we  look  at  Jesus  Christ  that  we  know  decisively  that  God’s  
deity  does  not  exclude,  but  includes  His  humanity.  Would  that  Calvin  had  energetically  
pushed  ahead  on  this  point  in  his  Christology,  his  doctrine  of  God,  his  teaching  about  
predestination,  and  then  logically  also  in  his  ethics!    His  Geneva  would  then  not  have  
become  such  a  gloomy  affair.  His  letters  would  then  not  have  contained  so  much  
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bitterness.”33  Barth’s  correction  to  Calvin’s  unduly  complicated  two-­‐‑state  vision  of  
humanity  that  links  sin  with  human  imperfection  frees  behavioral  theology  from  having  
to  understand  heuristics  and  biases  as  sin.  In  a  Barthian  anthropology  the  human  being  
finds  primary  expression  in  the  meeting  between  the  divine  and  the  human  in  the  
person  of  Jesus  Christ.  God  in  God’s  freedom  elects  to  partner  with  humanity  in  the  
person  of  Jesus  Christ,  and  this  partnership  impinges  neither  on  God’s  majesty  nor  on  
the  creatureliness  of  genuine  humanity.  Unlike  Calvin’s  Christ,  who  is  fully  God  and  
only  vaguely  recognizable  as  a  human  being,  Barth’s  Christ  is  fully  God  and  fully  
human.  Barth  frees  us  to  understand  the  heuristics  and  biases  described  by  behavioral  
theorists  not  as  broken  aspects  of  human  sinfulness  but  as  facets  of  our  full  humanity.  
I  would  also  argue  that  Barth’s  anthropology  does  not  merely  counter  Calvin  but  
creates  a  kind  of  space  in  which  behavioral  theology  might  sketch  out  a  connection  
between  a  theological  understanding  of  humanity  and  a  behavioral  understanding  of  
humanity.  There  are  aspects  of  deep  resonance  between  the  two  views,  as  disparate  as  
they  appear  on  the  surface.  Barth’s  extreme  pushback  against  humanist  optimism,  as  
noted  in  the  earlier  discussion  of  Barth’s  view  on  pride,  is  shared  by  the  behavioralist  
turn.  One  of  the  most  challenging  and  invigorating  aspects  of  Barth’s  theology  and  
behavioral  theory  is  his  bracing  attack  against  human  ability.  Writing  from  a  twenty-­‐‑first  
                                                                                                              
33  Barth,  The  Humanity  of  God,  49.  
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century  North  American  context  in  which  human  will  power  is  all  but  deified,  Barth’s  
consistent  shift  away  from  the  human  feels  right  at  home  with  the  humility  expressed  in  
behavioral  thinking.  To  be  sure  Barth  rightly  reminds  us  that  any  theological  
anthropology  must  start  with  Jesus  Christ  and  God’s  partnership  with  humanity  in  the  
person  of  Christ  and  not  with  social  science  or  history.  But,  Barth  was  no  anti-­‐‑
intellectual,  either.  Barth  acknowledged  the  role  of  the  sciences  provided  they  did  not  
usurp  the  divine  initiative.  In  this  way  Barth  not  only  leaves  space  for  a  behavioral  
theology  but  also  offers  a  helpful  framework  to  keep  such  a  project  from  falling  into  
humanist  error.
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6. Correcting Practical Docetism: A Behavioral 
Practical Theology 
Church  leaders  should  notice  that  something  really  interesting  is  at  work  in  the  
behavioral  critique  of  instrumental  rationality.  The  behavioral  critique  represents  a  shift  
in  anthropology,  which  occurred  as  researchers  grew  increasingly  aware  that  their  
neglect  of  full  humanity  jeopardized  the  validity  of  their  predictive  models.  The  church  
has  traveled  a  similar  road.  In  one  of  the  earliest  misunderstandings  of  Jesus  Christ  
second  century  Bishop  Serapion  grew  concerned  about  something  he  called  Docetism  
after  reading  the  Gospel  of  Peter  being  used  by  the  church  in  Rhosus.1  While  the  talking  
cross  in  the  Gospel  might  have  raised  a  few  eyebrows,  what  concerned  Serapion  most  
was  the  fact  that  on  the  cross  The  Gospel  of  Peter  states  that  Jesus  “felt  no  pain.”2  
Docetism,  from  the  Greek  δοκέέω,  meaning  to  seem,  claims  Jesus  was  not  truly  human,  
but  only  appeared  to  be  human.  This  belief  appeals  to  believers  then  and  now.  What  
could  be  better  than  to  get  rid  of  the  messiness  and  weakness  of  the  flesh?  As  already  
noted,  this  temptation  to  lift  up  Christ’s  spirit  and  mind  and  deny  his  humanness  was  
ruled  out  by  the  church  at  Nicaea  in  325.  Without  the  fleshy-­‐‑ness  of  Christ,  the  humanity  
of  Christ,  the  fundamental  connection  between  God  and  humanity  through  the  God-­‐‑
                                                                                                              
1  John  Arendzen,  "ʺDocetae,"ʺ  The  Catholic  Encyclopedia,  vol.  5  (New  York:  Robert  Appleton  Company,  1909),  
13,  accessed  January  9,  2014,  http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05070c.htm.  
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05070c.htm.  
2  Raymond  Brown,  trans.,  “The  Gospel  of  Peter,”  accessed  January  9,  2014,  
http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/text/gospelpeter-­‐‑brown.html.  
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man,  Jesus  Christ,  is  lost.  It  is  not  hyperbole  to  suggest  that  on  that  connection  rests  all.  
As  Gregory  of  Nazianzus  put  it:  “That  which  is  not  assumed  is  not  healed.”3  
And  yet,  to  borrow  and  modify  a  concept  from  Ken  Carder  and  Laceye  Warner,  
for  all  of  our  history  with  Docetism,  the  church  today  suffers  at  times  from  a  kind  of  
‘practical  Docetism’,  especially  in  the  way  the  church  trains  leaders.  Carder  and  Warner  
in  Grace  to  Lead  lament  the  habit  of  church  leaders  when  planning  for  the  future  to  slip  
into  a  kind  of  ‘practical  atheism’,  wrongly  thinking  that  the  future  of  the  church  depends  
on  human  strategic  thinking  alone  rather  than  the  outpouring  love  of  the  triune  God.4  
While  their  point  is  well  taken  that  faithful  ecclesial  leaders  must  ground  their  decision  
making  in  the  love  and  grace  of  God,  a  behavioral  theology  would  add  that  faithful  
leaders  also  need  to  make  decisions  in  light  of  an  adequate  theological  anthropology  
encompassing  our  full  humanity.  Without  an  adequate  theological  anthropology,  church  
leaders,  like  classical  economists,  unreflectively  ascribe  greater  rationality  to  church  
leaders  and  church  members  than  behavioral  theorists  have  demonstrated  is  present.  
Rather  than  the  econs  of  Sunstein  and  Thaler,  though,  practical  Docetism  assumes  
‘theologicons’,  entirely  rational  church  members  unswayed  by  emotion,  unaffected  by  
behavioral  blind  spots,  and  able  to  renew  their  minds  without  serious  attention  to  their  
brains  or  bodies.  Such  training  may  be  not  merely  unhelpful  but  professionally  
                                                                                                              
3  Hardy,  Christology  of  the  Later  Fathers,  218.  
4  Ken  Carder  and  Laceye  Warner,  Grace  to  Lead:  Practicing  Leadership  in  the  Wesleyan  Tradition  (Nashville,  TN:  
General  Board  of  Higher  Education  and  Ministry  of  the  United  Methodist  Church,  2011),  11.  
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damaging  to  those  called  to  lead.  Michael  and  Deborah  Jinkins  sense  this:  “Over  a  
combined  experience  of  almost  forty  years  of  leadership  and  study  in  nonprofit  
organizations  …  we  have  become  convinced  that  many  of  the  things  that  leaders  in  these  
institutions  are  taught  in  professional  schools  may  actually  work  against  their  effective  
leadership  and  that  their  highest  ideals  may  compound  the  problem.”5        
A  behavioral  theology  challenges  the  current  practical  Docetism  and  suggests  
that  churches  direct  attention  to  four  areas:  the  practice  of  theological  and  scriptural  
reflection;  decision  making;  the  role  of  a  pastor;  and  the  cultivation  of  an  experimental  
spirit  in  the  church.  When  it  comes  to  theological  and  scriptural  reflection,  behavioral  
theology  reminds  the  church  that  reason  alone  will  not  be  sufficient  because  fully  
human  church  leaders,  like  all  leaders,  are  subject  to  cognitive  limitations  such  as  
confirmation  bias,  which  steers  leaders  to  focus  more  on  information  that  confirms  their  
beliefs  and  blinds  them  to  disconfirming  information.  Regarding  decision  making,  many  
church  leaders  already  intuitively  know  and  follow  some  of  the  recommendations  from  
behavioral  theorists  when  making  important  decisions.  For  instance,  many  pastors  
intuitively  know  that  even  small  changes  can  feel  painful  to  the  people  in  their  care  even  
if  they  are  not  familiar  with  the  formal  concepts  of  status  quo  bias  and  loss  aversion.  
Articulating  a  decision-­‐‑making  process  guided  by  a  more  realistic  theological  
                                                                                                              
5  Michael  Jinkins  and  Deborah  Shaw  Jinkins,  The  Character  of  Leadership:  Political  Realism  and  Public  Virtue  in  
Nonprofit  Leadership  (San  Fransciso:  Jossey-­‐‑Bass,  1998),  1.    
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anthropology,  however,  will  help  congregational  leaders  and  the  churches  they  serve  
avoid  some  common  pitfalls  created  by  predictable  irrationality.  Behavioral  theology  
offers  guidance  for  how  leaders  might  understand  their  role,  suggesting  that  leaders  
begin  to  view  themselves  more  as  ‘choice  architects’  responsible  for  creating  space  in  
which  human  beings  can  discern  the  Holy  Spirit  rather  than  deciders  responsible  alone  
for  determining  God’s  will  for  the  congregations  they  lead.  Finally,  one  of  the  hallmarks  
of  behavioral  economics  is  the  reliance  upon  testing  theories  with  actual  living  human  
beings  and  amending  theories  based  on  the  findings.  Behavioral  theology  suggests  that  
in  conjunction  with  thoughtful  theological  and  scriptural  reflection,  church  leaders  
should  add  regular  experimentation  to  their  tools  to  discern  where  God’s  spirit  is  
leading.  
Theological and Scriptural Reflection 
Some  church  leaders  articulate  what  feels  like  a  disconnect  between  academic  
theology  and  the  practice  of  ministry.  Seminarians  often  complain  that  academic  
training  is  not  practical  enough,  and  scholars  rightly,  if  at  times  defensively,  respond  
that  faithful  ministry  today  is  more  complicated  than  any  set  of  techniques  can  possibly  
address.  A  behavioral  perspective  suggests  that  both  sides  of  this  debate  have  a  point.  In  
order  to  take  into  account  a  more  complicated  anthropology,  behavioral  econometric  
models  grew  more  rigorous  than  classical  economics.  In  other  words  rather  than  
simplifying  or  watering  down  rigor,  behavioral  economics  became  more  rigorous  even  
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as  it  helped  economics  as  a  discipline  become  more  practical.  In  the  same  way  a  
behavioral  theology  holds  that  theological  training  needs  to  continue  to  be  as  
theologically  rigorous  as  possible  with  no  decrease  in  the  amount  of  time  seminarians  
spend  learning  church  history,  systematic  theology,  ancient  languages,  and  biblical  
interpretation.  A  behavioral  theology  adds  to  this  rigorous  study  a  more  complicated  
understanding  of  our  full  humanity,  taking  into  account  how  cognitive  limitations  can  
affect  both  teacher  and  student  alike.  
In  his  2001  essay  “Biblical  Authority”  Walter  Brueggemann  offers  an  excellent  
example  of  what  this  blend  of  rigorous  theological  study  with  a  more  realistic  
theological  anthropology  looks  like:    
We  are  seldom  aware  of  or  honest  about  the  ways  in  which  our  work  is  shot  
through  with  distorting  vested  interests.  But  it  is  so,  whether  we  know  it  or  not.  
There  is  no  interpretation  of  scripture  (nor  of  anything  else)  that  is  unaffected  by  
the  passions,  convictions  and  perceptions  of  the  interpreter.  Ideology  is  the  self-­‐‑
deceiving  practice  of  taking  a  part  for  the  whole,  of  taking  “my  truth”  for  the  
truth,  of  palming  off  the  particular  as  a  universal.  It  is  so  already  in  the  text  of  
scripture  itself  as  current  scholarship  makes  clear,  because  the  spirit-­‐‑given  text  is  
given  us  by  and  through  human  authors.  It  is  so  because  spirit-­‐‑filled  
interpretation  is  given  us  by  and  through  bodied  authors  who  must  make  their  
way  in  the  world—and  in  making  our  way,  we  humans  do  not  see  so  clearly  or  
love  so  dearly  or  follow  so  nearly  as  we  might  imagine.6    
  
Without  using  the  language  of  confirmation  bias,  Brueggemann  describes  the  
mechanism  of  confirmation  bias  that  afflicts  the  scholar  every  bit  as  much  as  the  person  
reading  the  Bible  for  the  first  time.  Vested  interests  color  what  humans  notice  in  
                                                                                                              
6  Walter  Brueggemann,  “Biblical  Authority:  A  Personal  Reflection,”  The Christian Century 118, no. 1 (2001), 18.  
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scripture  and  in  the  theological  tradition.  Aware  of  what  the  self  notices  but  unaware  of  
the  bias  coloring  what  the  self  sees,  it  is  all  too  easy  to  believe  that  one’s  theological  
position  is  reasoned  and  grounded,  while  an  opposing  perspective  is  merely  emotional  
and  grounded  in  nothing  more  than  an  opponent’s  wishful  fantasy.  A  scholar  influenced  
by  behavioral  theology  will  assume  that  their  theological  perspective  and  biblical  
interpretation  is  interested  and  biased  accordingly.  While  liberation  and  feminist  
hermeneutics  have  raised  awareness  regarding  the  role  that  socio-­‐‑economic  status,  sex,  
and  race  play  in  our  ability  to  read  with  awareness,  behavioral  theology  further  expands  
the  understanding  of  bias  by  adding  cognitive  biases  to  the  list.  
An  example  of  a  scholar  aware  of  his  own  confirmation  bias,  Daniel  Kahneman  
questioned  whether  he  himself  might  be  subject  to  the  ‘halo  effect’  when  grading  
students.  Did  he  form  an  opinion  of  a  student  based  on  their  previous  work  and  
performance  and  grade  their  subsequent  work  more  or  less  highly  as  a  result?  Asking  
students  to  write  two  essays  for  their  final  exams,  Kahneman  remembered  telling  them  
that  both  essays  counted  equally.  But  did  they?  Instead  of  reading  both  essays  and  
grading  them  at  the  same  time  Kahneman  adopted  a  new  procedure:  he  read  all  of  the  
first  essays  and  graded  them.  Then,  without  looking  at  the  names  he  graded  the  second  
essays  removing  some  of  the  likelihood  that  he  would  read  the  second  essay  through  the  
lens  of  the  first:  
Soon  after  switching  to  the  new  method,  I  made  a  disconcerting  observation:  my  
confidence  in  my  grading  was  now  much  lower  than  it  had  been.  The  reason  was  
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that  I  frequently  experienced  a  discomfort  that  was  new  to  me.  When  I  was  
disappointed  with  a  student’s  second  essay  and  went  to  the  back  page  of  the  
booklet  to  enter  a  poor  grade,  I  occasionally  discovered  that  I  had  given  a  top  
grade  to  the  same  student’s  first  essay.  I  also  noticed  that  I  was  tempted  to  
reduce  the  discrepancy  by  changing  the  grade  that  I  had  not  yet  written  down,  
and  found  it  hard  to  follow  the  simple  rule  of  never  yielding  to  that  temptation.  
My  grades  for  the  essays  of  a  single  student  often  varied  over  a  considerable  
range.  The  lack  of  coherence  left  me  uncertain  and  frustrated.  I  was  now  less  
happy  with  and  less  confident  in  my  grades  than  I  had  been  earlier,  but  I  
recognized  that  this  was  a  good  sign,  an  indication  that  the  new  procedure  was  
superior.  The  consistency  I  had  enjoyed  earlier  was  spurious;  it  produced  a  
feeling    of  cognitive  ease,  and  my  System  2  was  happy  to  lazily  accept  the  final  
grade.  By  allowing  myself  to  be  strongly  influenced  by  the  first  question  in  
evaluating  subsequent  ones,  I  spared  myself  the  dissonance  of  finding  the  same  
student  doing    very  well  on  some  questions  and  badly  on  others.7  
  
Kahneman,  a  Nobel  laureate  who  could  easily  believe  that  understanding  
heuristics  and  biases  might  have  made  him  immune  to  their  effects,  put  himself  to  the  
test  regarding  his  own  ability  to  do  something  as  easy  and  common  as  grading  an  essay.  
His  discovery  confirms  what  Jesus  knew  regarding  the  Pharisees:  how  easy  it  is  to  teach  
what  oneself  is  unable  to  practice.  Behavioral  theologians  will  be  the  first  teachers  to  
assume  they  are  biased  and  will  subject  their  own  views  and  judgments  to  the  test.  
While  the  seminarian  hoping  to  avoid  reading  Karl  Barth  in  favor  of  something  that  
seems  more  practical  might  be  disappointed  to  learn  that  behavioral  theology  will  not  
spare  them  from  this  hard  work,  ultimately  they  will  find  nothing  is  more  practical  than  
ceasing  to  behave  as  if  education  results  in  perceiving  the  world  without  bias.  
                                                                                                              
7  Kahneman,  Thinking,  Fast  and  Slow,  83-­‐‑84.  
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Decision Making 
In  addition  to  this  increased  sense  of  humility  regarding  biblical  interpretation  
and  theological  reflection,  behavioral  theology  offers  congregational  leaders  valuable  
insight  into  the  decision-­‐‑making  process.  In  addition  to  the  impressive  theologically  
informed  tradition  of  discernment,  behavioral  theology  encourages  conversation  with  
proponents  of  decision  theory  as  well.  Decision  theory,  a  wide-­‐‑ranging  interdisciplinary  
study,  includes  scholars  informed  by  the  standard  model  of  rationality  such  as  
Stanford’s  Strategic  Decision  and  Risk  Management  (SDRM)  as  well  as  those  more  
sensitive  to  the  impact  of  cognitive  heuristics  and  biases  such  as  Decisive  authors  Chip  
and  Dan  Heath.  
Offering  a  robust  model  for  decision  makers  in  highly  complex  organizations,  
leaders  in  the  SDRM  center  underscore  how  good  decisions  are  entirely  distinct  from  
good  outcomes.  Leaders  can  make  a  terrible  decision  and  luck  into  a  good  outcome;  
conversely  leaders  can  make  a  wise  decision  and  suffer  a  poor  result.8  Practically  
grounded,  SDRM  asks  leaders  to  assess  how  much  time  to  spend  on  a  decision  based  on  
the  complexity  of  the  organization  and  the  analytical  difficulty  posed  by  the  decision;  
simple  decisions  can  be  made  quickly  using  common  sense  while  more  complicated  
decisions  require  greater  levels  of  devotion.9  SDRM  provides  leaders  a  helpful  series  of  
                                                                                                              
8  Peter  McNamee  and  John  Celona,  Decision  Analysis  for  the  Professional,  4th  ed.  (Menlo  Park,  CA:  SmartOrg,  
2001),  41.  
9  McNamee  and  Celona,  Decision  Analysis  for  the  Professional,  225.  
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assessment  guidelines  for  the  decision-­‐‑making  process:  appropriate  framing,  the  
existence  of  creative  and  doable  alternatives,  well-­‐‑articulated  values,  logical  thinking  
that  is  aware  of  cognitive  bias,  and  commitment  to  action.10  
In  helpful  contrast  Chip  and  Dan  Heath  offer  a  decision-­‐‑making  model  more  
sensitive  to  behavioral  concerns  in  a  way  that  complements  the  rationalist  decision  
quality  model.  In  Decisive  Chip  and  Dan  Heath  argue  nearly  all  decisions  occur  in  four  
stages:  decision  makers  formulate  options;  they  analyze  options;  they  make  a  choice;  
and  finally  they  live  with  this  choice.11  Whereas  proponents  of  decision  quality  include  
testing  for  bias  as  a  single  step,  the  Heaths  helpfully  note  that  common  biases  afflict  
decision  makers  at  every  stage.  Referring  to  these  biases  as  the  four  villains  of  decision  
making,  the  Heaths  highlight  how  narrow  framing  limits  options,  confirmation  bias  
compromises  analysis,  short-­‐‑term  emotion  impedes  the  ability  to  decide,  and  optimism  
bias  blinds  one  to  the  need  to  reassess  a  decision.12  Responding  to  these  common  traps,  
the  Heaths  offer  a  comprehensive  process  they  refer  to  as  WRAP,  which  stands  for:  
Widen  your  options;  Reality  test  your  assumptions;  Attain  distance  before  deciding;  and  
Prepare  to  be  wrong.13  By  synthesizing  SDRM’s  decision  quality  model  with  the  Heath’s  
deep  sense  for  cognitive  bias,  behavioral  theology  offers  congregational  leaders  a  
practical  way  to  enflesh  theological  discernment  in  wise  decisions.  In  no  particular  order  
                                                                                                              
10  McNamee  and  Celona,  Decision  Analysis  for  the  Professional,  256-­‐‑261.  
11  Heath  and  Heath,  Decisive,  Kindle  location  289.  
12  Heath  and  Heath,  Decisive,  Kindle  locations  294-­‐‑298.  
13  Heath  and  Heath,  Decisive,  Kindle  locations  366-­‐‑388.  
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this  model  suggests  that  church  leaders  making  good  decisions  will  prayerfully  consider  
scope  being  mindful  of  optimism  bias,  craft  alternatives  by  avoiding  narrow  framing,  
stay  centered  on  core  values  as  a  way  of  overcoming  the  churn  of  short  term  emotion,  
analyze  options  based  on  sound  information  aware  of  confirmation  bias,  and  commit  to  
action  in  light  of  loss  aversion.    
Both  SDRM  and  the  Heaths  address  primarily  for-­‐‑profit  business  ventures.  The  
goals  and  decision-­‐‑making  environments  of  these  organizations  often  vary  considerably  
from  the  church;  however,  the  processes  outlined  have  great  value  for  church  leadership  
teams.  Rich  discernment  practices  like  the  Ignatian  examen  help  leaders  assess  their  own  
spiritual  and  mental  states  during  the  decision  making  process.14  Practices  like  the  
Quaker  clearness  committee  can  help  decision  makers  sense  the  tug  of  God’s  Spirit  in  
the  midst  of  the  decision-­‐‑making  process.15  Robust  decision  frameworks  such  as  the  
process  adopted  by  the  Uniting  Churches  in  Australia  can  help  large  deliberative  bodies  
merge  spiritual  discernment  with  Robert’s  Rules  of  Order.16  Thus,  the  proposed  
behavioral  theological  synthesis  does  not  replace  spiritual  practices  the  church  has  relied  
on  for  centuries.  Rather,  this  model  aims  to  help  church  leaders  move  from  the  sense  of  
                                                                                                              
14  Elizabeth  Liebert,  The  Way  of  Discernment  (Louisville,  KY:  Westminster  John  Knox  Press,  2010),  Kindle  
location  312,  Kindle.  
15  Suzanne  Farnham  et  al.,  Listening  Hearts:  Discerning  Call  in  Community,  20th  Anniversary  Edition  (New  York:  
Morehouse  Publishing,  1991),  Kindle  locations  639-­‐‑640,  Kindle.  
16  The  Uniting  Church  in  Australia,  “A  Manual  for  Meetings,”  accessed  January  9,  2014,  
http://wr.victas.uca.org.au/assets/637/Manual_for_Meetings.pdf.  
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God’s  presence  gained  in  these  ancient  practices  to  making  actual  decisions  in  the  
complicated,  dynamic,  and  fully  human  environment  of  the  church.  
Assessing  the  scope  of  a  decision  is  one  of  the  most  challenging  aspects  of  
decision  making.  SDRM  defines  scope  as  ensuring  the  “right  people  are  treating  the  
right  problem  from  the  right  perspective.”17  Finding  the  right  solution  to  the  wrong  
problem  does  not  serve  any  organization  well.  While  many  things  can  go  wrong  
determining  scope,  cognitive  theory  suggests  the  most  persistent  error  will  be  assuming  
the  organization  can  achieve  more  than  it  can  in  less  time  than  leaders  expect.  Optimism  
bias  blinds  leaders  to  the  reality  of  obstacles  and  failure:  maybe  other  organizations  
might  run  into  trouble,  but  not  the  one  we  are  leading.  
Daniel  Kahneman  embarked  upon  a  project  with  Amos  Tversky  and  others  to  
write  a  textbook  with  the  laudable  goal  of  improving  judgment  and  decision  making  at  
the  high  school  level.  After  a  year  of  meeting  and  outlining,  Kahneman  asked  the  
members  of  the  project  to  independently  write  down  their  guess  as  to  how  long  their  
project  would  take  to  complete.  In  general  the  group  seemed  to  believe  the  project  
would  take  two  years,  with  the  highest  estimate  being  two  and  one-­‐‑half  years.  
Kahneman  then  asked  a  curriculum  expert  present  in  the  room  for  an  assessment  of  how  
much  time  other  similar  groups  took  to  complete  a  project  of  this  scale.  With  
embarrassment  the  expert  replied  that  perhaps  40%  of  the  groups  failed  to  finish  and  
                                                                                                              
17  McNamee  and  Celona,  Decision  Analysis  for  the  Professional,  229.  
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those  that  completed  took  at  least  seven  years.  Kahneman  wryly  noted  that  although  
this  new  information  should  have  led  the  group  to  disband,  they  persisted.  While  
eventually  successful,  the  group  took  eight  years  to  finish  the  project,  a  full  six  years  
longer  than  most  estimated.18  Kahneman  described  their  experience  as  an  example  of  
planning  fallacy,  whereby  group  members  tend  to  center  on  unrealistically  best-­‐‑case  
scenarios  without  the  benefit  of  researching  the  facts  from  other  similar  situations.19  
The  planning  fallacy  particularly  afflicts  leaders  facing  new  situations  with  
which  the  organization  has  little  experience,  which  describes  nearly  every  situation  
facing  a  typical  congregational  leader.  With  most  congregational  leaders  acting  as  
volunteers  who  also  work  full-­‐‑time  jobs,  the  decisions  they  face  at  the  monthly  board  
meeting  are  almost  entirely  novel.  It  is  one  thing  to  make  decisions  as  an  accountant,  
nurse,  or  teacher;  but  how  does  this  accountant,  nurse,  or  teacher  apply  the  knowledge  
of  the  firm,  hospital,  or  school  in  this  ecclesial  setting  with  so  many  unknowns?  And  
because  every  complex  decision  is  different,  seasoned  pastors  may  be  even  more  prone  
to  the  planning  fallacy  than  other  congregational  leaders  because  of  the  temptation  to  
think  they  have  been  there  and  done  that.  With  important  decisions  it  is  imperative  to  
spend  time  on  scope,  allowing  time  to  collect  accurate  information  from  comparable  
                                                                                                              
18  Kahneman,  Thinking  Fast  and  Slow,  247.  
19  Kahneman,  Thinking  Fast  and  Slow,  249.  
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situations  and  being  mindful  of  the  tendency  to  make  overly  optimistic  estimates  that  
fail  to  account  for  unforeseen  stumbling  blocks.  
When  leaders  believe  they  have  articulated  the  right  solution  for  the  right  
problem  and  believe  the  scope  is  well  understood,  solutions  will  begin  to  arise.  The  
Heaths  point  out  that  when  organizations  begin  to  discuss  solutions  and  options  a  
curious  phenomenon  occurs:  groups  get  stuck  considering  only  one  or  two  possibilities.  
Narrow  framing,  thinking  of  a  choice  in  terms  of  only  two  possibilities,  lures  even  the  
savviest  of  leaders;  avoiding  this  framing  limit  can  dramatically  improve  decision  
quality.20  Citing  a  study  by  researchers  from  the  University  of  Kiel  in  Germany,  the  
Heaths  note  that  when  organizations  consider  more  than  just  a  whether-­‐‑or-­‐‑not  decision,  
the  likelihood  that  their  decision  will  improve  increases  significantly.  When  the  
researchers  analyzed  the  data,  the  evidence  was  striking:  if  the  executive  board  
considered  more  than  one  alternative,  they  made  six  times  as  many  very  good  decisions.  
(Specifically,  40%  of  the  multi-­‐‑option  decisions  were  rated  very  good,  compared  with  
only  6%  of  the  whether-­‐‑or-­‐‑not  decisions.)21  Another  thought  leader  in  this  area,  Roger  
Martin,  argues  that  this  ability  to  escape  narrow  framing,  a  gift  and  skill  he  calls  
integrative  thinking,  presents  itself  in  the  habits  of  highly  creative  people:  “Integrative  
thinking  is  the  ability  to  face  constructively  the  tension  of  opposing  ideas  and,  instead  of  
                                                                                                              
20  Heath  and  Heath,  Decisive,  Kindle  locations  164-­‐‑166.  
21  Heath  and  Heath,  Decisive,  Kindle  locations  921-­‐‑923.  
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choosing  one  at  the  expense  of  the  other,  generate  a  creative  resolution  of  the  tension  in  
the  form  of  a  new  idea  that  contains  elements  of  the  opposing  ideas  but  is  superior  to  
each.”22  Congregational  leaders  should  consider  the  benefit  of  adopting  a  practice  of  
exploring  at  least  three  options  when  facing  a  serious  decision.  Such  a  policy  will  never  
ensure  that  a  decision  will  be  wise,  but  anything  leaders  can  do  to  avoid  the  natural  
tendency  toward  narrow  framing  is  good  stewardship.  
Process  can  help  congregations  avoid  narrow  framing  and  generate  creative,  
doable  alternatives.  While  many  congregational  leaders  have  all  too  much  experience  
sitting  around  a  room  late  at  night  with  a  white  board  brainstorming,  the  Heaths  
recommend  another  approach.  Because  of  the  anchoring  heuristic,  brainstorming  
encourages  narrow  framing.  The  first  few  ideas  tossed  out  in  a  brainstorming  session  
often  anchor  any  and  all  future  discussions,  prematurely  limiting  creative  discussion.  As  
an  alternative  to  brainstorming  the  Heaths  recommend  an  approach  they  refer  to  as  
‘multitracking’.  Pointing  to  the  unusual  success  of  the  design  firm  Lexicon  and  a  study  
of  graphic  designers,  the  Heaths  note  that  rather  than  focus  on  one  idea  developing  it  
until  it  is  ready  designers  often  work  on  several  competing  ideas  simultaneously  until  
the  best  idea  finally  surfaces.  Indeed,  in  the  study  of  graphic  designers,  not  only  did  the  
                                                                                                              
22  Roger  L.  Martin,  The  Opposable  Mind:  How  Successful  Leaders  Win  Through  Integrative  Thinking  (Boston:  
Harvard  University  Press,  2007),  15,  Kindle.  
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designers  who  followed  the  multitracking  process  achieve  more  success,  but  they  
enjoyed  the  process  more  as  well.  
The  study  compares  two  groups  of  designers  working  on  designing  an  ad.  In  the  
single-­‐‑track  group  each  designer  endured  six  rounds  of  criticism  before  finally  
submitting  their  finished  draft.  In  the  multitrack  group  designers  went  through  three  
rounds:  in  the  first  round  they  submitted  three  different  ideas;  in  the  second  round  they  
offered  two  ideas;  and  in  the  last  round  they  delivered  one  final  ad.  Designers  in  both  
groups  created  six  ads,  but  the  experience  was  qualitatively  different.  Not  only  was  the  
multitrack  group  more  successful,  but  also  they  found  the  process  more  enjoyable:  “It  
feels  better.  After  the  banner-­‐‑ad  study  concluded,  both  sets  of  designers  were  
interviewed.  Asked  to  rate  the  usefulness  of  the  feedback  they  received  during  the  
design  process,  over  80%  of  the  simultaneous  designers  said  the  feedback  was  helpful.  
Only  35%  of  the  one-­‐‑at-­‐‑a-­‐‑time  designers  agreed,  and  in  fact,  over  half  of  them  believed  
the  feedback  they’d  received  was  critical  of  them.”23  The  significance  of  this  discovery  
regarding  the  experience  of  the  decision  makers  cannot  be  overstated  when  thinking  of  
multitracking  in  a  church  context.  While  the  quality  of  the  decisions  church  leaders  
make  is  important,  the  experience  of  the  church  leaders  is  also  incredibly  important.  
How  often  do  church  boards  task  one  leader  or  one  group  of  leaders  with  designing  
something  like  an  ad  or  a  sign,  only  to  subject  these  leaders  to  multiple  rounds  of  
                                                                                                              
23  Heath  and  Heath,  Decisive,  Kindle  locations  866-­‐‑868.    
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criticism?  At  the  end  of  the  day  if  a  leader  succeeds  in  developing  a  good  idea  but  winds  
up  feeling  bitter  and  criticized,  the  church  loses.  How  easy  would  it  be  for  
congregational  leaders  to  adopt  a  process  by  which  they  required  themselves  to  generate  
more  than  two  options  and  then  asked  committees  to  develop  multiple  ideas  in  a  
multitrack  format?  Perhaps  such  a  policy  might  require  more  time,  but  the  possibility  of  
gaining  better  implementation  and  happier  leaders  more  than  outweighs  the  possible  
cost  of  taking  more  time.  
A  perennial  issue  facing  decision  makers  is  the  anxiety  generated  by  the  decision  
itself.  What  if  the  stakes  are  high  and  the  decision  turns  out  to  be  a  mistake?  What  if  the  
organization  chooses  not  to  act  and  this  indecision  leads  to  an  enormous  missed  
opportunity?  SDRM  rightly  advises  leaders  to  remain  as  grounded  as  possible  in  their  
core  values  and  evaluate  trade-­‐‑offs  between  alternatives  based  on  these  values.24  The  
Heaths  also  advise  decision  makers  to  find  direction  by  going  ad  fontes,  as  it  were,  
adhering  to  long-­‐‑term  values.25  However,  the  wisdom  of  the  behavioralists  is  that  
adhering  to  values  is  not  always  so  easy.  Decision  makers  often  experience  physical  
symptoms  of  stress  when  they  finally  arrive  at  a  decision  point.  Two  problems  result  
from  these  visceral  influences:  these  visceral  influences  shape  our  thinking  without  our  
awareness;  and  even  when  we  intellectually  realize  that  we  might  be  affected  by  a  
                                                                                                              
24  McNamee  and  Celona,  Decision  Analysis  for  the  Professional,  237.  
25  Heath  and  Heath,  Decisive,  Kindle  locations  2495-­‐‑2496.  
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change,  we  fail  to  account  for  how  we  will  think  and  feel  in  the  different  state.  George  
Loewenstein  has  shown  that  visceral  changes  in  the  body  brought  about  by  hunger,  
thirst,  pain,  and  fear  cause  substantive  changes  in  the  choices  people  make.26  Further,  as  
also  described  earlier  by  Ariely,  decision  makers  face  an  unfortunate  empathy  gap  that  
prevents  them  from  accurately  understanding  how  their  decision  making  will  change  
from  state  to  state.  Simply  put:  the  decision  making  brain  in  a  heated  church  meeting  is  
not  the  same  brain  as  the  one  that  first  arrived  at  the  meeting.  Actual  human  
participants  in  a  highly  charged  meeting  may  just  not  be  able  to  even  name  a  core  value  
let  alone  remain  grounded  in  it.  
One  of  the  most  important  tools  available  to  church  leaders  to  address  the  effects  
of  short-­‐‑term  emotion  is  allowing  sufficient  time  to  arrive  at  a  decision.  When  emotions  
run  high  and  create  anxiety,  leaders  often  just  want  to  make  a  decision  quickly  to  avoid  
the  crucible  of  conflict.  If  some  decision  makers  believe  that  the  organization  might  miss  
an  opportunity  by  not  making  a  quick  decision,  they  will  feel  much  pressure  to  reach  an  
immediate  resolution.  In  Wait:  The  Art  and  Science  of  Delay  Frank  Partnoy  notes  that  
although  humans  crave  the  speed  of  fast  decision  making,  human  bodies  are  not  geared  
to  make  complicated  decisions  quickly.  Human  brains,  according  to  Partnoy,  are  good  at  
making  some  fast  decisions.  Having  evolved  on  the  African  savannah  the  human  brain  
is  great  at  deciding  quickly  whether  a  lion  is  going  to  attack;  these  same  brains  are  poor  
                                                                                                              
26  Camerer,  Lowenstein,  and  Rabin,  Advances  in  Behavioral  Economics,  Kindle  locations  17714-­‐‑17715.  
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at  making  quick  decisions  when  it  comes  to  complicated,  interrelated  social  situations.27  
Anecdotally,  some  well-­‐‑known  leaders  are  famous  for  taking  their  time  to  make  
decisions.  Warren  Buffett  spends  a  great  deal  of  time  studying  companies  that  interest  
him  but  hardly  ever  makes  trades,  humorously  describing  his  philosophy  this  way:  
“Lethargy  bordering  on  sloth  remains  the  cornerstone  of  our  investment  strategy.”28  This  
unusually  deliberative  style  has  helped  him  avoid  major  catastrophes  like  the  dot.com  
implosion  and  anything  related  to  subprime  mortgage-­‐‑backed  securities.  Buffett  is  
successful  because  he  knows  how  to  wait.  President  of  USC  and  author  of  the  
Contrarian’s  Guide  to  Leadership,  Steve  Sample  lives  by  two  rules  when  it  comes  to  
decisions:  “Rule  1:  never  make  a  decision  someone  else  could  make;  Rule  2:  never,  ever  
make  a  decision  today  that  can  be  put  off  until  tomorrow.”29  Sample  claims  many  people  
who  want  to  appear  decisive  and  engaged  just  start  wading  into  complicated  situations  
making  decisions  before  they  really  understand  what  is  going  on.  
Congregational  leaders  can  take  heart  that  what  is  contrarian  wisdom  in  
Sample’s  sphere  has  a  long  pedigree  in  Christian  leadership.  Christopher  Beeley’s  work  
Leading  God’s  People:  Wisdom  from  the  Early  Church  for  Today  is  contrarian  in  its  own  way.  
In  it  Beeley  exhorts  leaders  to  remember  that  the  most  practical  disciplines  they  can  
observe  are  not  staying  constantly  busy  and  making  fast  decisions  but  attending  to  
                                                                                                              
27  Frank  Partnoy,  Wait:  The  Art  and  Science  of  Delay  (New  York:  Perseus  Books  Group,  2012),  68,  Kindle.  
28  Warren  Buffet,  “Berkshire  Hathaway  Annual  Report,”  accessed  January  9,  2014,  
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1990.html.  
29  Steve  Sample,  The  Contrarian’s  Guide  to  Leadership  (San  Francisco:  Jossey-­‐‑Bass,  2002),  72.  
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personal  holiness,  prayer,  and  the  study  of  the  scriptures,  all  of  which  slow  down  and  
complicate  the  decision-­‐‑making  process.  He  quotes  Gregory  of  Nazianzus  who  affirms  
that  God  can  make  use  of  a  wooden  aquaphor  only  if  it  is  full  of  water,  the  water  in  this  
case  being  the  inspiration  of  the  Holy  Spirit.30  Hence,  in  every  case  and  perhaps  
especially  when  decision  makers  feel  behind  and  pressured  to  vote,  it  is  the  leader’s  
most  important  responsibility  to  remain  prayerful  and  reflective,  slow  to  render  
judgments,  and  quick  to  recognize  that  God’s  ways  are  not  always  immediately  clear.  
Leaders  should  not  view  time  that  deliberative  bodies  take  to  pray  and  read  scripture  
together  as  tangential  to  the  work  of  the  body;  often  this  spiritual  work  plays  the  very  
practical  role  of  giving  bodies  the  room  they  need  for  short-­‐‑term  emotions  to  settle.  
After  leaders  finally  have  a  realistic  scope,  good  options,  and  the  peace  of  mind  
grounded  in  long-­‐‑term  values  to  make  a  decision,  they  are  not  out  of  the  woods.  When  
leaders  engage  in  analyzing  various  options  to  find  the  best  way  forward,  they  face  one  
of  the  most  challenging  biases  of  all:  the  confirmation  bias.  As  discussed  earlier  in  the  
lists  of  common  biases,  the  confirmation  bias  describes  the  process  by  which  decision  
makers  highlight  data  that  supports  the  option  they  intuitively  favor  and  discount  
contradicting  information.  Similar  to  how  confirmation  bias  interfered  with  sound  
biblical  interpretation  and  theological  reflection,  the  great  difficulty  of  the  confirmation  
bias  is  that  decision  makers  are  not  aware  of  its  influence  and  often  believe  that  they  are  
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acting  rationally  and  objectively  when,  in  fact,  they  are  simply  finding  facts  to  support  
the  conclusions  at  which  they  have  already  arrived.  Of  confirmation  bias  Dan  Lovallo,  a  
professor  of  decision  making  states:  “Confirmation  bias  is  probably  the  single  biggest  
problem  …  because  even  the  most  sophisticated  people  get  it  wrong.  People  go  out  and  
they’re  collecting  the  data,  and  they  don’t  realize  they’re  cooking  the  books.”31  
At  least  two  elements  are  required  for  leaders  to  reduce  the  effects  of  
confirmation  bias:  leaders  must  accept  that  confirmation  bias  afflicts  them  even  when  
they  are  not  aware  of  it;  and  leaders  need  to  seek  out  voices  who  will  raise  objections  to  
proposed  decisions.  Congregational  leaders  may  have  an  advantage  over  business  
leaders  when  it  comes  to  accepting  that  they  are  affected  by  confirmation  bias:  
congregational  leaders  formed  by  a  biblical  faith  believe  to  some  degree  that  when  it  
comes  to  discerning  God’s  will  for  their  congregation  that  God’s  ways  are  not  always  
their  ways.  Scriptural  anchoring  can  play  a  vital  role  in  helping  leaders  to  accept  that  
even  ideas  about  which  they  feel  strongly  may  not  be  exactly  what  God,  prompting  
through  the  Holy  Spirit,  desires  of  their  congregation.  Even  the  best  idea  any  leader  can  
articulate  will  not  exhaust  God’s  plan  for  a  people.  And  yet,  as  much  as  congregational  
leaders  might  be  able  to  agree  that  they  may  not  be  able  to  perfectly  articulate  God’s  
plan,  which  should  allow  for  some  room  to  push  on  and  question  any  and  all  proposals,  
another  factor  of  congregational  life  makes  this  room  for  examination  perhaps  more  
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difficult  than  it  is  in  the  business  world.  In  a  volunteer  organization  few  people  show  up  
to  meetings  to  experience  emotional  discomfort,  a  discomfort  that  many  experience  both  
in  the  giving  and  receiving  of  criticism.  Because  of  the  challenging  nature  of  pushing  
against  the  confirmation  bias,  the  development  of  an  institutional  practice  to  push  
against  the  confirmation  bias  seems  even  more  important.  
One  practice  that  checks  confirmation  bias  can  even  be  traced  back  to  the  church  
itself:  the  role  of  a  formal  devil’s  advocate.  Up  until  the  leadership  of  Pope  John  Paul  II  
the  Roman  Catholic  Church  acknowledged  the  importance  of  the  devil’s  advocate,  a  
leader  whose  role  was  to  bring  to  light  disconfirming  evidence  in  the  canonization  
process.  It  is  easy  to  see  why  the  church  would  need  to  institutionalize  such  a  role.  
Human  beings  on  their  own  find  it  difficult  to  speak  against  people  many  view  as  saints.  
However,  when  it  is  an  individual’s  role  to  promote  the  faith,  (from  promotor  fidei,  the  
official  title  of  this  office)  by  playing  a  critical  and  questioning  role,  the  office  takes  the  
personal  conflict  away.  It  is  no  surprise  that  since  this  role  was  abolished,  the  number  of  
saints  canonized  by  the  church  has  soared.32  Leadership  teams  in  the  church  would  be  
wise  when  considering  major  decisions  to  appoint  at  least  two  people  on  the  board  to  
play  the  role  of  promoters  of  the  faith  and,  whether  they  personally  agree  or  disagree  
with  a  possibility,  bring  to  light  as  much  strategic  thinking  and  data  as  possible  that  
would  show  why  an  idea  might  not  be  good  for  the  institution.    
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SDRM  lists  a  final  question  leaders  must  ask  when  they  are  assessing  the  quality  
of  their  decision:  whether  there  is  commitment  to  action.  SDRM  recommends  a  thorough  
process,  referred  to  as  the  decision  cycle,  ensuring  decision  makers  align  with  those  
executing  decisions  and  ensuring  that  all  of  the  right  people  have  been  consulted.  
Attention  to  this  decision  cycle  process  encourages  widespread  agreement  to  act.33  While  
SDRM  is  surely  correct  to  suggest  such  steps  to  ensure  commitment  to  action,  one  of  the  
most  significant  factors  influencing  commitment  to  action  is  not  simply  making  sure  
everyone  is  in  the  loop  but  understanding  and  accounting  for  the  sense  of  loss  people  in  
the  organization  will  feel  as  change  occurs.  
Congregations  are  one  of  the  most,  if  not  the  most,  sensitive  organizations  to  loss  
aversion.  Even  when  they  agree  with  a  decision,  good  changes  at  a  church  can  still  feel  
painful  for  participants  because  every  change  represents  difference,  which  means  loss.  
In  Open  Secrets  Richard  Lischer  painfully  and  beautiful  describes  the  education  he  
received  in  the  first  parish  he  served  when  he  attempted  to  remove  the  American  flag  
from  the  sanctuary.  He  writes:  “I  should  have  known  not  to  try  to  remove  the  American  
flag  from  the  chancel.  To  me,  the  national  flag  represented  an  intrusion  into  the  sacred  
space  of  the  congregation,  an  obvious  symbol  of  civil  religion.”34  Then,  speaking  as  a  
well-­‐‑trained  theologicon,  he  continues:  “Theologically,  the  flag  has  no  business  beside  
                                                                                                              
33  McNamee  and  Celona,  Decision  Analysis  for  the  Professional,  243.  
34  Richard  Lischer,  Open  Secrets:  A  Spiritual  Journey  Through  a  Country  Church  (New  York:  Doubleday,  2001),  
89.  
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the  altar.”35  Predictably,  the  young  pastor  met  a  brick  wall  in  the  form  of  a  resistant  
congregation.  Unpredictably,  Lischer  was  gifted  with  the  realization  that  his  
understanding  of  what  the  flag  symbolized  was  neither  the  only  understanding  possible  
nor  even,  perhaps,  the  deepest  understanding.  An  older  parishioner,  Don  Semanns,  
clarified  the  issue  by  simply  telling  a  story  about  receiving  the  news  of  his  uncle’s  death  
during  World  War  I.  The  motion  was  tabled,  and  Lischer  realized  that:  “the  flag,  as  it  
turned  out,  did  not  represent  civil  religion  or  any  other  abstraction,  not,  at  least,  for  my  
congregation.  It  simply  told  a  story  that  everyone  wanted  to  remember  but  found  too  
sorrowful  to  hear.”36    
When  decision  makers  consider  the  future  and  assess  the  commitment  to  action,  
they  must  not  only  do  the  difficult  work  of  making  sure  ideas  are  communicated  well  to  
the  community,  but  they  must  also  walk  the  extra  mile  of  asking  hard  questions  about  
what  kind  of  loss  different  community  members  might  experience.  If  possible,  leaders  
should  be  as  creative  as  possible  at  finding  solutions  that  minimize  loss.  I  am  grateful  to  
Professor  James  F.  Kay  of  Princeton  Theological  Seminary  who  passed  along  a  helpful  
suggestion  for  a  gender  inclusive  baptismal  formula  consistent  with  the  tradition.  He  
recommended  that  pastors  avoid  one  common  solution  of  substituting  Creator,  
Redeemer,  and  Sustainer  for  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit.  Not  only  is  this  substitution  
                                                                                                              
35  Lischer,  Open  Secrets,  89.  
36  Lischer,  Open  Secrets,  90.  
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theologically  problematic,  modalistically  referring  to  one  God  with  merely  three  
different  job  descriptions,  but  it  also  creates  needless  loss  by  removing  the  familiar  
language  of  God  as  Father.  Rather,  Kay  suggested,  consider  the  formula:  “I  baptize  you  
in  the  name  of  God  the  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit.  One  God:  Mother  of  us  all.”  While  
maternal  language  might  not  fly  in  every  congregation,  anecdotally  I  have  found  that  
adding  language  rather  than  taking  away  language  has  been  far  less  divisive.  
One  closing  point  is  that  the  decision-­‐‑making  process  does  not  end  when  the  
decision  is  made.  Once  human  beings  make  decisions  the  optimism  bias  coupled  with  
the  fact  that  life  moves  forward  and  brings  ever  more  challenges  makes  it  very  difficult  
for  decision  makers  to  prepare  for  the  possibility  that  their  decisions  might  be  wrong.  As  
previously  seen,  decision  makers  find  it  easy  to  believe  that  others  might  make  mistakes,  
but  find  it  very  difficult  to  believe  that  they  are  capable  of  such  error.  This  cognitive  
limitation  is  as  true  in  the  church  as  it  is  everywhere  else,  and  ecclesial  leaders  would  
benefit  by  acknowledging  that  the  decision-­‐‑making  process  is  not  over  until  they  
prepare  for  the  possibility  of  decision  mistakes.  
One  effective  practice  the  Heaths  recommend  is  what  psychologist  Gary  Klein  
calls  the  ‘premortem’.  While  a  postmortem  examines  the  reasons  for  death  after  the  fact,  
a  premortem  is  an  exercise  in  imagining  all  of  the  reasons  a  decision  might  fail  in  the  
long  term.  Leaders  are  encouraged  to  imagine  that  in  twelve  months  a  major  decision  
they  have  made  turns  out  to  be  disaster.  They  are  asked  to  consider  all  of  the  reasons  
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that  contributed  to  this  failure.  The  premortem  frees  leaders  to  remember  that  leaders  
and  their  decisions  are  always  fallible,  no  matter  how  brilliant  a  particular  decision  may  
seem  at  the  time.  Similar  to  how  the  wisdom  of  spiritual  practices  can  help  achieve  
emotional  distance  from  the  short-­‐‑term  turmoil  surrounding  difficult  decisions,  the  
church  also  provides  an  unusually  rich  soil  for  premortem  imagination.  While  the  term  
premortem  can  seem  shocking,  especially  in  a  North  American  context  so  devoted  to  
focusing  on  the  positive  and  eliminating  the  negative,  the  early  church  borrowed  from  
the  Roman  memento  mori  tradition  to  demonstrate  their  unflinching  attitude  toward  
death.  Iconography  of  St.  Jerome,  for  instance,  almost  always  includes  Jerome  holding  or  
standing  atop  a  skull,  pointing  to  the  traditional  belief  that  Jerome  worked  in  the  
presence  of  a  skull  to  remind  him  that  death  could  bring  failure  to  his  work.  This  
memento  mori  tradition  flourished  in  the  church  during  the  medieval  period  and  again  in  
the  Victorian  era.  Perhaps  an  ecclesial  behavioral  turn  can  reawaken  interest  in  the  
dormant  practice  of  memento  mori.  Church  leaders  could  once  again  be  inspired  to  face  
the  possibility  of  failure,  albeit  in  a  less  morbid  sense,  by  drawing  upon  the  premortem  
resources  that  are  already  part  of  the  tradition.  
Role of a Pastor 
Behavioral  theology  recovers  a  more  biblical  sense  of  what  it  is  to  be  a  pastor  by  
fleshing  out  what  it  means  for  a  pastor  to  be  a  shepherd,  arguably  the  most  biblical  of  
pastoral  images.  Pastors  today  struggle  to  find  a  guiding  metaphor;  they  are  encouraged  
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by  some  to  think  of  themselves  as  nonprofit  CEOs,  by  others  to  imagine  themselves  as  
pastoral  counselors,  and  by  still  others  to  see  themselves  as  spiritual  formation  gurus.  
One  of  the  hardest  questions  with  which  pastors  grapple  is:  “Who  am  I?”  Pastoral  
identity  comes  to  a  head  over  the  question  of  how  a  pastor  lives  into  being  a  decision  
maker.  Should  a  pastor  be  an  assertive  decision  maker  or  more  of  an  equipper,  someone  
who  empowers  congregational  leaders  to  own  the  ministry  of  the  congregation?  Or,  is  
some  kind  of  combination  the  right  leadership  style?  Pastoral  observers  like  Lovett  
Weems  and  Jack  Carroll  see  this  tension  as  a  continuum  between  being  authoritarian  on  
the  one  hand  and  laissez  faire  on  the  other.  Authoritarian  leaders  make  too  many  
decisions  on  behalf  of  their  people,  while  laissez  faire  pastors  do  not  offer  enough  
guidance.37  Weems  and  Carroll  argue  that  pastors  should  aim  for  something  in  the  
middle,  although  Carroll  cites  survey  data  indicating  pastors  who  fail  to  offer  leadership  
can  actually  be  more  harmful  to  congregations  than  pastors  who  are  viewed  as  
authoritarian.38  
But  is  a  middle  ground  really  best?  Pastors  guided  by  behavioral  theology  will  
look  for  a  way  to  be  assertive  and  supportive  at  the  same  time.  To  be  sure  this  dual  role  
is  something  both  Weems  and  Carroll  desire  to  see  in  pastors;  however,  behavioral  
theorists  offer  the  compelling  metaphor  of  a  choice  architect  that  outlines  a  vision  of  
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what  a  shepherd  might  look  like  in  the  twenty-­‐‑first  century  church.  To  behavioral  
theorists  like  Cass  Sunstein  and  Richard  Thaler,  the  question  of  whether  pastors  as  
leaders  should  be  more  decisive  or  more  equipping  is  not  a  helpful  distinction.  Sunstein  
and  Thaler  suggest  that  the  question  should  not  be  whether  to  make  decisions  that  shape  
congregations,  but  what  kind  of  decisions  pastors  should  be  making.  To  use  the  language  
of  Sunstein  and  Thaler:  pastors  need  to  be  extremely  assertive  as  choice  architects,  a  role  
that  ultimately  supports  congregational  leaders  and  congregations  to  make  their  own  
decisions  in  a  way  that  leads  to  individual  and  communal  flourishing.  
Choice  architects  function  in  much  the  same  way  that  shepherds  do.  Shepherds  
are  assertive  in  that  they  are  responsible  for  leading  their  flocks  to  areas  in  which  they  
can  flourish.  As  the  Psalmist  sings  unforgettably  in  Psalm  23:  “The  Lord  is  my  shepherd.  
I  shall  not  want.  He  makes  me  to  lie  down  in  green  pastures.  He  leads  me  beside  the  still  
waters.”    The  shepherd’s  job  is  to  lead  the  flock  into  an  area  that  is  broad  and  filled  with  
good  things  in  such  a  way  that  the  sheep  find  it  easy  to  make  choices  that  help  them  
flourish.  And  yet,  a  shepherd’s  job  is  not  to  somehow  coerce,  as  if  force  were  even  
possible,  the  sheep  to  eat  the  green  grass  or  drink  from  the  still  waters.  The  sheep  still  
have  significant  decisions  to  make  that  they  and  they  alone  must  choose.  In  this  sense  
the  pastor  as  choice  architect  offers  a  concrete  vision  of  what  it  is  to  be  a  shepherd  today.  
The  pastor  as  choice  architect  is  absolutely  responsible  for  leading  teams  to  create  a  
congregational  choice  architecture  in  such  a  way  that  the  flock  has  access  to  the  
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resources  they  need.  However,  pastors  are  not  superheroes  somehow  responsible  for  
everything.  Congregations,  especially  in  a  postmodern,  individualistic  environment,  are  
composed  of  individuals  responsible  for  the  choices  they  make;  and  while  it  is  the  job  of  
the  choice  architect  to  provide  an  array  of  good  options,  congregations  do  choose  and  
their  choices  matter.  
When  describing  the  work  of  the  choice  architect,  Sunstein  and  Thaler  emphasize  
the  importance  of  the  status  quo  bias,  referring  to  our  tendency  to  accept  default  
settings.39  Sometimes  the  consequences  of  choosing  the  default  are  immaterial.  Who  has  
not  been  sitting  at  a  Starbucks  and  reached  for  their  iPhone  or  BlackBerry  when  another  
phone  using  the  same  default  ringtone  chimed?  Individuals  could  change  their  ring  
tones,  but  most  people  just  go  along  with  whatever  Steve  Jobs  thought  best.  More  
significant  consequences  include  the  illustrations  discussed  earlier  regarding  European  
donor  organ  participation  and  retirement  savings  opt  in  at  the  University  of  Chicago.  
Government  officials  at  the  highest  levels  have  even  taken  notice.  Prime  Minister  David  
Cameron  of  the  United  Kingdom  established  a  behavioral  insights  team,  known  as  the  
‘nudge’  unit,  to  make  recommendations  on  policy  decisions  as  diverse  as  tax  collection,  
unemployment,  to  discouraging  the  proliferation  of  Internet  pornography.40  Coining  the  
term  ‘libertarian  paternalism’,  Sunstein  and  Thaler  emphasize  that  choice  architects  may  
                                                                                                              
39  Sunstein  and  Thaler,  Nudge,  7-­‐‑8.  
40  Katrin  Bennhold,  “Britain’s  Ministry  of  Nudges,”  The  New  York  Times,  December  7,  2013,  accessed  on  
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nudge  people  to  behave  in  certain  ways  by  paying  particular  attention  to  how  defaults  
are  set  and  how  decisions  are  framed.  They  would  argue  that  choice  architects  like  
David  Cameron  avoid  being  coercive  or  manipulative  by  preserving  freedom  of  choice.41  
Again,  this  harkens  back  to  the  image  of  the  shepherd  who  is  responsible  for  the  
environment  the  flock  enjoys  but  not  the  individual  choices  each  congregant  makes.  
Several  factors  combine  to  create  situations  where  choice  architects  need  to  create  
nudges:  when  the  benefits  of  a  decision  will  be  delayed;  when  people  do  not  have  a  
great  deal  of  experience  in  a  given  situation;  and  when  a  situation  is  unusually  
complicated.42  Many  people  experience  the  church  as  a  place  where  all  three  of  these  
factors  come  together.  First,  especially  for  a  newcomer,  the  benefits  of  integration  into  a  
church  family  can  feel  excruciatingly  delayed  early  on  a  Sunday  morning.  After  
whatever  initial  emotional  high  has  dissipated,  new  participants  can  find  themselves  
wondering  why  they  continue  to  write  offering  checks  and  show  up  to  night  meetings.  
Second,  even  people  who  have  grown  up  in  the  church  can  find  some  aspects  of  ecclesial  
life  mysterious  and  foreign.  Given  how  different  church  can  be  compared  to  other  
occupational  environments,  people  can  encounter  choices  at  church  for  which  they  have  
little  preparation.  Third,  while  many  can  master  simple  life  skills  like  tying  shoe  laces  
and  driving  a  car,  harder  things  like  tying  a  bow  tie  or  driving  a  manual  transmission  
                                                                                                              
41  Sunstein  and  Thaler,  Nudge,  4-­‐‑5.  
42  Sunstein  and  Thaler,  Nudge,  72.  
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require  more  practice.  Given  the  thousands  of  years  of  church  history  and  the  
complexities  of  scriptural  interpretation,  making  informed  decisions  in  the  church  can  
be,  to  say  the  least,  an  extremely  challenging  activity.  For  these  reasons  churches  are  
certainly  places  where  choice  architects  might  create  helpful  nudges.  
A  concrete  example  is  church  membership.  As  Christendom  continues  to  
unravel,  the  decision  of  whether  to  join  a  congregation  becomes  increasingly  complex.  
What  does  it  mean  to  be  a  member?  Is  it  similar  to  being  a  member  at  Costco  or  Sam’s  
Club?  What  does  it  mean  to  be  a  member  of  this  or  that  particular  denomination  or  
nondenominational  church?  If  a  new  visitor  to  a  Presbyterian  or  Methodist  church  grew  
up  Roman  Catholic,  does  she  have  any  sense  as  to  whether  her  relationship  to  this  new  
congregation  is  any  different?  If  a  visitor  is  baptized  as  a  child,  does  he  have  to  be  
baptized  again?  If  a  visitor  was  baptized  as  a  child  but  now  is  not  really  sure  what  he  
believes  about  Jesus,  can  he  be  an  active  member  of  a  congregation;  or  should  he  just  
attend  and  participate  until  his  faith  is  more  settled?  
One  church  I  have  served  responded  to  this  confusion  over  membership  by  
exploring  changes  to  the  default  setting  for  membership.  The  denomination  of  this  
particular  church,  the  Presbyterian  Church  (U.S.A.),  officially  offers  four  choices  for  
membership:  baptized  members,  active  members,  affiliate  members,  and  then  a  category  
that  includes  everyone  else.  The  reality  on  the  ground  for  the  leaders  at  this  church  is  
that  the  congregation  cared  for  a  wider  spectrum  of  people  than  these  categories  named.  
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Some  active  members  showed  up  once  or  twice  a  year,  while  many  participants  
regularly  attended  and  served  but  seemed  disinterested  in  becoming  members  for  
various  reasons.  The  session,  the  governing  body  of  the  congregation,  determined  that  
the  defaults  for  membership  were  unhelpful.  The  defaults  forced  people  to  choose  
between  either  being  a  member,  or  being  lumped  into  a  category  that  includes  everyone  
from  people  who  show  up  every  Sunday  to  people  who  may  never  attend.  
The  unhelpfulness  of  these  defaults  became  clear  when  a  new  couple  (to  whom  I  
shall  refer  as  Carol  and  Bill)  began  attending  the  congregation.  Carol  was  able  to  affirm  
Jesus  Christ  as  her  Lord  and  Savior,  answer  all  the  other  questions  for  membership,  and  
was  interested  in  joining.  Bill,  on  the  other  hand,  was  not  quite  sure  he  could  affirm  
those  questions  honestly  but  wished  to  join,  too.  The  inability  to  affirm  the  questions  for  
membership  presented  a  problem.  Bill  expressed  that  the  pastor  at  the  church  they  
attended  before  told  him  the  questions  were  just  a  formality  and  counseled  him  to  just  
say  yes  whether  he  really  affirmed  the  statements  or  not.  Our  leadership  expressed  to  
Bill  that  the  tradition  and  his  beliefs  deserved  a  better  answer.  As  the  pastor,  I  began  to  
meet  with  Bill  over  coffee  to  talk  about  our  faith  and  see  whether  he  might  be  able  to  
honestly  affirm  Jesus  as  his  Lord  and  Savior.  When  it  became  clear  that  his  affirmation  
was  not  going  to  happen  anytime  soon,  I  felt  backed  into  a  corner  by  our  defaults.  I  
wanted  to  bless  this  man  who  faithfully  attended  our  congregation  and  supported  us  
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with  his  time  and  treasure,  but  at  the  same  time  I  wanted  to  honor  the  integrity  of  our  
polity  as  well  as  the  meaningful  struggle  of  his  doubt.  
The  session  came  to  a  decision  that  the  default  choices  were  unhelpful  because  
the  world  these  leaders  served  did  not  realistically  break  down  into  Christian  members  
who  show  up  all  the  time  and  can  affirm  their  faith  in  Jesus  versus  everyone  else.  This  
church,  like  so  many  others,  has  rarely-­‐‑seen  members,  and  faithful  people  who  attend  
regularly,  love  and  support  the  congregational  mission,  and  yet  are  not  able  or  willing  to  
affirm  the  questions  for  membership.  As  choice  architects  of  the  congregation,  the  
session  decided  they  needed  more  options.  Having  taken  an  oath  to  follow  our  
denomination’s  polity,  the  elders  knew  they  could  not  amend  the  categories  of  
membership  in  the  Book  of  Order.  However,  they  realized  the  Book  of  Order  did  not  
preclude  the  session  from  adding  a  category  in  a  way  that  still  affirmed  the  polity.  
Borrowing  from  the  practice  of  the  first  century  synagogues  who  affirmed  Gentiles  who  
participated  in  worship  but  did  not  become  circumcised  and  full  members  of  the  
community  by  calling  them  God-­‐‑fearers,  the  session  began  to  welcome  a  new  category  
designated  as  adherents  into  the  life  of  the  congregation  by  naming  them  and  blessing  
them  at  the  font.  Per  the  polity  of  the  denomination  adherents  cannot  vote  in  meetings,  
serve  as  officers,  or  be  counted  as  members,  but  now  the  blessing  and  naming  of  
adherents  are  meaningful  practices  indeed.  This  congregation  now  has  an  extremely  
helpful  choice  to  offer  visitors  interested  in  the  church  but  with  honest  reservations  
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about  membership.  This  church  is  now  better  able  to  honor  their  tradition  and  at  the  
same  time  welcome  questioning  new  brothers  and  sisters  into  the  beloved  community.    
Experimental Spirit 
One  final  action  point  that  a  behavioral  theology  offers  the  church  is  a  
recommendation  to  become  more  experimental,  perhaps  even  playful.  Confusion  and  
anxiety,  certainly  emotions  very  much  present  among  many  of  today’s  leaders,  are  not  
emotions  related  to  good  decision  making  from  either  a  biblical  or  behavioral  theoretical  
perspective.  One  response  to  confusion  and  anxiety  is  to  look  to  leadership,  particularly  
expert  leadership,  for  answers.  Again,  the  biblical  witness  lines  up  with  behavioral  
theory  to  counsel  caution  when  investing  too  much  trust  in  human  opinion.  While  
biblical  scholars  might  argue  one  need  look  no  further  than  the  history  of  Israel  and  the  
early  church  for  evidence,  a  social  scientist  curious  about  the  merit  of  expert  opinions,  
Philip  Tetlock,  studied  political  experts  in  the  1980s  to  judge  for  himself.  
In  Expert  Political  Judgment  Tetlock  shares  the  research  he  gathered  from  a  
panoply  of  leaders  widely  acknowledged  to  have  expert  political  knowledge.  Tetlock  
asked  these  leaders  to  make  27,450  concrete  predictions  about  the  political  future.  At  the  
same  time  Tetlock  also  asked  a  number  of  undergraduate  students,  as  far  from  experts  
as  one  might  imagine,  to  make  similar  predictions.  While  the  good  news  is  the  experts  
did  outguess  the  undergraduates,  the  bad  news  is  that  it  was  not  by  much.  Further,  
Tetlock  noted  the  disturbing  fact  that  even  when  experts  were  proved  wrong,  many  of  
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them  were  so  well  defended  by  their  belief  systems  that  they  failed  to  change  their  
opinions  and  viewed  their  failures  as  insignificant  accidents.43  While  many  have  taken  
Tetlock’s  findings  to  skeptically  argue  that  experts  are  over  exposed  and  over  paid,  
Tetlock  himself  does  not  draw  this  conclusion.  Tetlock  notes  that  the  primary  reason  
experts  fail  to  accurately  predict  events  is  not  due  to  the  inherent  unworthiness  of  
expertise  but  to  the  complexity  of  the  world  the  experts  inhabit.  
The  world  Tetlock  describes  is  not  simply  the  complicated  world  of  geopolitical  
affairs;  it  is  the  world  in  general.  Complexity  certainly  describes  the  contemporary  
church:  an  unusually  diverse  mix  of  people,  perspective,  and  organizational  structure.  
Leaders  of  congregations  today  are  asked  to  be  theologians,  biblical  scholars,  nonprofit  
leaders,  pastoral  counselors,  and  the  list  continues.  And,  what  is  a  congregation?  Is  it  a  
house  of  prayer?  Is  it  a  business?  Is  it  a  relief  agency?  The  body  of  Christ  constitutes  a  
dizzying  array  of  complexity,  and  leaders  would  do  well  to  heed  the  Apostle  Paul’s  
wisdom  regarding  honoring  the  diverse  nature  of  this  body.  The  church  is  a  hand,  foot,  
and  eye,  and  more  than  all  of  these  together;  it  is  impossible  to  fully  grasp  without  a  
holistic  understanding  that  scholars  like  Tetlock  argue  lies  outside  the  realm  of  human  
understanding.  When  complexity  lies  beyond  the  realm  of  deductive  capacity,  
experimentation  becomes  the  most  appropriate  learning  posture.  
                                                                                                              
43  Philip  E.  Tetlock,  Expert  Political  Judgment  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  2009),  189,  Kindle.  
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In  Adapt  Tim  Harford  agrees  with  Tetlock’s  view  of  the  complexity  of  the  world.  
Harford  shares  the  memorable  experience  of  design  student  Thomas  Thwaites  who  
undertook  the  task  of  recreating  the  humble  toaster,  an  object  produced  en  masse  and  
readily  available  in  the  developed  world.  Thinking  the  toaster  would  not  be  that  difficult  
to  reproduce  from  scratch,  Thwaites  was  quickly  humbled  by  the  vast  complexity  
involved  in  its  manufacture.  Even  the  simplest  model  Thwaites  could  find  was  
composed  of  over  four  hundred  parts  and  subcomponents.  To  come  up  with  the  basic  
elements  of  construction  like  iron  ore,  Thwaites  had  to  travel  great  distances  and  
attempt  processing  techniques  totally  foreign  to  him.  Ultimately,  just  to  create  enough  
usable  iron  Thwaites  acknowledged  cheating  by  using  a  microwave  oven,  although  he  
notes  that  even  this  method  was  not  easy  as  he  destroyed  one  microwave  oven  in  the  
process.  At  the  end  of  the  toaster  project  Harford  describes  Thwaites’s  less  than  stellar  
result:  “Despite  his  Herculean  efforts  to  duplicate  the  technology,  Thomas  Thwaites’s  
toaster  looks  more  like  a  toaster-­‐‑shaped  birthday  cake  than  a  real  toaster,  its  coating  
dripping  and  oozing  like  an  icing  job  gone  wrong.  ‘It  warms  bread  when  I  plug  it  into  a  
battery,’  he  told  me,  brightly.  ‘But  I’m  not  sure  what  will  happen  if  I  plug  it  into  the  
mains.’  Eventually,  he  summoned  up  the  courage  to  do  so.  Two  seconds  later,  the  
toaster  was  toast.”44  Thwaites  notes  ruefully  that  one  could  easily  spend  a  lifetime  
building  something  from  scratch  as  simple  in  appearance  as  the  household  toaster.  
                                                                                                              
44  Tim  Harford,  Adapt:  Why  Success  Always  Starts  with  Failure  (New  York:  Macmillan,  2010),  2,  Kindle.  
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Harford’s  point  in  telling  this  story  is  to  point  out  how  easy  it  is  to  overlook  how  
complicated  the  world  has  become.  Commodities  from  toasters  to  lattes  depend  on  a  
vast  global  network  of  trade  and  production.  The  average  person  living  in  a  twenty-­‐‑first  
century  city  is  surrounded  by  billions  of  products  with  millions  more  being  created  
every  year.  The  complexity  of  this  system  makes  problem  solving  an  almost  infinitely  
difficult  task  in  that  changing  one  part  of  the  system  necessarily  means  producing  a  
chain  of  counter  effects  impossible  for  the  wisest  expert  to  fully  predict.  Perhaps  the  
most  difficult  part  of  complexity  for  a  leader  is  the  lack  of  awareness  most  people  have  
regarding  the  situation:  “The  complexity  of  the  society  we  have  created  for  ourselves  
envelops  us  so  completely  that,  instead  of  being  dizzied,  we  take  it  for  granted.”45      
Harford  argues  that  the  best  response  to  this  complexity  is  to  adopt  an  experimental  
approach  that  acknowledges  with  humility  the  limitations  of  human  knowledge.  
Citing  examples  from  the  Soviet  Union’s  failed  attempt  at  centralized  planning  to  
the  early  failures  by  Donald  Rumsfeld  to  adequately  prepare  for  the  Iraq  insurgency,  
Harford  demonstrates  again  and  again  how  complicated  situations  require  leaders  who  
view  themselves  less  as  experts  and  more  as  learners.  Harford  lifts  up  experimental  
heroes  like  Scottish  physician  Archie  Cochrane  who  railed  against  the  God-­‐‑complex  
attitudes  he  saw  among  other  physicians  of  his  day  who  simply  asserted  that  some  
practices  were  more  effective  than  others  without  any  real  evidence.  Cochrane  became  
                                                                                                              
45  Harford,  Adapt,  3.  
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so  frustrated  by  the  unwillingness  of  his  colleagues  to  heed  his  call  to  test  their  ideas  that  
he  resorted  to  a  ruse  to  gain  a  hearing.  Concerned  over  the  efficacy  of  coronary  care  
units,  Cochrane  wondered  whether  patients  recovered  faster  at  home.  Cochrane  ran  a  
study  and  then  played  a  trick  on  his  colleagues  when  he  shared  the  results.  Telling  his  
colleagues  that  the  home  care  trials  were  showing  more  deaths  than  the  coronary  care  
units,  his  colleagues  scolded  him  for  unethically  putting  people  at  risk.  After  allowing  
them  to  lecture  him  on  the  importance  of  patient  care,  Cochrane  then  acknowledged  he  
had  reversed  the  statistics:  in  reality  the  coronary  care  units  were  showing  significantly  
higher  mortality  levels.  Stunned,  Cochrane’s  colleagues  were  forced  to  reevaluate  the  
coronary  care  units  in  which  they  were  so  heavily  emotionally  invested.  The  point  is  
complexity  coupled  with  human  cognitive  limitations  means  responsible  leaders  should  
spend  as  much  time  testing  their  ideas  as  they  do  formulating  them.  
To  this  point  one  of  the  foundational  practices  of  behavioral  economics  is  the  
testing  of  economic  theory  to  see  when  models  accurately  describe  human  behavior  and  
when  they  do  not.  At  least  since  George  Katona’s  survey  work  related  to  the  Federal  
Reserve,  behavioralists  have  argued  theory  must  always  live  in  tension  with  
experimental  results.  One  of  the  great  hallmarks  and  gifts  of  the  behavioral  turn  is  the  
humble  acknowledgement  that  theory  and  practice  exist  in  a  dialectic:  theory  is  required  
to  formulate  ideas,  and  experimental  practice  is  required  to  understand  how  these  
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theories  take  flesh  in  complicated  environments.  The  importance  of  testing  ideas  has  a  
significant,  if  complicated,  biblical  heritage.  
On  the  one  hand  there  is  a  negative  connotation  associated  with  testing  in  
Scripture.  In  Luke  one  of  the  three  challenges  Satan  puts  to  Jesus  in  the  wilderness  is  to  
throw  himself  down  off  the  spire  of  the  temple  and  trust  that  God’s  angels  would  not  let  
him  fall  to  his  death.  Jesus  responds  by  quoting  Deuteronomy  6:16:  “Do  not  put  the  Lord  
your  God  to  the  test.”    In  several  other  instances  enemies  of  Jesus  put  questions  to  him  
with  the  specific  purpose  of  putting  the  rabbi  to  the  test.  In  the  Lukan  example  testing  
seems  equivalent  to  being  presumptuous.  The  proper  response  to  God’s  grace  and  care  
is  to  be  grateful,  rather  than  to  presume  upon  it  by  putting  it  to  the  test  in  such  a  
needless  way.  In  other  examples  of  Pharisees,  scribes,  and  Sadducees  challenging  Jesus,  
testing  may  be  less  negative  than  it  at  first  seems;  upon  reflection  this  testing  may  
simply  be  part  of  the  common  rhetorical  practices  of  Jewish  intellectuals.  Amy-­‐‑Jill  
Levine  is  right  to  caution  contemporary  Christians  who  may  read  these  examples  of  
testing  through  an  anti-­‐‑Semitic  lens  and  evaluate  the  passages  as  overly  or  unusually  
hostile  to  the  testers.46  Such  testing  was  and  continues  to  be  a  valuable  aspect  of  the  
rabbinic  give  and  take,  and  Jesus  never  responded  with  shock  at  being  questioned  but  
with  the  skillful  banter  of  one  unusually  gifted  in  such  exchanges.  In  none  of  these  
                                                                                                              
46  Levine,  The  Misunderstood  Jew,  40.  
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negative  instances  of  the  term  testing  do  we  find  anything  approaching  the  more  
scientific  meaning  of  testing  that  a  behavioral  perspective  advocates.  
The  Bible  contains  at  least  three  examples  of  such  scientific  testing:  in  two  of  
these  examples  the  testing  is  viewed  as  acceptable,  and  in  the  third  example  the  negative  
example  only  upholds  the  positive  meaning.  The  simplest  of  the  three  examples  comes  
from  the  letter  of  First  John.  Pain  infuses  the  letter  of  First  John  written  to  a  community  
experiencing  a  gut-­‐‑wrenching  internal  division.  Although  the  theological  reasons  for  the  
split  are  not  entirely  clear,  the  author  acknowledges  that  a  group  of  former  brothers  and  
sisters  who  deny  Christ  had  gone  out  from  the  community.  While  these  antichrists  
seemed  to  be  brothers  and  sisters,  the  author  argues  that  their  treason  proved  this  
familial  relationship  was  never  truly  the  case.  Again,  the  pain  of  the  break  spills  off  the  
page.  Given  this  painful  break  it  is  little  wonder  that  the  writer  cautions  his  community  
to  test  what  they  hear:  “Beloved,  do  not  believe  every  spirit,  but  test  the  spirits  to  see  
whether  they  are  from  God;  for  many  false  prophets  have  gone  out  into  the  world”  (First  
John  4:1).  The  author  of  First  John  goes  on  to  describe  the  theological  content  for  which  
the  community  should  look  to  determine  whether  a  teaching  is  true  or  false.  
An  even  more  sophisticated  method  of  testing  occurs  in  Chapter  6  of  the  Book  of  
Judges.  Throughout  the  Book  of  Judges,  as  well  as  the  entire  Deuteronomistic  history,  
the  Israelites  cycled  through  seasons  where  they  kept  faith  with  God  and  prospered  as  a  
result,  only  to  lose  faith  and  do  what  was  evil  in  the  sight  of  the  Lord  and  fall  on  hard  
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times.  Chapter  6  opens  with  the  Israelites  doing  what  was  evil  in  the  sight  of  the  Lord  
and  being  delivered  over  into  the  hands  of  the  Midianites.  While  this  capture  is  bad  
news,  the  good  news  is  that  God  was  raising  up  a  new  judge,  Gideon,  to  lead  the  people  
into  a  more  faithful  time.  Unusual  for  a  judge,  Gideon  was  not  the  most  trusting  of  
leaders.47  Gideon  first  tested  God  by  asking  for  a  sign.  God  told  Gideon  to  prepare  an  
offering  and  place  it  upon  a  rock.  When  Gideon  did  so  and  poured  broth  over  the  food,  
the  Lord  consumed  the  offering  in  flame  and  appeared  as  an  angel.  Sufficiently  moved,  
Gideon  responded  to  God’s  request  to  tear  down  the  altar  to  Baal  the  people  had  
erected.  
One  might  think  that  Gideon’s  need  for  proof  was  satisfied;  but  when  God  
requested  that  Gideon  go  up  against  the  overwhelming  odds  of  the  Midianites,  Gideon  
requested  another  sign,  only  this  sign  would  be  on  Gideon’s  terms.  Gideon  told  God  he  
would  lay  down  fleece  upon  the  ground,  and  in  the  morning  he  would  check  it.  If  the  
fleece  was  wet  and  the  ground  was  dry,  then  Gideon  said  he  could  be  sure  that  God  
would  help  him  rescue  his  people  from  the  hand  of  the  Midianites.  Surprisingly,  God  
complied  with  Gideon’s  request.  Even  more  surprisingly,  Gideon  was  not  finished  with  
his  experiment.  Realizing  that  perhaps  there  might  be  some  quality  related  to  the  fleece  
that  might  account  for  its  wetness,  Gideon  asked  for  a  second,  slightly  different  trial:  
“Then  Gideon  said  to  God,  ‘Do  not  let  your  anger  burn  against  me,  let  me  speak  one  
                                                                                                              
47  Ariely,  The  Upside  of  Irrationality,  Kindle  location  3832.  
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more  time;  let  me,  please,  make  trial  with  the  fleece  just  once  more;  let  it  be  dry  only  on  
the  fleece,  and  on  all  the  ground  let  there  be  dew.’  And  God  did  so  that  night.  It  was  dry  
on  the  fleece  only,  and  on  all  the  ground  there  was  dew”  (Judges  6:39–40).  These  verses  
offer  a  powerful  biblical  example  that  God  is  at  times  extremely  open  and  encouraging  
of  an  experimental  process.  The  opposite  of  faith  is  not  experimentation!  
The  third  example  of  putting  the  Lord  to  the  test  comes  from  Isaiah  Chapter  7  in  
which  Isaiah  is  speaking  with  King  Ahaz.  Although  this  example  is  negative,  in  this  case  
the  negative  serves  to  prove  the  rule.  In  735  BCE  King  Ahaz  of  Judah  confronts  a  terrible  
decision.  King  Pekah  of  Israel  and  King  Rezin  of  Aram  team  up  against  the  nascent  
power  of  Assyria.  Part  of  their  plan  is  to  get  rid  of  Ahaz  and  establish  a  puppet  king  in  
Ahaz’s  place.48  Ahaz  only  seems  to  have  two  options:  fight  this  alliance  on  his  own  or  
fight  this  alliance  with  Assyria’s  help.  While  Isaiah  does  not  record  the  advice  of  Ahaz’s  
other  advisors,  it  is  not  difficult  to  imagine  them  split  on  which  path  Ahaz  should  
choose.  Isaiah  alone  speaks  against  both  options  urging  Ahaz  to  consider  a  third  
possibility:  Isaiah  tells  him  to  place  his  trust  in  God  and  avoid  getting  involved.  
Interestingly,  Isaiah  records  God  Godself  telling  Ahaz  to  request  a  sign  for  reassurance.  
Ahaz,  feigning  a  faith  he  does  not  have,  sanctimoniously  retorts  that  he  would  never  test  
God  in  such  a  way:  “Again  the  LORD  spoke  to  Ahaz,  saying,  Ask  a  sign  of  the  LORD  
your  God;  let  it  be  deep  as  Sheol  or  high  as  heaven.  But  Ahaz  said,  I  will  not  ask,  and  I  
                                                                                                              
48  Bernard  Anderson,  Understanding  the  Old  Testament  (New  Jersey:  Prentice  Hall  Press,  1998),  296.  
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will  not  put  the  LORD  to  the  test.  Then  Isaiah  said:  ‘Hear  then,  O  house  of  David!  Is  it  
too  little  for  you  to  weary  mortals,  that  you  weary  my  God  also?  Therefore  the  Lord  
himself  will  give  you  a  sign.  Look,  the  young  woman  is  with  child  and  shall  bear  a  son,  
and  shall  name  him  Immanuel’”  (Isaiah  7:10–14).  While  at  first  one  might  assume  testing  
God  should  be  viewed  as  incompatible  with  the  faith,  here  again  testing  seems  to  be  
exactly  what  God  is  desiring.  
Viewed  in  this  light  the  emphasis  behavioralists  place  on  experimentation  and  
the  tools  they  have  developed  to  test  theory  can  be  helpful  to  the  church.  Currently,  the  
church  relies  on  untested  theory  to  a  far  greater  extent  than  experimentation.  Once,  in  
my  position  as  the  chairperson  for  the  Committee  on  Ministry  for  our  Presbytery,  I  was  
defending  the  common  Presbyterian  Church  (U.S.A.)  practice  of  formalized  interim  
pastors  leading  congregations  through  long  periods  between  installed  pastors.  When  
pressed  by  an  interlocutor  regarding  the  wisdom  of  this  practice,  I  became  indignant  
and  insistent  that  congregations  were  healthier  today  than  they  were  when  this  practice  
was  not  in  place.  Pushed  to  offer  evidence  for  this  belief,  I  was  forced  to  admit  that  I  had  
none.  I  realized  instantly,  and  with  chagrin,  that  I  was  simply  repeating  what  I  had  been  
told  by  others  I  trusted,  but  I  had  no  evidence,  experimental  or  otherwise,  to  support  my  
beliefs.  That  moment  has  stayed  with  me,  and  the  overwhelming  sense  I  have  today  is  
that  the  mission  of  the  church  is  far  too  important  and  far  too  complicated  for  leaders  to  
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accept  untested  theories  as  truth.  Thus,  I  view  the  behavioral  practice  of  careful  
experimentation  as  potentially  offering  a  helpful  corrective  to  the  church.  
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7. Behavioral Theology and Church Growth, Stability, 
and Decline 
Starting  in  the  late  1950s  mainline  denominations  along  with  other  social  
organizations  in  America  experienced  numerical  decline.1  Explanations  abound  for  this  
decline,  but  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  mainline  denominations  continue  to  experience  
aggregate  numerical  decrease,  significant  numbers  of  congregations  do  maintain  their  
membership  through  moderate  replacement  growth  while  some  congregations  even  
experience  more  dramatic  levels  of  growth.  
The  theological  implications  of  numerical  decrease  and  increase  are  complicated.  
Ever  since  John  6  when  Jesus  offended  and  alienated  a  large  number  of  would-­‐‑be  
followers,  it  is  clear  that  not  every  numerical  decrease  signals  spiritual  failure.  Similarly,  
not  every  growing  congregation  manifests  theological  fidelity  and  long-­‐‑term  
institutional  health.  However,  in  the  interest  of  institutional  vibrancy,  understanding  as  
much  as  possible  about  why  some  mainline  congregations  experience  numerical  
maintenance  and  growth  while  some  experience  decline  would  contribute  greatly  to  the  
current  conversation  among  voices  like  Mark  Chaves,  Robert  Putnam,  Robert  Wuthnow,  
and  Diana  Butler  Bass  regarding  the  future  of  the  mainline  church.  
Chaves  offers  a  brilliant  demographic  analysis  describing  the  effect  of  lowered  
birth  rates  and  other  forces  on  mainline  churches  and  the  general  trend  of  decreasing  
                                                                                                              
1  Robert  Putnam,  Bowling  Alone  (New  York:  Simon  and  Schuster,  2000),  71.  
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American  religiosity.2  Putnam  and  Wuthnow  articulate  broad  sociological  trends  
influencing  mainline  decline  with  Putnam  emphasizing  the  important  role  the  ‘nones’  
may  play  in  the  mainline  future.3  Bass  offers  a  socio-­‐‑theological  critique  of  mainline  
decline  also  focusing  on  the  nones;  however,  Bass  is  far  less  optimistic  that  the  church  as  
it  currently  exists  will  be  able  to  appeal  to  the  nones.4  While  these  voices  are  invaluable  
for  understanding  what  is  happening  in  mainline  churches,  broad  sociological  trends  
offer  little  understanding  of  how  factors  like  congregational  leadership  might  contribute  
to  or  impede  this  decline.  Recent  work  in  behavioral  game  theory  may.  
Cutting  edge  research  by  Harvard’s  Martin  Nowak  illuminates  one  promising  
factor  in  understanding  mainline  numerical  increase  and  decline:  the  willingness  and  
ability  of  congregational  leaders  to  cooperate.  Nowak,  a  mathematician,  studies  game  
theory,  primarily  relying  upon  the  iterated  prisoner’s  dilemma,  which  models  
cooperation  and  conflict  to  better  understand  behavior  in  populations  as  diverse  as  
stickleback  fish  to  cancer  to  human  group  behavior.  Nowak  builds  on  the  work  of  
Robert  Axelrod  who  in  The  Evolution  of  Cooperation  compared  the  results  of  computers  
using  various  strategies  to  play  iterated  prisoner’s  dilemmas.  Hypothesizing  that  the  
best  strategy  would  be  ruthless  and  complicated  enough  to  be  deceptive,  Axelrod  was  
                                                                                                              
2  Mark  Chaves,  American  Religion:  Contemporary  Trends  (Princeton,  NJ,  Princeton  University  Press,  2011),  11.  
3  Robert  Putnam  and  David  Campbell,  American  Grace:  How  Religion  Unites  and  Divides  Us  (New  York:  Simon  
and  Schuster,  2010),  133.  
4  Diana  Butler  Bass,  Christianity  After  Religion:  The  End  of  Church  and  the  Birth  of  a  New  Spiritual  Awakening,  
(San  Francisco:  Harper  Collins,  2012),  245,  Kindle.  
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surprised  to  discover  that  the  most  successful  strategy  was  highly  cooperative,  although  
still  willing  to  retaliate  against  an  unprovoked  defection.  Taking  this  direction  further,  
Nowak  discovered  other  successful  strategies  that  were  even  more  cooperative.  
Eventually,  Nowak  studied  the  public  goods  game,  a  multiplayer  version  of  the  
prisoner’s  dilemma  in  which  he  shows  that  groups  eschewing  the  use  of  punishment  
thrive  in  comparison  to  groups  willing  to  punish.  Nowak  cleverly  names  this  
counterintuitive  truth:  “punish  and  perish.”5  In  essence  Nowak  argues  that  teams  who  
learn  how  to  cooperate  with  one  another  are  not  only  more  faithful  but  should  be  more  
successful  in  their  efforts  as  well.    
Theologically,  a  strong  case  can  be  made  that  a  vital  faith  fosters  responsible  
cooperation  among  church  leaders.  Nowak’s  work  offers  church  leaders  a  way  to  test  
how  this  theory  plays  out,  an  experimental  spirit  that  characterizes  behavioral  theology.  
I  have  studied  whether  there  is  a  correlation  between  how  elders  in  Presbyterian  Church  
(U.S.A.)  congregations  with  varying  levels  of  growth  or  decline  play  two  versions  of  a  
cooperative  goods  game.  Viewing  these  games  as  a  kind  of  living  parable,  I  believe  they  
offer  insight  beyond  the  game  itself.  These  games  allow  the  possibility  for  ecclesial  
leaders  to  discern  whether  trust  is  as  present  as  they  believe,  whether  this  trust  
correlates  with  cooperative  behavior,  and,  in  conjunction  with  congregational  statistics,  
                                                                                                              
5  Martin  Nowak  and  Roger  Highfield,  SuperCooperators:  Altruism,  Evolution,  and  Why  We  Need  Each  Other  to  
Succeed  (New  York:  Simon  &  Schuster,  2011),  230,  Kindle.  
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whether  this  cooperative  behavior  is  consistent  with  numerical  growth,  stability,  or  
decline.  
I  will  summarize  the  vibrant  conversation  occurring  between  behavioral  game  
theorists  regarding  cooperation,  punishment,  and  the  public  goods  game.  Indeed,  
Nowak’s  position  regarding  the  superiority  of  cooperation  in  the  absence  of  punishment  
is  only  one  of  many  important  views.  Then,  I  will  describe  the  study  design  (included  in  
Appendix  A).  Next,  I  will  present  my  initial  predictions.  Finally,  I  will  offer  the  results  of  
the  study  with  a  statistical  and  behavioral  theological  analysis.  
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8. Game Theory, Cooperation, and the Public Goods 
Game 
John  von  Neumann  and  Oskar  Morgenstern  established  the  economic  study  of  
game  theory  in  1944  with  the  publication  of  their  book  Theory  of  Games  and  Economic  
Behavior.  The  games  described  in  game  theory  attempt  to  outline  conflicted  social  
interactions.  Johan  Almenberg  and  Anna  Dreber  offer  a  concise  description  of  these  
games:  “A  game  is  a  simple,  stylized  way  of  representing  a  strategic  interaction.  It  
abstracts  from  specific  details  and  attempts  only  to  distill  the  essential,  general  structure  
of  an  interaction.  A  game  consists  of  three  elements:  (1)  the  players;  (2)  the  actions  that  
the  players  choose  from;  and  (3)  the  payoff  functions  that  map  each  action  to  a  payoff  for  
an  individual  player,  given  the  choices  made  by  the  other  players.”173  To  those  shaped  
by  a  biblical  imagination  the  parabolic  nature  of  the  interactions  in  game  theory  provoke  
interest.  Jesus  eschewed  abstract  theological  reflection  in  his  teaching  in  favor  of  
narrative  parables.  In  a  similar  way  game  theorists  describe  their  games  in  the  form  of  
curious  stories  about  hunters  deciding  whether  to  pursue  stags  or  hares,  drivers  stuck  in  
the  snow,  and  luckless  prisoners  forced  to  make  a  simultaneous  decision  regarding  their  
mutual  fate.  
Despite  the  considerable  influence  game  theory  has  had  in  economics  and  the  
intriguing  connections  with  the  biblical  tradition,  very  little  work  has  been  done  to  
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connect  these  conversations.  In  Biblical  Games  game  theorist  Steven  J.  Brams  casts  biblical  
narratives  in  terms  of  payoff  matrices  and  decision  trees  provocatively  casting  God  as  a  
player  whose  preferences  and  strategies  can  be  encoded  like  any  other  player.174  From  
the  social  science  perspective  Robert  Wright  in  the  Evolution  of  God  applies  the  basic  
distinction  between  zero-­‐‑sum  and  non-­‐‑zero-­‐‑sum  games  to  the  history  of  religion.  Wright  
makes  the  argument  that  the  great  Abrahamic  faiths  already  contain  the  seeds  of  non-­‐‑
zero-­‐‑sum  tolerance;  the  hope  for  peaceful  co-­‐‑existence  depends  on:  “heed[ing]  the  
lessons  embedded  in  the  Abrahamic  scriptures;  arrange  things,  wherever  possible,  so  
that  people  of  different  Abrahamic  faiths  find  themselves  in  non-­‐‑zero-­‐‑sum  
relationships.175  It  is  only  very  recently  with  the  unusual  partnership  between  theologian  
Sarah  Coakley  and  evolutionary  biologist  Martin  Nowak  that  the  connection  between  
game  theory  and  the  biblical  tradition  is  being  more  thoroughly  studied.  Critically,  the  
partnership  is  not  only  conceptual  but  also  experimental.  Coakley  has  not  only  
published  her  steps  towards  a  humbled  natural  theology  informed  by  a  game  theoretic  
critique  of  evolutionary  biology,  but  she  has  participated  in  an  experiment  testing  the  
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influence  of  religious  conditioning  on  the  willingness  of  subjects  to  be  cooperative  in  
one-­‐‑shot  prisoner  dilemma  games.176  
The  historic  disconnect  may  stem  from  the  seemingly  incompatible  gulf  between  
the  rationalism  of  game  theory  and  the  biblical  tradition.  Classical  game  theory  operated  
with  the  same  assumptions  regarding  human  nature  as  the  standard  economic  model:  
classical  game  theory  assumes  people  are  rational  and  able  to  maximize  their  utility,  
possess  self-­‐‑control  enough  to  pursue  their  best  strategy,  and  are  fundamentally  self-­‐‑
interested  and  seek  after  their  own  best  material  payoff.177  By  now  the  behavioral  
critique  of  these  assumptions  should  be  familiar;  behavioralists  find  particular  value  in  
game  theory  due  to  how  easy  it  is  to  show  that  when  actual  humans  play  these  games,  
they  behave  in  ways  the  conventional  model  would  have  to  describe  as  predictably  
irrational.178  This  insight  not  only  chastens  the  rationalism  of  the  standard  model  but  
also  provides  a  bridge  to  the  more  realistic  anthropology  of  the  biblical  tradition.  
Four  games  are  particularly  helpful  in  seeing  how  actual  people  play  in  ways  
that  diverge  from  how  the  standard  economic  model  predicts:  the  dictator  game,  the  
ultimatum  game,  the  prisoner’s  dilemma,  and  the  public  goods  game.  In  the  dictator  
game  two  strangers  are  paired  up  in  a  one-­‐‑time  interaction.  One  player,  the  dictator,  is  
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given  an  amount  of  money  and  has  to  decide  how  much  of  the  money  to  keep  for  herself  
and  how  much  money  to  give  to  the  other  player.179  While  the  standard  model  would  
predict  that  a  rational  player  would  give  no  money  to  the  other  player,  when  real  people  
play  this  game  the  dictators  almost  always  give  away  some  amount.180  As  described  
earlier,  the  ultimatum  game  builds  on  the  dictator  game,  with  one  player  making  a  
decision  regarding  how  to  divide  an  amount  of  money  and  the  second  player  deciding  
whether  or  not  both  players  receive  the  split  amount.  Again,  in  the  standard  economic  
model  the  first  player  should  give  as  little  as  possible,  and  the  second  player  should  
accept  any  offer  since  something  is  better  than  nothing.  But,  in  actual  studies  players  are  
far  more  generous  and  far  more  willing  to  reject  unfair  offers  than  the  standard  model  
would  predict.181  
    Because  the  prisoner’s  dilemma  and  the  public  goods  game  provide  the  basis  
for  the  rest  of  this  work  and  because  the  public  goods  game  is  really  a  multiplayer  
version  of  the  prisoner’s  dilemma,  it  is  worth  spending  more  time  and  attention  
outlining  each  of  these  games.  The  prisoner’s  dilemma  pits  individual  benefit  over  and  
against  the  collective  good.  One  of  the  most  studied  games,  the  prisoner’s  dilemma  was  
first  conceived  by  Melvin  Dresher  and  Merrill  Flood  during  the  dark,  cold  war  era  days  
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in  the  RAND  Corporation.182  The  dilemma  was  given  its  name  and  parabolic  story  from  
Albert  Tucker,  Ph.D.  advisor  to  none  other  than  John  Nash.  Tucker  posited  two  
prisoners  being  held  separately  in  a  police  station.  Although  the  police  have  enough  
evidence  to  convict  both  prisoners  on  a  small  charge,  without  further  cooperation  and  
testimony  from  at  least  one  of  the  men  the  police  will  not  be  able  to  convict  either  on  the  
most  serious  charge.  So,  the  police  offer  each  prisoner  the  same  deal:  testify  against  your  
partner  and  go  free.  Three  possibilities  arise  from  this  situation:  the  prisoners  cooperate  
with  one  another  and  say  nothing  to  the  police  resulting  in  both  being  convicted  on  the  
lightest  charge;  the  prisoners  both  give  evidence  (known  as  ‘defecting’)  causing  each  to  
be  convicted  on  the  serious  charge;  or,  diabolically,  one  of  the  prisoners  maintains  
silence  while  the  other  defects,  the  result  of  which  is  the  loyal  partner  is  convicted  on  the  
most  serious  charge  while  the  betrayer  goes  free.183  
The  rational  strategy  for  playing  the  prisoner’s  dilemma  according  to  the  
standard  model  was  articulated  by  none  other  than  John  Nash.  In  1994  John  Nash,  John  
Harsanyi,  and  Richard  Selton  won  the  Nobel  Prize  in  economics  for  their  work  in  
noncooperative  game  theory;  Nash’s  award-­‐‑winning  contribution  was  his  formulation  
of  the  Nash  equilibrium  from  1951.184  A  Nash  equilibrium  exists  whenever  one  player  is  
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unable  to  improve  their  situation  by  unilaterally  switching  their  strategy.185  In  other  
words  a  Nash  equilibrium  exists  whenever  each  player  is  making  the  most  rational,  self-­‐‑
interested  choice  they  can  make  in  light  of  the  other  player’s  strategic  possibilities.  The  
Nash  equilibrium  for  a  prisoner’s  dilemma,  even  a  repeated  prisoner’s  dilemma  in  
which  players  interact  over  a  period  of  many  rounds,  exists  when  both  players  defect.  
Even  though  both  players  would  benefit  more  if  they  cooperate,  the  specter  of  the  
‘sucker’s  payoff’  is  so  costly  that  rational,  self-­‐‑interested  individuals  adopt  a  defensive,  
uncooperative  position.  However,  as  with  the  dictator  game  and  the  ultimatum  game,  
when  behavioral  economists  observe  actual  human  beings  play  versions  of  the  
prisoner’s  dilemma,  human  beings  are  far  more  willing  to  cooperate  than  is,  at  least  by  
John  Nash’s  calculation,  rational.  But  why  are  some  groups  more  willing  to  cooperate  
than  others?  And  are  there  mechanisms  that  exist  to  increase  the  willingness  of  people  to  
cooperate  with  one  another?  
One  of  the  first  to  seriously  engage  this  question  was  mathematician  Robert  
Axelrod.  Axelrod  fixed  his  scholarly  attention  on  what  he  considers  the  central  question  
in  human  interaction:  “Under  what  conditions  will  cooperation  emerge  in  a  world  of  
egoists  without  central  authority?”186  Wanting  to  model  human  behavior  in  the  most  
realistic  way,  Axelrod  decided  to  study  open-­‐‑ended,  iterated  prisoner’s  dilemma  games  
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pitting  two  players  together  for  a  repeated  series  of  games.  In  order  to  model  a  world  of  
egoists,  nothing  demonstrates  humanity  at  its  most  venial  like  the  prisoner’s  dilemma.  
Wanting  as  much  data  as  possible,  Axelrod  held  a  computer  tournament  in  
which  specialists  from  such  diverse  fields  as  political  science,  computer  science,  
mathematics,  and  biology  entered  computer  programs  that  competed  against  other  
programs.  Some  of  the  programmed  strategies  entered  were  incredibly  complicated,  
taking  into  account  nuances  in  the  opponent’s  patterns  of  behavior.  Some  of  the  
programmed  strategies  were  simple,  composed  of  just  a  few  lines  of  code.  Many  of  the  
strategies  were  aggressive,  seeking  to  defect  as  much  as  possible.  Some  of  the  strategies  
were  conciliatory,  showing  a  willingness  to  cooperate.  Axelrod  compiled  all  of  these  
programmed  strategies  and  carefully  played  them  against  one  another,  detailing  the  
results.  The  surprising  results  led  to  his  groundbreaking  work  The  Evolution  of  
Cooperation.  
Axelrod  and  his  research  team  assumed  that  the  most  successful  program  would  
be  the  most  cutthroat,  the  one  most  willing  to  use  subterfuge,  and  the  one  most  willing  
to  defect.187  In  others  words  Axelrod  and  his  research  team  hypothesized  that  the  
program  most  resembling  a  stereotypically  Machiavellian  personality  would  dominate  
in  this  ultimately  competitive  game  of  total  conflict.  Curiously,  however,  the  dominant  
program  from  a  mathematician  at  the  University  of  Toronto,  Anatol  Rapoport,  was  not  
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only  the  most  simple,  but  it  was  among  the  nicest  strategies  as  well.  Rapoport’s  
program,  entitled  ’tit  for  tat’,  is  as  simple  as  it  is  powerful:  a  tit  for  tat  strategy  will  
always  begin  by  cooperating;  it  will  always  retaliate  one  time  after  the  other  program  
defects;  then  tit  for  tat  will  immediately  go  back  to  cooperating;  and  it  will  never  deviate  
from  this  pattern.188  After  tit  for  tat  won  the  first  computer  competition,  Axelrod  wanted  
to  see  how  the  strategy  would  fare  against  opponents  that  had  a  chance  to  prepare.  
Axelrod  published  the  surprising  results  and  welcomed  more  than  twice  as  many  
competitors  into  a  second  tournament  where,  again,  tit  for  tat  came  out  on  top.  
Axelrod  believes  the  power  of  tit  for  tat  lies  in  its  four  attributes.  First,  the  
program  is  considered  nice,  because  tit  for  tat  begins  by  cooperating  and  will  continue  
cooperating  as  long  as  the  other  player  does  not  defect.  Far  from  an  anomaly,  this  
willingness  to  cooperate  was  the  norm  for  successful  strategies:  “Each  of  the  eight  top-­‐‑
ranking  entries  (or  rules)  is  nice.  None  of  the  other  entries  is  …  the  nice  entries  received  
tournament  averages  between  472  and  504,  while  the  best  of  the  entries  that  were  not  
nice  received  only  401  points.”189  However,  this  strategy  is  no  doormat.  When  another  
program  attempted  to  take  advantage  of  tit  for  tat’s  willingness  to  cooperate  by  
defecting,  tit  for  tat  immediately  retaliated  by  defecting.  The  key  point  here  is  that  while  
tit  for  tat  is  willing  to  retaliate,  its  strategy  is  what  the  researchers  termed  ‘forgiving’  
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meaning  that  immediately  after  defecting  in  retaliation,  tit  for  tat  returns  to  cooperating.  
Axelrod  highlights  the  significance  of  forgiveness.  Of  the  eight  top-­‐‑ranking  nice  entries,  
the  one  that  was  the  least  competitive  was  the  rule  that  was  the  least  forgiving.190  
Axelrod  noted:  “even  expert  strategists  do  not  give  sufficient  weight  to  the  importance  
of  forgiveness.”191  Finally,  for  Axelrod  the  final  virtue  of  tit  for  tat  is  clarity;  the  simple  
clarity  of  tit  for  tat  allowed  other  strategies  to  understand  it,  predict  its  behavior,  and  
therefore  make  a  free,  independent  decision  whether  or  not  to  cooperate:  “What  
accounts  for  TIT  FOR  TAT’s  robust  success  is  its  combination  of  being  nice,  retaliatory,  
forgiving,  and  clear  …  its  clarity  makes  it  intelligible  to  the  other  player,  thereby  
eliciting  long-­‐‑term  cooperation.”192  
The  significance  of  Axelrod’s  work  cannot  be  overestimated.  Scholars  in  political  
science,  history,  and  evolutionary  biology  have  utilized  Axelrod’s  work  to  recommend  
strategies  to  world  leaders,  explaining  why  some  species  dominate  biomes  while  others  
die  out  and  elucidating  how  cooperative  behavior  can  emerge  without  centralized  
control  in  the  unlikeliest  of  circumstances.  Indeed,  Axelrod  includes  a  brief  study  of  the  
known  truces  that  occurred  spontaneously  during  World  War  I  by  showing  how  the  
unique  nature  of  trench  warfare  created  an  iterative  prisoner’s  dilemma.  In  opposition  to  
the  high  command  on  both  sides,  the  English  and  German  soldiers  at  the  front  created  a  
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well-­‐‑documented  live-­‐‑and-­‐‑let-­‐‑live  system  by  being  willing  to  cooperate,  retaliate,  and  
forgive  when  mistakes  occurred.  In  one  instance  one  visiting  English  officer  described  a  
German  officer  rushing  forward  when  German  artillery  mistakenly  fired  on  the  English:  
“All  at  once  a  brave  German  got  on  his  parapet  and  shouted  out  ‘We  are  very  sorry  
about  that;  we  hope  no  one  was  hurt.  It  is  not  our  fault,  it  is  that  damned  Prussian  
artillery.’”193 
It  is  possible  to  discern  this  tit  for  tat  pattern  in  Scripture  as  well.  Liberal  
Protestantism  famously  expresses  embarrassment  over  the  scriptural  depiction  of  God  
displaying  wrath  and  a  willingness  to  punish  throughout  the  Old  and  New  Testaments.  
At  one  time  the  desire  for  niceness  in  liberal  Protestantism  became  so  great,  H.  Richard  
Niebuhr  famously  described  it  as  a  narrative  in  which:  “A  God  without  wrath  brought  
men  without  sin  into  a  kingdom  without  judgment  through  the  ministrations  of  a  Christ  
without  a  Cross."ʺ194  Even  a  cursory  glance  through  the  great  Old  Testament  Exodus  
narrative  demonstrates  how  a  tit  for  tat  relationship  emerges  between  a  God  who  is  
forgiving  but  not  forgetful  and  a  stiff-­‐‑necked  people  who  observe  periods  of  faithfulness  
punctuated  by  periods  of  rebellion.  In  the  Corinthian  correspondence  one  can  sense  a  tit  
for  tat  relationship  between  the  Apostle  Paul  and  the  fractious  church  in  Corinth.  While  
speaking  lofty  words  about  faith,  hope,  and  love,  Paul  is  quick  to  recommend  
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excommunication  for  the  unnamed  man  sleeping  with  his  father’s  wife.  A  tit  for  tat  
strategy  provides  a  somewhat  realistic  heuristic  to  study  community  emergence  and  
formation  in  many  biblical  stories.    
But,  does  tit  for  tat  solve  the  prisoner’s  dilemma?  Is  tit  for  tit  the  best  strategy  for  
every  conceivable  situation?  Robust  mathematician  Martin  Nowak  and  others  
discovered  that  as  powerful  as  tit  for  tat  was  in  Axelrod’s  two  tournaments,  the  strategy  
also  brought  with  it  troubling  side  effects.  The  main  problem  was  that  tit  for  tat’s  
eagerness  to  punish  defection  could  cause  long  strings  of  mutual  defection,  which  was  
harmful  to  both  parties.  Especially  when  played  in  more  realistic  settings  by  humans  
rather  than  computers,  ‘noise’  caused  by  error  created  significant  trouble.  Nowak  and  
others  found  two  kinds  of  noise;  they  named  the  first  kind  of  noise  the  ‘trembling  hand’,  
referring  to  mistakes  caused  by  a  player  wanting  to  make  a  certain  choice  but  picking  
the  opposite  by  mistake.195  ‘Fuzzy  mind’  represents  the  second  kind  of  noise  where  one  
player  mistakenly  believes  the  other  player  defected  against  them  and  retaliates  when  
the  other  player  had  actually  cooperated.196  When  these  kinds  of  mistakes  occur,  as  they  
do  with  actual  people,  even  a  nice,  forgiving  strategy  like  tit  for  tat  is  not  able  to  foster  
cooperation.  
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Another  question  the  Christian  leader  has  to  ask  is  whether  tit  for  tat  represents  a  
faithful  strategy  in  line  with  the  deepest  narrative  of  Holy  Scripture:  the  self-­‐‑giving  of  
Jesus  Christ  on  behalf  of  the  world.  While  the  student  of  scripture  might  detect  patterns  
of  initial  cooperation,  commensurate  defection  in  the  face  of  rebellion,  and  forgiveness  
in  the  Exodus  narrative  and  in  some  of  Paul’s  relationships  with  new  churches,  is  this  
pattern  consistent  with  the  self-­‐‑giving  love  of  Jesus  Christ?  Jesus  is  certainly  no  doormat  
despite  how  Axelrod  typecasts  him  in  one  series  of  experiments  in  which  the  ‘Jesus  
strategy’  (always  cooperate)  is  matched  against  a  ‘Lucifer  strategy’  (always  defect).197  
Jesus  is  far  from  nice  all  the  time  as  has  already  been  shown:  he  defected  from  the  
religious  establishment  calling  the  Pharisees  whitewashed  tombs  filled  with  dead  men’s  
bones;  he  threw  the  money  lenders  out  of  the  temple  whipping  them  with  cords;  and  he  
acknowledged  that  he  did  not  come  to  bring  peace,  per  se,  but  a  sword,  sometimes  
dividing  families  and  friends.  Yet,  while  Jesus  shows  some  willingness  to  defect  in  
certain  ways,  the  great  story  of  the  Gospels  is  the  son  traveling  into  the  far  country  and  
offering  himself  on  behalf  of  many;  this  story  is  one  of  radical  forgiveness.  To  frame  the  
theological  in  the  language  of  game  theory,  in  his  crucifixion  and  death  Jesus  crucifies  
defection  itself.  Rising  to  newness  of  life,  Jesus  rises  categorically  beyond  the  limited  
framework  of  tit  for  tat  and  possibly  beyond  the  framework  of  any  strategic  pattern.  
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Dissatisfied  with  the  problems  of  tit  for  tat  but  intrigued  with  how  biologists  
were  beginning  to  use  the  prisoner’s  dilemma  to  shed  light  on  evolutionary  theory,  
Nowak  continued  to  explore  the  problem  by  creating  an  evolutionary  computer  
simulation  of  the  prisoner’s  dilemma.  Nowak  was  able  to  create  worlds  in  which  
different  strategies  could  interact,  and,  depending  on  their  strategic  interactions,  
winning  strategies  would  be  allowed  to  reproduce  and  losing  strategies  would  not.198  
Nowak  was  fascinated  by  what  he  observed.  Initially  meaner  strategies  that  were  not  
willing  to  cooperate  and  were  eager  to  defect  defeated  nicer  strategies  like  tit  for  tat,  
reproducing  quickly  almost  to  the  point  of  taking  over.  Just  when  Nowak  believed  these  
harsh  strategies  would  take  over,  a  strange  thing  happened  repeatedly:  the  cooperative  
strategies  staged  a  comeback  from  the  margins  as  the  defectors  stumbled  at  the  center  
unwilling  to  cooperate  with  one  another.  Moreover,  not  only  did  more  cooperative  
strategies  advance,  but  a  strategy  even  more  willing  to  forgive  than  tit  for  tat,  a  strategy  
known  as  ‘generous  tit  for  tat’,  proved  more  robust.  
Generous  tit  for  tat  plays  exactly  like  tit  for  tat:  it  always  starts  by  cooperating;  it  
always  attempts  forgiveness  after  it  defects;  but  it  differs  by  being  more  willing  to  
forgive  and  by  being  unpredictable  with  its  grace.  While  the  tit  for  tat  strategy  of  always  
defecting  when  defected  against  subjected  the  strategy  to  potentially  long  rounds  of  
costly,  mutual  defections,  generous  tit  for  tat  uses  a  probability  function  directing  it  to  
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defect  around  one  time  for  every  three  defections.  This  extra  willingness  to  forgive  
allows  for  noise,  and  the  randomness  of  this  extra  forgiveness  means  the  strategy  could  
not  be  taken  advantage  of  by  more  hostile  strategies.199  Robert  Axelrod  viewed  tit  for  
tat’s  clarity  as  a  strength  but  in  light  of  generous  tit  for  tat’s  greater  success,  Nowak  
concludes  that  sometimes  it  is  preferable  to  be  graciously  mysterious.    
Not  all  researchers  are  as  convinced  as  Robert  Axelrod  and  Martin  Nowak  that  
the  prisoner’s  dilemma  offers  realistic  explanatory  power.  Critics  argue  that  the  
prisoner’s  dilemma  is  both  too  artificial  and  too  drastic.200  In  the  real  world  one  rarely  
encounters  pristine  examples  of  conflict  between  only  two  people.  And  when  only  two  
people  relate  in  this  way,  it  is  rarely  the  case  that  they  have  to  choose  whether  to  
cooperate  or  defect  simultaneously  without  any  communication.  Acknowledging  these  
criticisms,  Nowak  and  his  team  responded  in  two  ways.  First,  they  developed  an  
alternating  iterative  prisoner’s  dilemma  in  which  one  player  chooses  to  cooperate  or  
defect  and  the  other  gets  to  respond.201  Then,  Nowak  engaged  the  rich  conversation  
taking  place  around  the  public  goods  game,  a  multiplayer  version  of  the  prisoner’s  
dilemma,  which  many  argue  is  more  helpful  in  understanding  real  social  interaction.  
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In  the  Malthusian  Tragedy  of  the  Commons  Garrett  Hardin  offers  the  classic  
version  of  a  public  goods  game.202  Hardin  describes  how  in  England  farmers  were  
allowed  to  graze  their  cattle  on  land  known  as  the  commons.  The  commons  were  land  
held  for  use  by  all.  There  were  rules  about  how  many  cattle  an  individual  farmer  could  
graze  on  the  commons,  but  there  was  little  oversight.  If  every  farmer  cooperated  and  
grazed  the  number  of  cows  allowed  to  them,  the  land  would  sustain  such  use  on  an  
ongoing  basis.  However,  each  individual  farmer  stood  to  personally  benefit  by  
overgrazing.  Given  lax  oversight,  the  farmers  were  unafraid  of  being  punished.  It  is  not  
difficult  to  imagine  what  happened.  All  the  farmers  decided  if  others  would  overgraze  
and  benefit  personally,  they  would  be  foolish  not  to  do  so  as  well.  Most  of  the  farmers  
overgrazed  the  commons,  and  within  a  short  period  of  time  the  fields  became  a  
trampled  wasteland  of  no  use  to  anyone.  As  in  a  prisoner’s  dilemma,  this  public  goods  
game  pits  the  individual  good  of  one  farmer  over  against  the  common  good  of  all.  The  
farmers  as  a  collective  would  have  benefited  most  by  cooperating  and  working  together;  
however,  the  farmers  as  individuals  benefited  more  in  the  short  term  by  defecting.  
Hardin  himself  argued  that  overpopulation  was  ruining  the  environment,  and  in  his  
view  the  only  proper  solution  was  strong  governmental  intervention.203  
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Whatever  one  thinks  of  the  politics  of  Hardin’s  position,  one  of  the  assumptions  
he  makes  is  that  a  strong,  centralizing  power  exists  that  is  able,  either  through  
punishment,  reward,  or  some  mix  of  the  two,  to  establish  cooperation.  But  what  if  no  
centralizing  authority  exists  that  is  able  to  establish  cooperation?  In  one  of  the  most  
important  public  goods  game  studies  Nobel  laureate  Elinor  Ostrom  researched  how  
individuals  stewarding  what  she  terms  common  pool  resources  (CPRs)  might  be  able  to  
maintain  cooperation  when  a  centralized  authority,  a  “Leviathan”  as  she  put  it  quoting  
Hobbes,  is  either  incompetent  or  absent.204  Ostrom  was  particularly  interested  in  
whether  communication  could  play  a  significant  role.  While  Hobbes  and  noncooperative  
game  theory  discount  the  role  of  mere  words,  Ostrom  hypothesized  that  communication  
might  play  a  powerful  role.205  Ostrom  created  three  forms  of  a  public  goods  game:  one  
group  played  without  covenant  or  sword,  meaning  without  communication  or  
punishment;  a  second  group  played  with  the  ability  to  communicate;  and  a  third  group  
played  the  game  able  to  communicate  and  punish.  The  findings  were  stunning.  
Consistent  with  other  public  goods  game  studies,  communities  playing  just  the  basic  
game  observed  decreasing  levels  of  commitment  over  time.  In  a  surprising  discovery,  
however,  communication  not  only  played  a  major  role  in  creating  the  environment  for  
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cooperation  to  emerge,  but  communication  proved  superior  to  sanctions.206  In  the  
punishment  conditions  participants  punished  with  greater  frequency  than  was  merited,  
suggesting  that  players  punished  not  only  free-­‐‑riding  behavior  but  also  punished  due  to  
anger  or  mistake.207  The  resulting  punishment  lowered  the  collective  score  of  the  groups  
using  it,  leading  Ostrom  to  conclude  that  where  possible  communities  should  invest  in  
as  much  face-­‐‑to-­‐‑face  communication  as  possible  when  cooperation  is  paramount.  
Sometimes  communication  is  not  feasible  or  possible,  however,  and  in  these  
situations  Ostrom  acknowledges  that  sanctions  can  play  an  important  role  in  inducing  
cooperation.  Particularly  interested  in  the  role  of  punishment,  economists  Ernst  Fehr  
and  Simon  Gachter  hypothesized  that  the  ability  to  punish  is  required  for  establishing  
cooperation.  They  further  theorized  that  ‘altruistic  punishment’,  punishment  that  is  
costly  to  the  punisher,  represented  a  built-­‐‑in  evolutionary  mechanism,  which  is  
important  for  humans  to  establish  community  life  at  a  very  deep  level.208  To  study  
altruistic  punishment,  Fehr  and  Gachter  decided  to  eliminate  the  possibility  that  an  
individual  would  punish  another  due  to  what  evolutionary  biologists  refer  to  as  either  
direct  reciprocity,  a  condition  in  which  a  punisher  harms  another  as  a  response  to  
previous  harm,  or  indirect  reciprocity,  a  condition  in  which  a  punisher  harms  another  as  
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208  Ernst  Fehr  and  Simon  Gachter,  “Altruistic  Punishment  in  Humans,”  Nature  415  (2002),  137.  
     154  
a  response  to  witnessing  the  punished  harming  another.209  To  eliminate  these  
possibilities,  Fehr  and  Gachter  created  a  public  goods  game  with  four  conditions:  a  
partner  condition  with  and  without  punishment;  and  a  stranger  condition  with  and  
without  punishment.  Again,  as  expected,  in  partner  and  stranger  conditions  without  
punishment,  cooperation  deteriorated  as  the  game  progressed  until  extremely  low  levels  
of  cooperation  existed.210  Important  for  Fehr  and  Gachter’s  hypothesis  is  whether  
punishment  was  able  to  create  levels  of  cooperation  in  partner  and  stranger  conditions.  
Indeed,  the  findings  show  that  in  both  partner  and  stranger  conditions  punishment  did  
create  the  conditions  for  cooperation  to  emerge,  with  costly  punishment  discouraging  
free  riding  over  time.  Fascinating  to  Fehr  and  Gachter  is  the  fact  that  individuals  were  
willing  to  use  punishment  even  in  a  stranger  condition.  Fehr  and  Gachter  concluded  that  
people  were  willing  to  punish  perfect  strangers  at  a  cost  to  themselves  simply  arising  
from  a  feeling  of  anger  at  free-­‐‑riding  behavior:  “We  believe,  in  particular,  that  subjects  
strongly  dislike  being  the  ‘sucker,’  that  is,  being  those  who  cooperate  while  other  group  
members  free  ride.  This  aversion  against  being  the  ‘sucker’  might  well  trigger  a  
willingness  to  punish  free  riders.”211  
Sometimes,  even  in  the  presence  of  free-­‐‑riding  behavior,  punishers  fail  to  rise  up.  
The  chilling  1964  story  of  Kitty  Genovese,  a  New  York  woman  whose  neighbors  heard  
                                                                                                              
209  Ernst  Fehr  and  Simon  Gachter,  “Cooperation  and  Punishment  in  Public  Goods  Experiments,”  The  
American  Economic  Review  90,  no.  4  (2000),  981.  
210  Fehr  and  Gachter,  “Cooperation  and  Punishment  in  Public  Goods  Experiments,”  982.  
211  Fehr  and  Gachter,  “Cooperation  and  Punishment  in  Public  Goods  Experiments,”  981.  
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an  attacker  kill  her  but  did  not  call  authorities  for  help,  illustrates  the  volunteer’s  
dilemma.212  A  volunteer’s  dilemma  exists  when  players  would  benefit  as  a  community  
by  stepping  forward  to  punish  a  free  rider;  and  yet,  because  punishing  is  a  costly  
behavior,  potential  volunteers  are  incented  to  inaction.  Game  theorists  refer  to  this  
volunteer’s  dilemma  as  a  second-­‐‑order  dilemma,  as  opposed  to  a  first-­‐‑order  dilemma  in  
which  participants  in  a  public  goods  game  decide  whether  to  cooperate  in  the  first  place.  
Casting  doubt  on  Fehr  and  Gachter’s  premise  that  punishment  stems  entirely  from  a  
fundamental  aspect  of  human  nature,  Wojtek  Przepiorka  and  Andreas  Diekmann  
experimented  with  public  goods  games  to  test  whether  punishment  heterogeneity,  
creating  conditions  such  that  it  cost  more  for  some  players  to  punish  than  others,  would  
increase  the  likelihood  of  punishment.213  Indeed,  Przepiorka  and  Diekmann  did  find  that  
when  the  cost  of  punishment  was  shared  among  players,  players  were  less  willing  to  
sanction  negative  behavior.214  When  it  was  clear  that  one  player  was  more  easily  able  to  
punish,  then  punishment  occurred  both  with  greater  regularity  and  to  greater  effect.215  
Przepiorka  and  Diekmann  do  not  question  whether  punishment  can  help  establish  
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cooperation,  but  they  do  question  Fehr  and  Gachter’s  assumption  that  people  are  
punishing  by  nature.  
In  a  full  rebuttal  of  those  arguing  for  the  necessity  of  punishment,  Martin  Nowak  
and  his  colleagues  argue  that  while  cooperation  can  emerge  when  players  punish  free  
riders,  punishment  is  neither  required  nor  is  it  an  optimal  way  to  create  the  conditions  
for  cooperation  to  emerge.  Arguing  that  Fehr  and  Gachter’s  study  design  is  unrealistic,  
Nowak’s  team  suggests  that  in  most  real  life  public  goods  games  players  have  sustained  
interaction  and  some  knowledge  about  past  action.216  Reputation,  they  argue,  plays  an  
incredibly  important  role  in  understanding  how  cooperation  can  emerge  in  such  a  game.  
To  this  end  Nowak’s  team  designed  a  public  goods  game  experiment  in  which  players  
interact  in  a  group  for  several  rounds.  As  with  all  public  goods  games  players  have  the  
ability  to  contribute  monetary  units  to  a  common  pool.  This  pool  is  then  multiplied,  in  
this  game  by  a  factor  of  1.6,  and  then  distributed  equally.  Nowak’s  team  studied  four  
conditions:  a  standard  game;  a  game  with  a  second  round  in  which  players  could  punish  
another  player  at  cost  to  themselves;  a  game  with  a  second  round  in  which  players  could  
reward  another  player  at  cost  to  themselves;  and  finally  a  game  with  a  second  round  in  
which  players  could  punish  or  reward  another  player  at  cost  to  themselves.217  Nowak’s  
team  questioned  Fehr  and  Gachter’s  conclusion  that  punishment  was  required  in  order  
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to  establish  cooperation,  and  this  study  supported  their  hypothesis.218  In  the  standard  
game,  cooperation  diminished  as  expected;  in  the  punishment  condition,  punishment  
effectively  supported  cooperation.  However,  the  reward  condition  and  the  reward  with  
punishment  conditions  were  just  as  effective  in  promoting  cooperation.219  Further,  in  the  
reward  and  reward  and  punish  conditions,  teams  that  discovered  how  to  foster  
cooperation  without  using  punishment  fared  significantly  better  than  teams  that  
resorted  to  costly  punishment.220  The  conclusion  of  Nowak’s  team  is  that  while  
punishment  is  sometimes  necessary  to  induce  cooperation,  it  is  inefficient.  Further,  in  
almost  every  situation  it  is  more  desirable  for  communities  to  find  positive  ways  of  
facilitating  community.  
Taking  the  conversation  from  the  theoretical  to  the  practical,  organizational  
psychologist  Adam  Grant  resonates  with  Nowak’s  position  and  makes  the  case  that  in  
contrast  to  the  common  sense  notion  that  one  has  to  behave  like  a  taker  to  get  ahead,  
people  who  give  can  be  highly  successful.  Grant  studies  reciprocity  styles  and  divides  
people  into  three  main  categories:  givers,  takers,  and  matchers.  Givers  want  others  to  
benefit  in  social  interaction,  takers  want  to  receive  more  than  they  give,  and  matchers  
are  people  who  seek  equality  in  their  relationships  neither  being  overly  giving  nor  
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overly  receiving.221  Citing  large  studies  of  various  professions  Grant  notes  that  a  pattern  
emerges  regarding  the  long-­‐‑term  success  of  givers,  takers,  and  matchers.  In  line  with  
conventional  expectations,  across  the  board  those  deemed  to  be  at  the  bottom  of  their  
colleagues  in  terms  of  pay  and  regard  are  givers.  Takers  and  matchers  dominate  the  
middle  of  the  success  ladder.  The  surprise  is  that  Grant  discovers  that  neither  takers  nor  
matchers  dominate  the  very  top  of  the  success  ladder:  givers  do.  Men  and  women  
practicing  a  giving  reciprocity  style  were  the  most  and  least  successful.222  Grant  argues  
that  the  givers  at  the  bottom  show  consistent  and  fixable  behaviors  that  diminish  their  
ability  to  thrive.223  Thus,  Grant  establishes  that  a  wise  giving  strategy,  what  he  refers  to  
as  an  ‘otherish’  strategy  dominates  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that  when  givers  succeed  
others  around  them  succeed  as  well,  making  the  whole  community  stronger.224  
In  a  major  study  of  negotiating  styles  Grant  points  out  that  the  most  successful  
negotiators  do  not  follow  a  harsh  taker’s  strategy  but  opt  for  a  far  more  generous  giving  
strategy  that  may  not  always  pay  off  in  the  long  term  but  pays  off  over  time.225  In  
another  study  of  negotiation,  MBA  students  with  varying  GMAT  scores  were  paired  off  
in  negotiation  games.  The  researches  believed  that  the  smartest  players,  those  with  the  
highest  GMAT  scores,  would  win  by  getting  better  deals  for  themselves.  They  found  just  
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the  opposite,  however.  The  smarter  players  did  perform  the  best  over  all,  but  they  
performed  the  best  by  negotiating  better  deals  for  their  partners.  The  smartest  players  
were  also  the  most  generous,  and  over  time  this  generosity  proved  successful.226  In  these  
and  in  many  other  examples  Grant  shows  again  and  again  that  Nowak’s  theory  that  
supercooperators  will  thrive  in  comparison  to  more  selfish  and  punitive  strategies  not  
only  works  out  with  numbers  but  in  real  life,  too
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9. Research 
9.1 Initial Predictions: 
I  observed  congregational  leaders  of  Presbyterian  Church  (U.S.A.)  churches,  
members  of  local  deliberative  bodies  known  as  sessions,  play  two  versions  of  a  public  
goods  game  modeled  after  the  study  by  Martin  Nowak  described  in  detail  in  Appendix  
A.  The  first  version  of  the  game  was  a  simple  version  of  a  public  goods  game  with  no  
option  for  reward  or  punishment.  The  second  version  of  the  game  included  the  
possibility  for  members  to  exact  costly  reward  and  punishment  on  one  another.  By  
studying  congregations  with  different  rates  of  growth  and  decline  over  a  four  year  time  
period,  I  wanted  to  discover  whether  church  leaders  experiencing  decline  played  in  
different  ways  than  church  leaders  experiencing  growth.  This  study  assumes  that  
session  leaders  have  a  substantive  impact  on  the  direction  of  the  congregation;  the  way  
the  session  members,  also  known  as  elders,  play  the  game  accurately  reflects  how  they  
live  together  in  real  life;  and  reward  and  punishment  actions  in  the  game  equate  to  real  
actions  such  as  rewarding  thank  you  notes  and  public  recognition  for  good  work,  as  
well  as  punishing  negative  comments,  opposition,  and  other  unsupportive  behaviors  
church  leaders  might  exhibit.    
I  predicted  that  leaders  of  churches  with  high  and  sustainable  levels  of  growth  
would  show  more  willingness  to  cooperate  in  the  standard  public  goods  game  and  
would  show  a  reluctance  to  use  punishment  in  the  second  version.  These  behaviors  
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would  reflect  higher  levels  of  trust,  which  I  believed  to  be  consistent  with  growing  and  
sustainable  churches.  While  I  agreed  with  Chaves  that  much  church  growth  and  decline  
is  a  function  of  demographics,  I  also  believed  leadership  would  still  play  a  vital  role  in  
healthy  congregations.  Churches  with  leaders  who  exhibit  low  levels  of  trust  and  who  
resort  to  punishment  would  have  a  difficult  time  thriving  even  in  positive  demographic  
environments.  
I  also  predicted  that  leaders  of  larger  churches  would  be  more  willing  to  use  
punishment  than  leaders  of  smaller  congregations.  Given  Elinor  Ostrom’s  findings  
regarding  the  importance  of  communication  in  avoiding  the  use  of  ‘the  sword’  to  
maintain  covenants,  leaders  of  smaller  congregations,  by  virtue  of  their  size,  would  have  
more  opportunity  for  conversation.  Leaders  of  larger  congregations,  with  less  
opportunity  for  face-­‐‑to-­‐‑face  conversation,  would  find  sanctions  more  necessary.  
While  I  did  not  foresee  this  happening,  I  thought  it  might  be  possible  that  the  
leadership  of  struggling  congregations  might  exhibit  more  cooperation  than  leaders  of  
sustaining  and  growing  congregations.  Rather  than  showing  trust,  however,  I  suspected  
that  this  result  might  stem  more  from  what  Robert  Putnam  refers  to  as  ‘bonding  capital’  
in  Bowling  Alone.  Whereas  ‘bridging  capital’  creates  bonds  across  cultures,  Putnam  notes  
that  bonding  capital  creates  close-­‐‑knit  ties  within  similar  kinds  of  people.  Because  it  
creates  a  division  between  those  inside  the  church  and  the  world  outside,  it  is  possible  
that  strong  bonding  capital  could  play  a  role  in  initiating  congregational  decline  or  
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furthering  it;  and  if  leaders  of  declining  congregations  show  high  levels  of  cooperation,  
this  dynamic  might  be  at  work  since  willingness  to  cooperate  with  one  another  might  
not  necessarily  exhibit  an  ability  to  welcome  and  get  along  with  those  perceived  to  be  
outsiders.  
9.2 Results 
98  elders  from  11  congregations,  designated  1  through  11,  participated  in  the  
study.  Sessions  played  three  rounds  of  the  first  version  of  the  game,  Game  1,  and  three  
rounds  of  the  second  version  of  the  game,  Game  2.  The  raw  data  from  both  games  is  
included  in  Table  1.  
Table  1:  Raw  Data    

















































































A 20 10 30 10 41 12 49 20 10 None 33 9 Reward H 29 13 Reward D 59
B 20 12 28 12 37 15 42 20 12 None 31 12 Punish A 48 16 Reward A 51
C 20 20 20 20 21 20 21 20 20 None 23 17 None 39 18 None 80
D 20 20 20 20 21 11 30 20 20 None 23 16 Reward G 24 20 Reward G 47
E 20 6 34 9 46 9 57 20 10 Punish A 29 10 None 40 9 Reward D 50
F 20 17 23 17 27 15 32 20 17 None 26 15 None 32 15 None 40
G 20 10 30 13 38 15 43 20 10 None 33 11 None 55 11 Reward K 75
H 20 3 37 5 53 4 69 20 20 None 23 17 Reward C 35 18 Reward A 36
I 20 10 30 10 41 10 51 20 8 Reward A 31 10 Reward B 26 10 Reward C 35
J 20 10 30 10 41 10 51 20 10 None 33 10 Punish I 40 9 Reward C 50
K 20 15 25 16 30 16 34 20 15 None 28 14 None 35 16 Reward C 50
A 20 14 29 12 40 15 50 20 12 None 30 16 Punish D 46 20 None 49
B 20 15 28 15 36 12 49 20 18 None 24 16 Punish N 28 16 Reward C 31
C 20 20 23 20 26 20 31 20 20 None 10 20 None 38 20 None 41
D 20 20 23 15 31 15 41 20 16 Punish N 10 16 Reward O 2 10 Punish C 11
E 20 10 33 15 41 15 51 20 5 Reward O 33 15 Reward A 38 10 Punish N 47
F 20 15 28 15 36 15 46 20 15 None 27 15 None 36 12 None 71
G 20 20 23 20 26 20 31 20 20 None 22 20 None 26 20 None 29
H 20 10 33 10 46 10 61 20 10 None 32 10 None 46 10 None 59
I 20 15 28 15 36 18 43 20 12 Reward N 26 12 Reward N 34 14 Reward C 39
J 20 16 27 13 37 18 44 20 16 Punish C 34 15 Reward E 39 16 Reward F 42
K 20 12 31 10 44 12 57 20 12 None 30 12 Reward C 38 12 Reward F 45
L 20 15 28 8 43 10 58 20 10 Punish N 28 10 Punish E 38 8 None 53
M 20 20 23 20 26 20 31 20 16 Punish N 22 16 Reward C 26 16 Punish N 29
N 20 5 38 11 50 17 58 20 7 Punish D 7 20 None 11 12 Punish C 26
O 20 10 33 15 41 15 51 20 15 Reward J 35 15 None 56 15 None 64
P 20 10 33 10 46 10 61 20 10 None 32 10 None 46 10 None 59
A 20 15 20 15 21 15 24 20 15 Reward C 65 15 Reward M 61 10 Reward N 110
B 20 13 22 13 25 13 30 20 8 Reward M 60 10 Reward J 85 10 Reward M 86
C 20 10 25 9 32 12 38 20 11 REWARD G 45 13 Reward J 67 9 Reward J 69
D 20 9 26 10 32 10 40 20 9 23 8 Reward B 38 10 None 43
E 20 12 23 10 29 10 37 20 9 Punish J 23 8 Reward L 26 8 Reward F 41
F 20 6 29 7 38 12 44 20 7 Reward A 25 7 Reward J 29 7 Reward A 45
G 20 10 25 10 31 10 39 20 10 Reward A 34 10 None 39 10 None 44
H 20 7 28 7 37 6 49 20 7 Reward I 25 7 Reward D 29 7 Reward E 33
I 20 6 29 10 35 12 41 20 14 Punish L 30 11 Punish K 30 9 Reward A 32
J 20 7 28 8 36 8 46 20 8 Reward A 12 8 Reward C 63 8 None 82
K 20 9 26 9 33 10 41 20 8 Reward C 24 9 Reward M 14 8 Reward A 17
L 20 10 25 9 32 9 41 20 9 Reward A 11 9 Reward B 25 8 None 32
M 20 5 30 5 41 7 52 20 8 Reward B 36 0 71 0 None 98
N 20 7 28 7 37 10 45 20 8 Reward B 24 8 Reward C 27 8 Reward A 42
O 20 13 22 16 22 18 22 20 18 Reward B 14 16 Reward J 9 20 None 4
A 20 16 24 10 32 12 38 20 10 None 38 15 Punish F 47 10 Reward F 72
B 20 12 28 12 34 10 42 20 10 Reward C 34 10 Punish H 36 10 None 29
C 20 9 31 9 40 9 49 20 9 Reward A 35 9 Reward F 38 9 Reward F 40
D 20 8 32 8 42 8 52 20 8 None 28 8 None 36 8 Reward I 39
E 20 10 30 10 38 10 46 20 10 None 26 10 None 32 10 Reward I 33
F 20 16 24 15 27 15 30 20 10 Reward B 22 10 Reward G 24 8 Reward A 51
G 20 12 28 12 34 12 40 20 12 None 24 12 Reward I 48 12 Reward I 47
H 20 18 22 15 25 15 28 20 5 Reward I 39 5 Reward A 34 5 Punish B 40
I 20 15 25 15 28 15 31 20 15 Reward H 29 15 Reward G 38 15 Reward A 70
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A 20 12 23 15 23 10 29 20 14 Reward B 30 12 Reward E 31 12 Punish B 33
B 20 15 20 5 30 12 34 20 10 None 38 12 Reward C 51 13 Punish D 52
C 20 0 35 7 43 11 48 20 9 None 27 10 None 46 12 64
D 20 12 23 13 25 10 31 20 12 None 24 11 None 30 14 Reward C 18
E 20 6 29 6 38 7 47 20 5 Reward A 27 6 Reward B 46 5 Reward B 55
A 20 15 27 15 33 15 42 20 15 Reward B 22 15 None 34 15 Reward C 70
B 20 18 24 16 29 17 36 20 10 Reward D 51 15 Reward C 59 15 Reward A 35
C 20 12 30 10 41 15 50 20 15 None 26 15 Reward D 46 15 Reward A 58
D 20 15 27 14 34 15 43 20 20 None 33 20 None 52 5 Reward A 62
E 20 13 29 13 37 15 46 20 13 None 28 13 Reward F 50 14 Punish B 51
F 20 7 35 10 46 10 60 20 5 Reward B 32 20 Reward E 47 5 Punish B 57
A 20 10 31 12 39 12 47 20 12 None 17 12 Punish G 34 12 Punish D 49
B 20 11 30 11 39 11 48 20 12 Reward B 37 12 Reward C 42 12 Reward D 57
C 20 10 31 10 41 11 50 20 12 Reward F 25 12 Punish G 42 12 Reward F 33
D 20 10 31 10 41 10 51 20 10 None 31 10 Reward F 50 10 Reward B 55
E 20 15 26 12 34 12 42 20 12 Punish A 25 12 Reward G 30 12 None 49
F 20 15 26 12 34 12 42 20 14 Reward G 23 14 Reward A 26 14 Reward H 39
G 20 14 27 15 32 15 37 20 17 Punish F 32 18 Reward D 19 12 Reward E 34
H 20 13 28 12 36 13 43 20 12 None 29 12 None 38 4 Punish C 61
I 20 16 25 16 29 15 34 20 13 None 28 13 Punish F 32 13 Reward G 34
J 20 14 27 14 33 14 39 20 14 None 27 14 None 34 15 Reward A 34
A 20 12 26 7 36 19 35 20 13 Reward G 30 6 Reward B 35 15 Reward D 35
B 20 12 26 12 31 12 37 20 13 None 22 13 None 72 13 None 66
C 20 5 33 6 44 4 58 20 5 Reward G 26 2 Reward B 47 15 Reward F 59
D 20 8 30 8 39 7 50 20 8 None 27 7 Reward C 31 6 None 56
E 20 13 25 12 30 10 38 20 13 None 22 12 None 25 10 Punish B 30
F 20 15 23 15 25 15 28 20 2 Reward A 29 10 Reward B 30 10 Reward C 47
G 20 10 28 12 33 10 41 20 10 None 49 12 Reward B 48 10 None 57
A 20 5 34 6 48 6 61 20 4 Reward D 29 4 Reward D 36 5 Reward C 44
B 20 10 29 10 39 10 48 20 10 27 15 Reward F 23 16 Punish J 20
C 20 12 27 13 34 12 41 20 15 34 12 37 12 54
D 20 20 19 20 19 19 19 20 15 Reward C 42 16 77 20 86
E 20 6 33 6 47 5 61 20 5 Reward D 28 2 Reward D 37 4 Reward D 46
F 20 18 21 19 22 18 23 20 15 22 10 39 10 46
G 20 12 27 10 37 9 47 20 8 29 5 Reward D 35 4 36
A 20 10 28 10 35 6 45 20 8 Reward C 23 8 Reward B 37 5 45
B 20 14 24 12 29 12 33 20 10 37 12 51 10 54
C 20 20 18 20 15 16 15 20 20 27 18 Reward A 19 19 13
D 20 5 33 5 45 5 56 20 5 Reward B 26 5 47 5 55
E 20 7 31 6 42 8 50 20 3 32 0 Reward D 42 0 55
A 20 15 31 14 43 14 57 20 15 Reward E 29 18 Punish C 35 18 Punish F 52
B 20 17 29 17 38 18 48 20 20 Reward C 24 18 Reward D 42 18 Reward E 47
C 20 17 29 15 40 19 49 20 19 41 18 Punish E 47 15 Punish F 55
D 20 20 26 20 32 20 40 20 18 Reward F 26 20 Reward B 42 20 Reward A 57
E 20 10 36 16 46 18 56 20 15 45 15 46 15 70
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Table  2  presents  a  summary  of  the  data  collected.  Church  size  and  attendance  
figures  are  compound  annual  congregational  membership  and  attendance  growth  from  
data  shared  by  the  Presbyterian  Church  (U.S.A.)  from  2008  to  2012.  For  the  purposes  of  
the  Student’s  T  test  and  Chi  Squared  test,  congregations  were  divided  into  the  binary  
categories  of  growing  (G)  or  declining  (D).  Opting  for  a  conservative  approach  
congregations  reporting  a  0%  or  less  compound  annual  growth  in  either  membership  or  
attendance  are  considered  in  decline.  All  others  are  designated  as  growing.  
Congregations  were  also  separated  into  the  binary  categories  of  big  (B)  and  small  (S)  
depending  on  whether  the  congregation  reports  a  total  membership  above  or  below  100,  
a  number  commonly  used  by  sociologists  studying  congregations.  Congregations  with  
100  members  and  below  are  considered  small,  and  those  above  100  are  considered  big.  
I  calculated  individual  statistics  and  group  statistics  for  both  Game  1  and  Game  
2.  Individual  statistics  are  reported  in  the  yellow  columns  and  group  statistics  are  
reported  in  the  green.  Individual  scores  report  the  total  score  of  each  individual  after  
three  rounds.  Individual  giving  represents  the  average  amount  each  player  contributed  
over  the  three  rounds.  The  reciprocity  style  derives  from  Adam  Grant’s  categories  of  
giver,  taker,  and  matcher.  Givers  are  designated  as  players  who  gave  an  average  of  14-­‐‑20  
over  three  rounds,  matchers  gave  an  average  of  7-­‐‑13,  and  takers  gave  an  average  of  0-­‐‑6.  
The  group  scores  represent  the  mean  of  all  the  players  in  a  session.  I  calculated  the  
average  group  score  by  finding  the  average  of  the  total  individual  scores.  Nota  bene,  the  
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score  reflects  the  rules  of  the  game  that  multiply  all  contributions  by  1.6  each  round.  The  
average  giving  shows  the  mean  of  the  raw  contributions  over  three  rounds.  The  
difference  between  the  highest  and  lowest  scores  aims  to  measure  inequality.  I  
calculated  this  number  by  averaging  the  difference  between  the  highest  and  lowest  score  
for  three  rounds.  Groups  with  higher  numbers  of  elders  played  with  larger  spreads  
between  the  highest  and  lowest  scoring  players.  
Statistics  for  Game  2  include  all  of  the  calculations  described  for  Game  1  along  
with  a  few  additional  important  calculations.  In  Game  2  the  reciprocity  style  includes  
Grant’s  giver,  taker,  matcher  styles  calculated  the  same  way  as  in  Game  1,  as  well  as  a  
binary  categorization  playfully  termed  angel  (A)  and  demon  (D).  Angels  gave  an  
average  between  10-­‐‑20;  demons  gave  between  0-­‐‑9.99.  Reward  and  punishment  
percentages  are  also  reported  first  for  the  group  and  then  individually.  The  group  
reward  and  percentage  averages  are  calculated  as  total  instances  of  reward  or  
punishment  divided  by  the  total  number  of  opportunities  each  player  had  to  punish  or  
reward.  The  individual  numbers  are  reported  in  the  same  way.  Each  individual  had  
three  opportunities  to  reward  or  punish;  therefore,  the  individual  numbers  are  0%,  
33.33%,  66.66%,  or  100%.  
These  figures  are  reported  in  Table  2  below:  
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A 7 7 G 138 127 B 49 10.67 M 43.5 12.49 32.33 59 10.67 M A 52.09 13.58 28.67 67 14 66 0
B 7 7 G 138 127 B 42 13 M 43.5 12.49 32.33 51 10.33 M A 52.09 13.58 28.67 67 14 33 33
C 7 7 G 138 127 B 21 20 G 43.5 12.49 32.33 80 18.33 G A 52.09 13.58 28.67 67 14 0 0
D 7 7 G 138 127 B 30 17 G 43.5 12.49 32.33 47 18.67 G A 52.09 13.58 28.67 67 14 66 0
E 7 7 G 138 127 B 57 8 M 43.5 12.49 32.33 50 9.67 M D 52.09 13.58 28.67 67 14 33 33
F 7 7 G 138 127 B 32 16.33 G 43.5 12.49 32.33 40 15.67 G A 52.09 13.58 28.67 67 14 0 0
G 7 7 G 138 127 B 43 12.67 M 43.5 12.49 32.33 75 10.67 M A 52.09 13.58 28.67 67 14 33 0
H 7 7 G 138 127 B 69 4 T 43.5 12.49 32.33 36 18.33 G A 52.09 13.58 28.67 67 14 66 0
I 7 7 G 138 127 B 51 10 M 43.5 12.49 32.33 35 9.33 M D 52.09 13.58 28.67 67 14 100 0
J 7 7 G 138 127 B 51 10 M 43.5 12.49 32.33 50 9.67 M D 52.09 13.58 28.67 67 14 33 33
K 7 7 G 138 127 B 34 15.67 G 43.5 12.49 32.33 50 15 G A 52.09 13.58 28.67 67 14 33 0
A 3 0 D 753 325 B 50 13.67 M 47.7 14.44 38.67 49 16 G A 41.4 14.02 53 27 25 0 33
B 3 0 D 753 325 B 49 14 M 47.7 14.44 38.67 31 16.67 G A 41.4 14.02 53 27 25 33 33
C 3 0 D 753 325 B 31 20 G 47.7 14.44 38.67 41 20 G A 41.4 14.02 53 27 25 0 0
D 3 0 D 753 325 B 41 16.67 G 47.7 14.44 38.67 11 14 M A 41.4 14.02 53 27 25 33 66
E 3 0 D 753 325 B 51 13.33 M 47.7 14.44 38.67 47 10 M D 41.4 14.02 53 27 25 66 33
F 3 0 D 753 325 B 46 15 G 47.7 14.44 38.67 71 14 M A 41.4 14.02 53 27 25 0 0
G 3 0 D 753 325 B 31 20 G 47.7 14.44 38.67 29 20 G A 41.4 14.02 53 27 25 0 0
H 3 0 D 753 325 B 61 10 M 47.7 14.44 38.67 59 10 M D 41.4 14.02 53 27 25 0 0
I 3 0 D 753 325 B 43 16 G 47.7 14.44 38.67 39 12.67 M A 41.4 14.02 53 27 25 100 0
J 3 0 D 753 325 B 44 15.67 G 47.7 14.44 38.67 42 15.67 G A 41.4 14.02 53 27 25 66 33
K 3 0 D 753 325 B 57 11.33 M 47.7 14.44 38.67 45 12 M A 41.4 14.02 53 27 25 66 0
L 3 0 D 753 325 B 58 11 M 47.7 14.44 38.67 53 9.33 M D 41.4 14.02 53 27 25 0 66
M 3 0 D 753 325 B 31 20 G 47.7 14.44 38.67 29 16 G A 41.4 14.02 53 27 25 33 66
N 3 0 D 753 325 B 58 11 M 47.7 14.44 38.67 [6 13 M A 41.4 14.02 53 27 25 0 66
O 3 0 D 753 325 B 51 13.33 M 47.7 14.44 38.67 64 15 G A 41.4 14.02 53 27 25 33 0
P 3 0 D 753 325 B 61 10 M 47.7 14.44 38.67 59 10 M D 41.4 14.02 53 27 25 0 0
A 5 4 G 721 526 B 24 15 G 39.3 9.911 20 110 13.33 M A 51.9 9.333 78.66 73 6 100 0
B 5 4 G 721 526 B 30 13 M 39.3 9.911 20 86 9.33 M D 51.9 9.333 78.66 73 6 100 0
C 5 4 G 721 526 B 38 10.33 M 39.3 9.911 20 69 11 M A 51.9 9.333 78.66 73 6 100 0
D 5 4 G 721 526 B 40 9.67 M 39.3 9.911 20 43 9 M D 51.9 9.333 78.66 73 6 33 0
E 5 4 G 721 526 B 37 10.67 M 39.3 9.911 20 41 8.33 M D 51.9 9.333 78.66 73 6 66 33
F 5 4 G 721 526 B 44 8.33 M 39.3 9.911 20 45 7 T D 51.9 9.333 78.66 73 6 100 0
G 5 4 G 721 526 B 39 10 M 39.3 9.911 20 44 10 M D 51.9 9.333 78.66 73 6 33 0
H 5 4 G 721 526 B 49 6.67 T 39.3 9.911 20 33 7 T D 51.9 9.333 78.66 73 6 100 0
I 5 4 G 721 526 B 41 9.33 M 39.3 9.911 20 32 11.33 M A 51.9 9.333 78.66 73 6 33 66
J 5 4 G 721 526 B 46 7.67 M 39.3 9.911 20 82 8 M D 51.9 9.333 78.66 73 6 66 0
K 5 4 G 721 526 B 41 9.33 M 39.3 9.911 20 17 8.33 M D 51.9 9.333 78.66 73 6 100 0
L 5 4 G 721 526 B 41 9.33 M 39.3 9.911 20 32 8.67 M D 51.9 9.333 78.66 73 6 66 0
M 5 4 G 721 526 B 52 5.67 T 39.3 9.911 20 98 2.67 T D 51.9 9.333 78.66 73 6 33 0
N 5 4 G 721 526 B 45 8 M 39.3 9.911 20 42 8 M D 51.9 9.333 78.66 73 6 100 0
O 5 4 G 721 526 B 22 15.67 G 39.3 9.911 20 4 18 G A 51.9 9.333 78.66 73 6 66 0
A 3 3 G 283 162 B 38 12.67 M 41.9 11.37 35.4 72 11.67 M A 47.1 9.58 28 57 10 33 33
B 3 3 G 283 162 B 42 11.33 M 41.9 11.37 35.4 29 10 M D 47.1 9.58 28 57 10 33 33
C 3 3 G 283 162 B 49 9 M 41.9 11.37 35.4 40 9 M D 47.1 9.58 28 57 10 100 0
D 3 3 G 283 162 B 52 8 M 41.9 11.37 35.4 39 8 M D 47.1 9.58 28 57 10 33 0
E 3 3 G 283 162 B 46 10 M 41.9 11.37 35.4 33 10 M D 47.1 9.58 28 57 10 33 0
F 3 3 G 283 162 B 30 15.33 G 41.9 11.37 35.4 51 9.33 M D 47.1 9.58 28 57 10 100 0
G 3 3 G 283 162 B 40 12 M 41.9 11.37 35.4 47 12 M A 47.1 9.58 28 57 10 66 0
H 3 3 G 283 162 B 28 16 G 41.9 11.37 35.4 40 5 T D 47.1 9.58 28 57 10 66 33
I 3 3 G 283 162 B 31 15 G 41.9 11.37 35.4 70 15 G A 47.1 9.58 28 57 10 100 0
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Table  2  (continued)  
  
  












































































































































































































































B 3 3 G 55 53 S 34 10.67 M 37.8 9.31 18.09 52 11.67 M A 44.4 10.25 24.5 46 13 66 0
C 3 3 G 55 53 S 48 6 T 37.8 9.31 18.09 48 10.33 M A 44.4 10.25 24.5 46 13 33 0
D 3 3 G 55 53 S 31 11.67 M 37.8 9.31 18.09 69 12.33 M A 44.4 10.25 24.5 46 13 33 0
E 3 3 G 55 53 S 47 6.33 T 37.8 9.31 18.09 55 5.33 T D 44.4 10.25 24.5 46 13 66 0
A 3 X5 D 69 42 S 42 15 G 46.2 13.61 17.33 70 15 G A 55.5 13.61 29.67 61 11 66 0
B 3 X5 D 69 42 S 36 17 G 46.2 13.61 17.33 35 13.33 M A 55.5 13.61 29.67 61 11 100 0
C 3 X5 D 69 42 S 50 17.33 M 46.2 13.61 17.33 58 15 M A 55.5 13.61 29.67 61 11 66 0
D 3 X5 D 69 42 S 43 14.67 M 46.2 13.61 17.33 62 15 G A 55.5 13.61 29.67 61 11 33 0
E 3 X5 D 69 42 S 46 13.67 M 46.2 13.61 17.33 51 13.33 M A 55.5 13.61 29.67 61 11 33 33
F 3 X5 D 69 42 S 60 9 M 46.2 13.61 17.33 57 10 M D 55.5 13.61 29.67 61 11 66 33
A X12 X7 D 490 263 B 47 11.33 M 43.3 12.57 11.67 49 12 M A 44.5 12.43 26.33 50 23 0 66
B X12 X7 D 490 263 B 48 11 M 43.3 12.57 11.67 57 12 M A 44.5 12.43 26.33 50 23 100 0
C X12 X7 D 490 263 B 50 10.33 M 43.3 12.57 11.67 33 12 M A 44.5 12.43 26.33 50 23 66 33
D X12 X7 D 490 263 B 51 10 M 43.3 12.57 11.67 55 10 M D 44.5 12.43 26.33 50 23 66 0
E X12 X7 D 490 263 B 42 13 M 43.3 12.57 11.67 49 12 M A 44.5 12.43 26.33 50 23 33 33
F X12 X7 D 490 263 B 42 13 M 43.3 12.57 11.67 39 14 M A 44.5 12.43 26.33 50 23 100 0
G X12 X7 D 490 263 B 37 14.67 M 43.3 12.57 11.67 34 15.67 G A 44.5 12.43 26.33 50 23 66 33
H X12 X7 D 490 263 B 43 12.67 M 43.3 12.57 11.67 61 9.33 M D 44.5 12.43 26.33 50 23 0 33
I X12 X7 D 490 263 B 34 15.67 G 43.3 12.57 11.67 34 13 M A 44.5 12.43 26.33 50 23 33 33
J X12 X7 D 490 263 B 39 14 M 43.3 12.57 11.67 34 14.33 M D 44.5 12.43 26.33 50 23 33 0
A 0 X1 D 47 36 S 35 12.67 M 41 10.67 19.67 35 11.33 M A 50 9.785 36.67 52 5 100 0
B 0 X1 D 47 36 S 37 12 M 41 10.67 19.67 66 13 M A 50 9.785 36.67 52 5 0 0
C 0 X1 D 47 36 S 58 5 T 41 10.67 19.67 59 7.33 T D 50 9.785 36.67 52 5 100 0
D 0 X1 D 47 36 S 50 7.67 M 41 10.67 19.67 56 7 T D 50 9.785 36.67 52 5 33 0
E 0 X1 D 47 36 S 38 11.67 M 41 10.67 19.67 30 11.67 M A 50 9.785 36.67 52 5 0 33
F 0 X1 D 47 36 S 28 15 G 41 10.67 19.67 47 7.33 M D 50 9.785 36.67 52 5 100 0
G 0 X1 D 47 36 S 41 10.67 M 41 10.67 19.67 57 10.67 M A 50 9.785 36.67 52 5 33 0
A X2 X3 D 48 40 S 61 5.67 T 43.4 11.71 28.66 44 4.33 T D 47.42 9.86 46.66 43 5 100 0
B X2 X3 D 48 40 S 48 10 M 43.4 11.71 28.66 20 13.67 M A 47.42 9.86 46.66 43 5 33 33
C X2 X3 D 48 40 S 41 12.33 M 43.4 11.71 28.66 54 13 M A 47.42 9.86 46.66 43 5 0 0
D X2 X3 D 48 40 S 19 19.67 G 43.4 11.71 28.66 86 17 G A 47.42 9.86 46.66 43 5 33 0
E X2 X3 D 48 40 S 61 5.67 T 43.4 11.71 28.66 46 3.67 T D 47.42 9.86 46.66 43 5 100 0
F X2 X3 D 48 40 S 23 18.33 G 43.4 11.71 28.66 46 11.67 M A 47.42 9.86 46.66 43 5 0 0
G X2 X3 D 48 40 S 47 10.33 M 43.4 11.71 28.66 36 5.67 T D 47.42 9.86 46.66 43 5 33 0
A X14 0 D 33 49 S 45 8.67 M 39.8 10.4 28.67 45 7 T D 44.4 8.53 29.33 33 0 66 0
B X14 0 D 33 49 S 33 12.67 M 39.8 10.4 28.67 54 10.67 M A 44.4 8.53 29.33 33 0 0 0
C X14 0 D 33 49 S 15 18.67 G 39.8 10.4 28.67 13 19 G A 44.4 8.53 29.33 33 0 33 0
D X14 0 D 33 49 S 56 5 T 39.8 10.4 28.67 55 5 T D 44.4 8.53 29.33 33 0 33 0
E X14 0 D 33 49 S 50 6 T 39.8 10.4 28.67 55 1 T D 44.4 8.53 29.33 33 0 33 0
A X4 X3 D 204 116 B 57 14.33 M 50.7 15.7 13.67 52 17 G A 53.17 17.05 23.33 50 22 33 66
B X4 X3 D 204 116 B 48 17.33 G 50.7 15.7 13.67 47 18.67 G A 53.17 17.05 23.33 50 22 100 0
C X4 X3 D 204 116 B 49 17 G 50.7 15.7 13.67 55 17.33 G A 53.17 17.05 23.33 50 22 0 66
D X4 X3 D 204 116 B 40 20 G 50.7 15.7 13.67 57 19.33 G A 53.17 17.05 23.33 50 22 100 0
E X4 X3 D 204 116 B 56 14.66 M 50.7 15.7 13.67 70 15 G A 53.17 17.05 23.33 50 22 0 0
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9.3 Analysis 
While  the  public  goods  game  study  of  Presbyterian  Church  (U.S.A.)  leaders  is  a  
promising  and  interesting  study,  three  caveats  are  important  to  announce  at  the  outset  
of  the  analysis.  The  first  caveat  regards  the  small  sample  size  and  lack  of  randomness.  
Given  the  limitations  of  time  and  resources  most  of  the  congregations  participating  in  
the  study  reside  in  the  Pacific  Northwest.  Sociologists  like  Patricia  O’Connell  Killen  
document  the  uniquely  open  religious  habitus  of  the  Pacific  Northwest.227  While  one  
quarter  of  the  congregations  studied  represent  the  geographic  southeast,  it  is  possible  
that  some  of  the  behavior  observed  in  this  study  pertains  more  to  the  Pacific  Northwest  
than  other  regions  of  the  United  States.  Further  study  would  be  helpful  in  learning  more  
about  the  possible  effect  regional  differences  might  play  in  congregational  behavior.  
A  second  caveat  is  related  to  the  first  and  concerns  the  cultural  differences  
between  social  liberals  and  conservatives  regarding  fairness.  In  The  Righteous  Mind:  Why  
Good  People  Are  Divided  by  Politics  and  Religion  Jonathan  Haidt  demonstrates  the  different  
ways  in  which  social  conservatives  and  liberals  tend  to  understand  the  meaning  of  
fairness.  Social  conservatives  view  fairness  primarily  as  proportional:  the  person  who  
does  the  work  should  benefit  from  the  work.228  Social  liberals  on  the  other  hand  
emphasize  the  equality  of  fairness:  fairness  means  on  principle  that  the  few  should  not  
                                                                                                              
227  Patricia  O’Connell  Killen,  Religion  and  Public  Life  in  the  Pacific  Northwest:  The  None  Zone  (Walnut  Creek,  
CA:  AltaMira  Press,  2004),  10,  Kindle.  
228  Haidt,  The  Righteous  Mind,  Kindle  locations  2491-­‐‑2493.  
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have  vastly  more  than  the  many  regardless  of  how  much  work  is  done.229  This  study  did  
not  assess  congregational  levels  of  social  liberal  or  conservative  views  of  fairness,  but  
anecdotal  information  garnered  from  contact  with  the  leaders  leads  me  to  suspect  that  
different  views  of  fairness  might  correlate  strongly  to  how  leaders  play  these  games.  The  
significance  of  this  association  is  that  pastoral  leaders  may  need  to  exercise  great  care  
regarding  how  the  vision  of  fairness  might  shift  dramatically  in  different  congregational  
contexts.    
A  third  caveat  concerns  the  lack  of  laboratory  conditions  and  financial  incentive.  
Although  there  is  some  debate,  many  economists  distrust  experiments  conducted  in  the  
field  and  experiments  conducted  without  financial  incentive.230  Trials  of  the  public  
goods  game  conducted  with  church  members  previous  to  the  study  offer  anecdotal  
evidence  that  game  behavior  reflects  actual  behavior  without  the  need  for  financial  
incentive.  Yet,  one  of  the  hallmarks  of  public  goods  games  is  a  breakdown  of  
cooperation  in  the  absence  of  the  ability  to  reward,  punish,  or  communicate.  The  elders  
participating  in  this  study  did  not  show  a  decrease  in  cooperation  in  the  first  game,  
which  casts  some  doubt  on  how  effectively  the  first  game  reflects  real  behavior.  As  nice  
as  many  church  leaders  are,  every  shepherd  knows  that  sheep  bite;  and  it  is  unlikely  that  
church  leaders  are  somehow  less  susceptible  to  self-­‐‑interest  than  the  population  at  large.  
                                                                                                              
229  Haidt,  The  Righteous  Mind,  Kindle  locations  2491-­‐‑2493.  
230  Ariel  Rubenstein,  “Rubenstein  on  Game  Theory  and  Behavioral  Economics,”  Econ  Talk,  accessed  January  
17,  2014,  http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/04/rubinstein_on_g.html.  
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Given  that  the  real  emphasis  of  this  study  is  placed  on  the  use  of  reward  and  
punishment,  though,  this  doubt  does  not  invalidate  the  results  of  the  whole  study.  
Rather,  these  findings  suggest  that  further  study  with  financial  incentives  could  be  
extremely  interesting.  
Regarding  the  evidence  itself:  at  first  the  statistical  results  appear  to  disappoint  
with  regard  to  trust  and  growth.  The  key  hypothesis,  that  congregational  growth  will  
positively  correlate  with  higher  levels  of  trust  as  evidenced  by  high  scores  during  the  
game,  is  weak  when  analyzing  play  for  all  churches.  The  total  average  score  after  three  
rounds  of  play  in  the  second  game  offers  the  best  measure  of  trust  since  it  is  a  composite  
of  amounts  given  and  also  depicts  whether  players  chose  to  punish  or  reward  other  
players.  The  correlation  between  growth  and  total  score  in  the  total  population  as  
measured  by  the  total  average  score  after  three  rounds  of  play  in  the  second  game  is  
weak  and  statistically  insignificant  (r  =  0.272,  p  =  0.42).  (See  Figure  1.)  
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  Moreover,  the  second  most  important  factor  for  which  I  was  testing  was  a  
positive  correlation  between  growth  and  reward  and  a  negative  correlation  between  
growth  and  punishment.  Martin  Nowak’s  maxim  that  those  who  punish,  perish  draws  
upon  the  observational  data  of  groups  playing  the  same  version  of  the  second  public  
goods  game  in  which  groups  that  created  the  conditions  for  cooperation  to  thrive  
without  punishment  thrived  in  comparison  to  groups  who  used  punishment.  For  all  
congregations  there  was  positive  correlation  (r  =  0.51,  p  =  0.11)  between  growth  and  
reward  approaching  the  significance  of  a  trend.  (See  Figure  2.)  But,  there  was  an  
insignificant  relationship  between  punishment  and  growth  (r  =  0.05,  p  =  0.88).  (See  
Figure  3.)  
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Figure  3:  Percent  punishment  for  all  congregations  
Far  more  suggestive  is  what  happens  when  churches  with  populations  over  100  
are  viewed  apart  from  churches  with  populations  under  100.  Scholars  such  as  Cynthia  
Woolever  and  Deborah  Bruce  have  shown  in  detail  that  congregational  size  significantly  
shapes  the  strengths  congregations  have;  these  findings  further  show  how  small  
churches  differ  from  their  larger  counterparts.231  Due  to  the  distribution  between  larger  
and  smaller  churches  in  the  mainline  church,  94%  of  mainline  congregations  average  
less  than  350  in  attendance  with  over  half  of  these  churches  averaging  less  than  100  
members.  Yet,  most  worshippers  attend  larger  membership  congregations;  
understanding  these  differences  is  incredibly  important.232  
The  data  on  larger  membership  congregations,  churches  with  populations  over  
100,  indicate  a  much  stronger  relationship  between  growth,  reward,  and  lack  of  
                                                                                                              
231  Cynthia  Woolever  and  Deborah  Bruce,  Beyond  the  Ordinary:  10  Strengths  of  U.S.  Congregations  (Louisville:  
Westminster  John  Knox  Press,  2004),  19.    
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punishment.  Although  statistically  insignificant  the  coefficient  for  membership  growth  
and  reward  is  somewhat  strong  (r  =  .31,  p  =  .55).  The  relationship  between  attendance  
growth  and  reward  is  even  stronger  (r  =  .53,  p  =  .28).  (See  Figure  4.)  More  data  could  
strengthen  this  relationship.  Conversely,  the  relationship  between  growth  and  
punishment  is  negative  (r  =  -­‐‑0.6,  p  =  0.2);  the  coefficient  for  attendance  growth  and  
punishment  is  even  more  strongly  negative  (r  =  -­‐‑0.72,  p  =  0.1)  and  approaches  the  level  
of  a  trend.  (See  Figure  5.)  Thus,  in  line  with  Nowak’s  findings,  larger  growing  churches  
in  this  study  exhibited  comparatively  low  levels  of  punishment.  
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Figure  5:  Percent  punishment  in  >100  congregations  
Anecdotally,  observation  bears  these  data  out.  The  session  of  one  larger  Southern  
church  gave  at  the  highest  average  levels  of  any  larger  congregation.  Elders  gave  an  
average  of  14.44  units  during  the  first  game  and  14.02  units  during  the  second,  the  
second  highest  average  of  any  group  in  the  study.  Yet,  their  total  score  after  playing  
three  rounds  of  the  second  game  was  the  lowest  of  any  of  the  larger  churches  at  41.4.  
This  low  total  score  was  entirely  due  to  the  degree  to  which  elders  punished  one  
another.  This  session  languished  under  a  25%  rate  of  punishment,  a  rate  that  tied  for  the  
highest  level  of  punishment  observed.  Disturbingly,  when  one  of  the  elders  with  the  
lowest  contribution  rates  was  punished  by  other  players,  this  player  lashed  out  with  
punishment  not  directed  at  the  punishing  players  but  at  a  player  with  the  highest  levels  
of  contribution.  This  behavior  suggests  retribution  and  contempt  for  the  group.    
In  contrast,  one  larger  church  in  the  Northwest  contributed  at  the  lowest  level  for  
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first  game  and  9.333  during  the  second  game,  the  second  lowest  averages  in  the  study.  
Yet,  this  session  outscored  the  Southern  session  with  a  total  score  of  51.9  after  three  
rounds.  The  success  in  the  game  of  the  Northwest  church  was  due  to  their  extremely  
low  punishment  rate  of  6%  and  the  highest  reward  levels  observed  at  73%.  Most  
interestingly,  one  of  the  elders  in  the  Northwest  boycotted  the  game  early  in  the  second  
game.  The  elder  chose  not  to  contribute  anything  to  the  group  eschewing  either  reward  
or  punishment.  Yet,  in  response  to  this  low  contribution  level  the  other  elders  of  the  
Northwest  church  avoided  punishing  him  and  even  tried  to  induce  his  participation  by  
rewarding  him.  When  it  comes  to  larger  institutions,  these  data  suggest  that  Nowak’s  
maxim  is  accurate:  those  who  punish,  perish.  These  results  seem  to  suggest  that  larger  
institutions  may  be  better  off  by  seeking  creative  ways  to  encourage  cooperation  among  
members  and  avoiding  punitive  behavior  as  much  as  possible.    
The  story  with  smaller  membership  congregations  also  becomes  clearer  when  
separated  out  from  the  entire  population.  The  correlation  between  growth  and  total  
score  is  moderately  strong  (r  =  0.51,  p  =  0.37),  although  as  with  larger  congregations  the  
high  p  value  rules  out  the  significance  of  this  relationship.  Similar  to  larger  membership  
congregations  there  is  a  link  between  growth  and  the  willingness  to  reward  that  exceeds  
the  level  of  a  trend  (r  =  .83,  p  =  .08).  (See  Figure  6.)  The  real  story  with  smaller  
membership  congregations  in  comparison  to  larger  membership  congregations,  
however,  lies  in  the  willingness  of  leaders  to  punish  one  another.  While  in  larger  
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membership  congregations  punishment  is  strongly  negatively  correlated  to  growth,  in  
smaller  membership  congregations  these  data  show  it  is  just  the  opposite.  There  is  a  
very  strong  positive  relationship  between  growth  and  punishment  in  smaller  
congregations  (r  =  0.89,  p  =  0.046).  (See  Figure  7.)  So,  while  larger  membership  
congregations  may  be  wise  to  eschew  punitive  behavior,  it  is  possible  that  smaller  
membership  congregations  may  want  to  ask  themselves  hard  questions  about  whether  
they  need  to  take  steps  to  make  free-­‐‑riding  behavior  more  costly.  
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Figure  7:  Percent  of  punishment  in  <100  congregations  
This  strong  correlation  between  punishment  and  growth  in  smaller  
congregations  may  come  about  due  to  the  social  pressure  to  be  agreeable  in  smaller  
congregations  where  leaders  have  a  harder  time  getting  away  from  one  another.  Smaller  
churches  experiencing  growth  may  have  leaders  willing  to  push  back  on  one  another,  
and  churches  experiencing  decline  may  have  leaders  unwilling  to  say  hard  truths  to  one  
another.  Grant  cites  a  study  on  negotiation  comparing  couples  in  relationship  with  
strangers  in  various  negotiation  situations.  The  researchers  hypothesized  that  couples  
would  perform  at  higher  levels  in  the  study  due  to  the  closeness  of  their  relationship.  
The  opposite  turned  out  to  be  the  case.  Couples  negotiated  less  well  than  strangers,  and  
couples  reporting  higher  levels  of  love  did  worse  than  couples  with  lower  levels.  The  
researchers  concluded  that  the  couples  often  failed  to  be  honest  with  one  another,  
preferring  to  protect  the  relationship  rather  than  being  honest  enough  with  one  another  
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circuiting  efforts  to  discover  integrative  solutions  in  favor  of  more  accessible  but  less  
mutually  satisfactory  outcomes,’  the  researchers  write,  leading  to  a  ‘kid  gloves’  
approach  to  problem  solving.”233      
The  inequality  dynamic  emerged  as  a  surprise  during  the  research.  After  
studying  one  of  the  small  membership  congregations,  a  participant  shared  with  me  her  
experience  of  frustration  in  the  game  as  a  high  contributor  who  was  first  rewarded  and  
later  punished  for  this  behavior.  She  noted  that  the  group  seemed  to  show  a  concern  for  
inequality,  rewarding  players  with  low  total  scores  and  punishing  players  with  high  
scores.  After  examining  the  patterns  it  appears  the  participant  was  correct.  Rather  than  
individuals  playing  the  game  to  win,  this  session  seems  to  have  played  the  game  with  a  
view  to  keeping  a  low  gap  between  the  highest  and  lowest  scoring  players.  By  
calculating  the  average  difference  between  the  highest  and  lowest  scoring  players  in  
both  games,  several  other  sessions  also  seemed  to  play  with  this  unspoken  goal  in  mind.  
While  these  sessions  were  successful  at  reducing  the  difference  between  the  score  of  the  
highest  and  lower  players,  they  also  generated  confusion  and  resentment  in  the  process  
by  rewarding  and  then  punishing  the  same  player.  It  is  possible  that  this  game  behavior  
models  a  real  concern  in  church  communities  regarding  tolerance  for  some  members  
being  too  visible  in  their  leadership.  If  this  connection  is  true,  communities  less  tolerant  
of  inequality  may  not  provide  sufficient  support  for  some  of  their  best  leaders.  
                                                                                                              
233  Grant,  Give  and  Take,  196.  
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In  this  study  smaller  membership  congregations  manifested  a  greater  intolerance  
for  inequality  than  larger  membership  congregations;  and  in  the  population  as  a  whole,  
even  though  inequality  was  not  a  strong  predictor  of  growth,  the  data  suggest  that  
congregations  experiencing  more  growth  tend  to  be  more  comfortable  with  inequality.  
But,  as  with  total  score  and  punishment  percentages  inequality  manifested  differently  
for  smaller  membership  congregations  than  for  larger  congregations.  For  larger  
membership  congregations  the  congregations  experiencing  the  most  growth  show  the  
greatest  tolerance  with  inequality  (r  =  0.73,  p  =  0.01).  (See  Figure  8.)  However,  with  
smaller  membership  congregations  the  opposite  is  true.  The  faster-­‐‑growing  smaller  
congregations  were  very  much  less  tolerant  of  inequality  (r  =  -­‐‑0.79,  p  =  0.1).  (See  Figure  
9.)  
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Figure  9:  Inequality  tolerance  in  <100  congregations  
Before  the  study  I  hypothesized  that  if  churches  experiencing  decline  still  
showed  high  levels  of  trust  in  the  game  that  the  reason  for  this  behavior  might  be  due  to  
bonding  capital.  Bonding  capital  may  well  help  to  explain  this  interesting  pattern  with  
inequality.  Assuming  the  bonding  capital  between  members  is  lower  in  a  larger  
institution,  it  makes  sense  that  larger  churches  are  both  more  tolerant  of  inequality  and  
that  faster-­‐‑growing  churches  show  even  greater  tolerance.  This  willingness  to  tolerate  
inequality  will  enable  these  churches  to  offer  a  high  level  of  support  to  leaders  showing  
an  unusually  high  level  of  activity.  However,  in  a  smaller  membership  congregation  
greater  bonding  capital  may  decrease  a  congregation’s  willingness  to  tolerate  leaders  
standing  above  the  rest.  Leaders  who  excel  may  be  viewed  as  doing  too  much,  and  their  
efforts,  while  positive,  may  still  create  unwelcome  tension.  In  this  sense  it  makes  sense  
that  smaller  communities  experiencing  more  growth  also  show  less  inequality  as  
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smaller  membership  communities  in  particular  need  to  exercise  care  with  their  most  
active  leaders.  On  the  one  hand  the  community  may  need  to  learn  how  to  support  these  
very  active  leaders,  but  on  the  other  hand  it  is  possible  that  pastoral  leadership  may  
need  to  find  ways  to  help  standout  leaders  continue  to  contribute  without  being  quite  as  
visible.  
To  shed  further  light  on  the  relationship  between  growth,  decline,  and  game  
performance  I  analyzed  the  results  in  terms  of  the  98  individual  results  as  well  as  by  
congregation.  To  do  this  analysis  I  divided  congregations  into  two  categories:  growing  
versus  declining.  I  defined  a  congregation  as  declining  using  the  lower  of  the  two  
membership  and  attendance  percentage  growth  numbers;  if  a  congregation  experienced  
0%  growth  or  negative  growth,  I  considered  them  to  be  a  declining  congregation.  
Having  divided  the  congregations  into  two  clear  groups,  I  then  performed  a  Student’s  T  
test  on  the  two  groups  measuring  the  total  score  in  Games  1  and  2,  and  measuring  for  
reward  and  punishment  percentage.  
First,  I  found  statistically  significant  relationships  for  every  variable.  
Interestingly,  individuals  in  declining  populations  gave  more  than  individuals  in  
growing  populations  in  both  games.  In  Game  1  the  average  giving  of  individuals  in  
declining  populations  was  13.15  where  average  giving  in  growing  populations  was  10.89  
(t  =  2.894,  p  =  .0
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declining  populations  gave  an  average  of  12.5  units  and  individuals  in  growing  
populations  gave  an  average  of  10.59  (t  =  2.347,  p  =  .021).  
The  relationship  between  reward  and  punishment  behavior  by  individuals  in  
declining  and  growing  populations  is  equally  clear  and  significant.  Individuals  in  
growing  populations  rewarded  more  and  punished  less.  In  terms  of  rewarding  behavior  
individuals  in  declining  populations  show  a  42.56%  average  rate  of  reward,  while  
individuals  in  growing  populations  show  a  59.05%  average  rate  (t  =  -­‐‑2.33,  p  =  .022).  The  
opposite  was  true  for  punishment:  individuals  in  declining  populations  experienced  a  
15.5%  rate  of  punishment,  while  individuals  in  growing  populations  enjoyed  a  rate  of  
7.2%  (t  =  1.99,  p  =  .049).  
This  relationship  between  reward  and  punishment  behavior  is  the  strongest  
evidence  yet  to  support  Nowak’s  hypothesis  that  growing  populations  can  create  the  
conditions  for  cooperation  to  flourish  in  the  absence  of  punishment.  Individuals  in  
growing  populations  rewarded  more  than  leaders  in  declining  populations  in  this  study,  
and  conversely,  individuals  in  growing  populations  punished  at  less  than  half  the  rate  of  
leaders  in  declining  populations.  The  fact  that  leaders  in  declining  populations  gave  
more  generously  than  leaders  in  growing  populations  is  somewhat  puzzling.  I  would  
have  guessed  that  leaders  in  growing  populations  would  trust  one  another  more  and  
exhibit  this  trust  by  contributing  more  units  to  the  game,  which  is  clearly  not  the  case,  
however.  
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Perhaps  the  reason  leaders  in  declining  populations  gave  more  generously  than  
leaders  in  growing  populations  has  to  do  with  Grant’s  categories  of  givers,  takers,  and  
matchers.  Lower  levels  of  giving  suggest  that  leaders  in  growing  congregations  give  
with  the  more  wary  eye  of  the  matcher.  They  are  willing  to  reward  more  generously  
than  individuals  leading  declining  populations,  but  perhaps  by  giving  less  they  want  to  
ensure  that  other  leaders  are  doing  their  part.  Leaders  in  declining  congregations  give  
more;  but,  perhaps  like  some  of  the  givers  Grant  describes,  their  high  levels  of  giving  
expose  them  to  taking  behavior,  which  might  also  explain  their  comparatively  high  level  
of  punishment.  Perhaps,  hell  hath  no  fury  like  a  giver  scorned.  
To  test  for  the  influence  of  giving  style  I  divided  the  populations  by  reciprocity  
style.  I  designated  individuals  who  gave  an  average  of  15-­‐‑20  units  as  givers,  I  designated  
leaders  who  gave  an  average  of  7-­‐‑14  units  as  matchers,  and  I  termed  individuals  who  
gave  between  0  and  6  takers.  I  analyzed  givers,  takers,  and  matchers  using  reward  and  
punishment  percentages  based  on  performance  in  Games  1  and  2  using  the  Chi  Squared  
test.  While  the  results  of  the  reward  conditions  were  not  statistically  significant,  the  
results  of  the  punishment  conditions  using  the  performance  in  Game  1  fell  within  the  
level  of  a  trend  (p  =  0.079).  These  results  do  not  allow  us  to  say  that  more  givers  exist  in  
growing  populations,  and  more  takers  exist  in  declining  populations.  What  we  can  say  
is  that  the  distribution  of  reward  percentage  is  spread  fairly  evenly  for  givers,  takers,  
and  matchers;  however,  in  terms  of  punishment  givers  and  matchers  are  responsible  for  
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nearly  all  of  the  punishment  taking  place.  Those  designated  as  takers  in  the  first  game  
exhibited  no  punishing  behavior  at  all  in  the  second  game  while  nearly  a  tenth  of  givers  
and  matchers  punished  at  a  rate  of  100%.  More  individuals  designated  as  takers  in  the  
second  game  chose  to  punish,  but  aside  from  these  outliers  the  pattern  held:  everyone  
rewards,  but  givers  and  matchers  are  far  more  likely  to  punish.  
This  pattern  does  not  explain  exactly  why  leaders  in  declining  congregations  
give  higher  average  amounts  while  rewarding  less  and  punishing  more.  It  does,  
however,  suggest  that  leaders  should  be  wary  of  punishing  behavior  and  wise  to  eschew  
excess  giving  in  favor  of  a  matching  stance  when  they  think  about  designating  time,  
talent,  and  treasure  to  the  bodies  they  serve.  Like  Jesus  telling  the  disciples  to  leave  
unwelcoming  places  by  shaking  the  dust  off  their  feet,  these  games  suggest  that  leaders  
of  healthy,  vital  institutions  are  willing  to  give,  but  exercise  caution  in  their  giving  and  
are  willing  to  move  on  from  frustrating  situations  without  resorting  to  punishing  
behavior.  
What  becomes  very  clear  from  the  reciprocity  style  analysis  is  the  effect  reward  
and  punishment  have  on  the  game.  I  ranked  players  by  total  score  and  giving  style  for  
both  games  and  separated  them  into  four  quartiles.  In  Game  1  givers  barely  make  it  into  
the  first  quartile  comprising  just  4%  of  the  top  group  with  matchers  and  takers  
dominating.  The  opposite  is  the  case  with  the  bottom  quartile  that  has  74%  givers,  26%  
matchers,  and  not  a  single  taker.  In  the  absence  of  reward  and  punishment,  matchers  
     186  
and  takers  thrive  while  givers  are  pushed  to  the  bottom.  Given  the  crucial  importance  of  
givers  for  group  health  this  pattern  is  not  good  to  see.  (See  Figure  10.)  
  
Figure  10:  Reciprocity  styles  in  Game  1  ranked  by  quartile  
In  stark  contrast  when  leaders  play  with  the  ability  to  reward  and  punish,  an  
entirely  different  picture  emerges.  In  the  reward  and  punishment  condition  the  presence  
of  givers  in  the  first  quartile  doubles  to  8%,  and  an  equal  percentage  of  givers  populate  
the  second,  third,  and  fourth  quartiles  with  24%.  Twenty-­‐‑four  percent  of  givers  in  the  
fourth  quartile  in  the  second  version  of  the  game  is  a  dramatically  different  distribution  
than  the  74%  of  givers  filling  the  fourth  quartile  in  the  first  version  of  the  game.  Takers  
are  also  pushed  to  the  middle  two  quartiles  in  the  second  version  of  the  game.  In  Game  
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make  it  to  the  top.  Given  the  prevalence  of  reward  over  punishment  these  data  suggest  
that  interactive  relationships  characterized  by  generous  use  of  giving  along  with  
judicious  punishment,  particularly  in  smaller  membership  congregations,  create  the  
space  needed  to  discourage  taking  behavior  and  allow  healthier  giving  and  matching  
styles  to  thrive.  (See  Figure  11.)  
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10. Summary 
   Pairing  the  insights  of  cognitive  psychology,  behavioral  economics,  and  theology  
may  seem  novel,  but  in  an  important  way  this  work  is  simply  an  attempt  to  shed  further  
light  on  what  the  church  has  confessed  since  Chalcedon:  Christ  is  fully  divine  and  fully  
human.  Behavioral  insights  help  us  understand  with  growing  experimental  precision  
the  sometimes  surprising  complexity  of  human  nature.  These  insights  aid  theologians  in  
describing  theological  anthropology  and  sin;  they  also  provide  biblical  exegetes  tools  to  
interpret  scripture  in  a  way  that  affirms  the  integrity  of  Christ’s  humanity.  Behavioral  
theology  gives  leaders  language  and  an  identity  as  choice  architects  to  reflect  on  their  
practice,  and  it  presses  leaders  to  ask  whether  their  decisions  are  taking  into  
consideration  the  full  humanity  of  the  church.  Such  a  theology  will  humble  leaders  and  
require  us  to  be  mindful  of  the  cognitive  biases  we  bring  to  every  situation;  but,  more  
importantly,  such  a  theology  will  free  us  to  engage  our  ministry  contexts  with  a  more  
playful  and  experimental  attitude.  
   Applying  behavioral  game  theory  to  church  settings  allows  us  to  add  to  the  
lively  discussion  about  church  growth.  To  be  sure  Mark  Chaves  and  other  sociologists  
rightly  demonstrate  how  demographics  explain  much  of  church  growth  and  decline.  
And  yet,  leadership  makes  a  difference.  Pastoral  leadership  makes  a  difference,  and  this  
public  goods  game  study  of  Presbyterian  sessions  indicates  that  congregational  
leadership  makes  a  difference,  too.  To  summarize  the  more  important  findings:  leading  
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a  larger  membership  congregation  is  very  different  than  leading  a  smaller  membership  
congregation.  Leaders  of  larger  congregations  should  exercise  the  greatest  possible  
caution  regarding  punitive  behavior.  Positive,  rewarding  behavior  marks  growing  larger  
membership  congregations.  I  am  not  saying  that  larger  membership  congregations  
should  overlook  conflict,  rather  I  am  suggesting  that  larger  membership  leaders  should  
think  carefully  before  becoming  entangled  in  situations  that  may  unravel  emergent  
cooperation.  In  smaller  membership  contexts  positive,  rewarding  behavior  is  just  as  
important  as  it  is  in  their  larger  counterparts,  but  in  smaller  membership  contexts  the  
leaders  of  growing  congregations  used  more  punishment  in  the  games.  I  hypothesized  
that  this  behavior  is  not  punitive  behavior  so  much  as  it  reflects  leaders  exercising  
healthy  discipline  on  members  who  were  not  adding  to  the  community.  In  an  actual  
situation  this  healthy  discipline  might  look  like  elders  expressing  honest  disagreement  
by  speaking  the  truth  in  love  when  it  is  often  easier  in  tight  living  quarters  to  keep  one’s  
thoughts  to  oneself.  
   This  study  also  indicates  that  leaders  should  reflect  carefully  on  how  they  see  
inequality  in  their  context.  Larger  membership  congregations  generally  played  these  
games  with  a  far  greater  tolerance  for  inequality  suggesting  that  in  real  life  these  
churches  might  be  able  to  support  standout  leaders.  Smaller  membership  congregations,  
on  the  other  hand,  played  these  games  with  less  tolerance  for  inequality  suggesting  that  
in  actual  church  settings  these  smaller  churches  might  exhibit  more  anxiety  if  some  
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leaders  are  perceived  as  too  high  or  too  low.  Pastors  of  smaller  membership  
congregations  may  be  wise  indeed  to  support  and  protect  unusually  gifted  leaders  in  
situations  where  many  are  likely  to  be  uncomfortable  with  such  high-­‐‑profile  leaders.  
   The  most  important  conclusion  is  that  this  study  should  be  seen  as  a  comma  
rather  than  a  period:  more  work  needs  to  be  done  to  understand  the  relationship  
between  the  church  and  games  such  as  the  public  goods  game.  While  the  Student’s  T  
test  resulted  in  statistically  significant  findings  using  the  power  of  the  individual  data,  
eleven  congregations  was  not  a  large  enough  sample  to  produce  many  significant  
correlations.  However,  the  insights  that  I  gleaned  are  interesting  and  stimulating.  
Further,  the  iterations  on  this  study  are  endless.  Using  the  same  game  structure  a  future  
experiment  could  be  conducted  with  more  congregations  using  financial  incentives  to  
compare  congregations  playing  with  and  without  incentives.  This  study  did  not  analyze  
how  culture,  gender,  or  political  leaning  might  affect  the  way  different  sessions  play.  It  
is  highly  possible  that  what  is  viewed  as  punitive  behavior  in  one  area  of  the  country  
might  not  be  viewed  as  punitive  in  another.  These  games  are  easy  to  play,  and  many  of  
the  leaders  reported  their  personal  interest  and  enjoyment.  My  hope  is  that  this  study  
encourages  more  like  it  to  add  to  the  body  of  behavioral  knowledge  in  church  settings.  
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Appendix A: Study Design 
The  Duke  University  Institutional  Review  Board  (IRB)  approved  the  following  
research  protocol  on  May  30,  2013.  
  
1. Research Design  
I  will  study  the  way  Presbyterian  Church  (U.S.A.)  leaders  in  numerically  
declining,  stable,  and  growing  congregations  play  two  versions  of  a  public  goods  game,  
in  order  to  determine  whether  there  is  correlation  between  trust  and  growth.  I  will  rely  
on  the  national  PC(USA)  database  to  determine  numerically  declining,  stable,  and  
growing  congregations.  Each  version  will  be  twenty  rounds  long.  To  protect  from  the  
shadow  of  the  future  the  number  of  the  rounds  will  be  kept  secret.  
After  obtaining  consent  from  each  study  participant,  game  instructions  will  be  
read  before  play  begins.  After  a  time  for  questions  and  clarification,  players  will  observe  
silence.  Following  the  classic  public  goods  game,  each  participant  will  be  given  20  units,  
defined  by  each  player  as  time,  money,  or  energy,  which  they  will  then  privately  decide  
to  contribute  to  a  common  pot  or  keep  to  themselves.  Each  unit  shared  in  the  common  
pot  will  be  multiplied  by  1.6.  The  multiplied  pot  will  be  divided  equally  among  the  
players.  After  each  round  the  actions  of  each  participant  will  be  shared  anonymously,  
and  a  new  round  will  begin.  In  this  version  of  the  public  goods  game  cooperation  tends  
to  break  down.  Breakdown  in  cooperation  should  occur  at  different  rates  with  groups  
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experiencing  higher  levels  of  trust  and  cooperation  maintaining  higher  collective  scores  
over  a  longer  period  of  time.    
In  the  second  version  of  the  game  a  private  stage  of  action  is  added.  After  each  
individual  decides  how  much  to  share,  and  the  units  are  multiplied  and  returned,  each  
individual  will  be  given  another  choice:    whether  to  reward,  punish,  or  remain  neutral  
toward  the  other  participants.  In  this  second  round  each  player  may  choose  to  spend  4  
of  their  units  in  order  to  either  reward  another  player,  giving  this  other  player  an  12  
additional  units,  or  punish  a  player,  taking  away  12  units.  The  player  may  not  reward  or  
punish  themselves.  If  a  player  has  a  negative  number  of  units  due  to  ex  ante  punishment  
they  must  contribute  0  units  and  may  not  choose  to  reward  or  punish.  After  all  private  
actions  are  taken,  the  next  round  begins.    
This  version  of  the  game  tests  the  disputed  question  regarding  punishment  and  
cooperation.  Traditionally,  theorists  like  Robert  Axelrod,  Ernst  Fehr,  and  Simon  Gachter  
argue  that  some  punishment  is  necessary  to  maintain  cooperation  in  a  public  goods  
environment.  Fehr  and  Gachter  use  the  term  ‘altruistic  punishment’  to  describe  costly  
punishment  designed  to  discourage  free-­‐‑riding  behavior,  which  is  necessary  to  maintain  
cooperation  in  a  public  goods  environment.  Martin  Nowak,  on  the  other  hand,  points  
out  that  while  altruistic  punishment  does  create  cooperation,  such  behavior  is  costly  to  
the  group  overall.  Nowak  suggests  that  the  highest  scoring  groups  rely  on  trust  and  
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positive  reinforcement  to  create  the  conditions  for  cooperation  to  emerge.  Thus,  
Nowak’s  maxim:    punish  and  perish.  
After  the  games  are  played,  the  subjects  are  invited  to  respond  to  two  questions  
regarding  their  experience  of  trust  as  leaders.  They  are  asked  what  behaviors  or  events  
have  strengthened  their  sense  of  trust,  harmed  their  sense  of  trust,  and  they  will  be  
asked  to  assign  an  objective  number  to  their  perception  of  the  trust  level  present  in  their  
leadership  body.  
  
2. Subject Selection  
The  subject  population  are  teaching  and  ruling  elders  in  the  Presbyterian  Church  
(U.S.A),  men  and  women  elected  by  their  congregations  to  lead.  Using  national  statistics  
regarding  growth  and  the  compound  annual  growth  formula,  I  will  study  congregations  
experiencing  numerical  decline,  stability,  and  increase.  
I  hope  to  study  ten  congregations  in  each  category.  The  subjects  will  be  
composed  mainly  of  churches  in  Oregon,  Washington,  North  Carolina,  and  Texas.  I  will  
recruit  these  subjects  by  asking  for  time  on  the  docket  of  their  monthly  meeting.  
  
3. Risks and Benefits 
It  is  possible  the  subjects  might  experience  feelings  of  concern  and  dismay  if  they  
experience  other  leaders  playing  the  games  in  uncooperative  or  punishing  ways.  But  
     194  
given  the  brief  and  abstract  nature  of  the  games,  I  believe  the  risk  of  harm  is  low.  On  the  
other  hand  I  believe  it  is  possible  the  governing  bodies  may  learn  something  about  one  
another  and  about  how  they  relate  by  playing  the  game.  I  think  it  is  likely  that  some  
leaders  will  gain  some  insight  about  the  importance  of  cooperation  and  finding  non-­‐‑
punishing  ways  of  developing  cooperation.  
  
4. Confidentiality 
Personal  information  will  not  be  used  in  scoring  the  games.  I  will  mark  the  
players  down  using  only  their  initials.  I  will  store  this  information  both  in  hard  copy  and  
on  a  hard  drive  until  the  thesis  is  completed.  When  various  sessions  will  be  discussed  in  
the  research,  their  congregations  will  not  be  named.  The  churches  will  be  described  
without  identifying  details,  i.e.  “one  session  leading  a  smaller,  rural  congregation  in  the  
Pacific  Northwest  experienced  a  high  level  of  trust.”                
  
5. Compensation 
No  compensation  will  be  given.  
  
6. Informed Consent 
Duke’s  informed  consent  will  be  used.  The  script  that  will  be  read  to  the  
participants  and  the  statement  are  attached.  
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7. Deception 
No  deception  will  be  used.  
8. Debriefing 
No  debriefing  is  needed  due  to  lack  of  deception.  
  
9. Appendices  
A.  Excel  tool  used  for  calculating  game  and  projecting  results  
B.  Script  explaining  the  research  and  the  rights  of  the  participants.  
C.  Response  sheet  handed  out  to  participants.  
D.  Consent  form.  
E.  Sample  recruitment  form  
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IRB  Appendices  
  
Appendix  A:    Excel  tool  for  calculating  and  projecting  
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Appendix  B:  Scrip  
  
Public  Goods  Game  Instructions  
  
Instructions  for  the  First  Game:  
In  the  first  version  of  the  game  each  player  will  begin  with  20  units.  I  invite  you  
to  think  of  these  units  as  time,  energy,  or  financial  resources  you  might  give  to  your  
community  in  your  role  as  an  elder.  At  the  beginning  of  each  round  every  player  will  
privately  write  down  how  many  units  they  are  willing  to  offer.  When  everyone  has  
decided  and  written  down  their  amount,  I  will  come  by  and  record  your  choice.  I  will  
then  enter  all  of  the  decisions  into  a  spreadsheet  I  am  projecting  for  the  group  to  see.  The  
players  will  be  designated  ‘A’,  ‘B’,  ‘C’,  and  so  forth.  Because  the  recording  sheets  you  are  
using  will  be  randomized,  you  will  have  perfect  knowledge  of  all  decisions  made,  but  
you  will  not  know  the  personal  identity  of  the  players.  All  of  the  amounts  will  be  added  
together,  multiplied  by  1.6,  and  then  divided  equally  and  returned  to  each  player.  For  
example  in  a  game  of  8  players,  if  each  player  gave  every  unit,  after  the  units  were  
added  together,  multiplied  by  1.6,  divided  equally  and  returned,  all  players  will  benefit  
and  end  the  round  with  32  units.  However,  trust  factors  into  the  game,  because  players  
are  able  to  donate  little  and  still  benefit.  In  the  same  game  of  eight  people,  if  seven  
players  donate  20,  and  one  player  donates  0,  the  seven  players  will  wind  up  with  28  
units  while  the  player  who  donated  nothing  will  have  48,  nearly  double  the  amount  of  
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those  who  contributed.  This  game  will  be  played  for  several  rounds,  and  you  will  have  
the  opportunity  to  see  how  much  each  player  contributes  and  the  total  number  of  units  
each  player  is  given  at  the  end  of  each  round.  
  
We  will  begin  with  a  practice  round.  This  round  does  not  count  against  your  
score  and  will  not  be  recorded  as  part  of  the  study.  It  is  simply  for  you  to  gain  a  feel  for  
the  game.  Feel  free  to  talk  during  the  practice  round  and  ask  questions,  but  when  the  
game  begins  I  will  ask  everyone  to  observe  silence.  
  
[The  game  is  played.]  
  
Instructions  for  the  Second  Game:  
The  second  version  of  the  game  is  just  like  the  first,  only  players  will  have  an  
additional  step.  After  each  player  writes  down  how  many  units  they  are  willing  to  
contribute,  players  are  also  given  the  opportunity  to  reward  or  punish  another  player.  A  
player  may  spend  4  units  to  reward  another  player  with  12  additional  units.  Or,  a  player  
may  spend  4  units  to  deduct  12  units  from  another  player.  Players  may  not  reward  or  
punish  themselves  and  may  choose  to  reward  only  one  other  player  per  round.  As  
before,  when  everyone  has  made  their  decisions,  I  will  come  by  and  record  your  choice  
or  choices.  I  will  then  enter  all  of  the  decisions  into  a  spreadsheet  I  am  projecting  for  the  
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group  to  see.  The  players  will  be  designated  ‘A’,  ‘B’,  ‘C’,  and  so  forth.  Because  the  
recording  sheets  you  are  using  will  be  randomized,  you  will  have  perfect  knowledge  of  
all  decisions  made,  but  you  will  not  know  the  personal  identity  of  the  players.  Players  
do  not  have  to  reward  or  punish  other  players.  This  game  will  also  be  played  for  several  
rounds.  If  a  player  has  negative  units  because  of  previous  punishment,  they  must  choose  
to  give  0  units  and  may  not  reward  or  punish  another  player.  
  
As  before  we  will  play  a  practice  round  that  will  not  count  against  your  score.  
After  the  practice  round,  we  will  begin  and  observe  silence  for  as  many  rounds  as  we  
play.  
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Appendix  C:    Recording  Sheet  
  
Public  Goods  Game  Recording  Sheets*  
  
         Units  
Practice  Round:   ___________  
Round  1:      ___________  
Round  2:      ___________  
Round  3:      ___________  
Round  4:      ___________  
Round  5:      ___________  
Round  6:      ___________  
Round  7:      ___________  
Round  8:      ___________  
Round  9:      ___________  
Round  10:      ___________  
Round  11:      ___________  
Round  12:      ___________  
Round  13:      ___________  
Round  14:      ___________  
Round  15:      ___________  
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*  Although  the  number  of  rounds  possible  on  this  recording  sheet  is  15,  the  
actual  of  number  of  rounds  will  differ.  For  the  sake  of  realism  the  number  of  actual  
rounds  will  not  be  disclosed  to  the  players.  (This  language  will  be  removed  from  the  
actual  sheets.)  
  
      Units         Punish/Reward?      Player  Name?    
Practice  Round:___________      ___________________     ________________  
Round  1:   ___________      ___________________     ________________  
Round  2:   ___________      ___________________     ________________  
Round  3:   ___________      ___________________     ________________  
Round  4:   ___________      ___________________     ________________  
Round  5:   ___________      ___________________     ________________  
Round  6:   ___________      ___________________     ________________  
Round  7:   ___________      ___________________     ________________  
Round  8:   ___________      ___________________     ________________  
Round  9:   ___________      ___________________     ________________  
Round  10:   ___________      ___________________     ________________  
Round  11:   ___________      ___________________     ________________  
Round  12:   ___________      ___________________     ________________  
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Round  13:   ___________      ___________________     ________________  
Round  14:   ___________      ___________________     ________________  
Round  15:   ___________      ___________________     ________________  
  
*  Although  the  number  of  rounds  possible  on  this  recording  sheet  is  15,  the  
actual  of  number  of  rounds  will  differ.  For  the  sake  of  realism  the  number  of  actual  
rounds  will  not  be  disclosed  to  the  players.  (This  language  will  be  removed  from  the  
actual  sheets.)  
In  my  opinion  these  behaviors  or  events  have  strengthened  trust  among  the  









In  my  opinion  these  behaviors  or  events  have  weakened  trust  among  the  leaders  
of  our  congregation:  









On  a  scale  of  1  to  10,  with  1  being  the  lowest  and  10  being  the  highest,  I  perceive  
the  trust  among  our  congregation’s  leaders  to  be:    (Please  circle  one  number.)  
1                              2                              3                              4                              5                              6                              7                              8                              9                              10  
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Appendix  D:  Informed  Consent  to  Participate  in  a  Research  Study:  
  
Playing  Games  in  Church:  Trust,  Church  Growth,  and  the  Public  Goods  Game  
  
Purpose  of  the  Research:    To  learn  more  about  the  possible  relationship  between  
the  level  of  trust  present  in  a  session  and  the  numerical  decline,  stability,  or  growth  of  
the  congregation.  This  sheet  is  intended  to  give  you  more  information  and  to  invite  you  
to  ask  me  questions  so  you  can  decide  if  you  would  like  to  participate.  
I  am  Ken  Evers-­‐‑Hood,  the  pastor  of  Tualatin  Presbyterian  Church  and  a  doctoral  
student  at  Duke  Divinity  School.  I’m  conducting  research  for  my  doctoral  thesis  by  
studying  how  PC(USA)  sessions  play  two  versions  of  what  is  called  a  public  goods  
game.  Participation  in  this  study  is  completely  voluntary  and  you  can  choose  the  level  of  
your  involvement.  You  may  choose  to  stop  participating  at  any  time.    
What  I  will  ask  you  to  do:    I  will  ask  you  to  play  two  versions  of  a  public  goods  
game  and  then  answer  questions  about  the  level  of  trust  you  sense  in  your  session.  A  
public  goods  game  simulates  a  social  dilemma  in  which  individual  benefit  conflicts  with  
the  common  good.  In  a  public  goods  game  individuals  are  given  units  they  may  think  of  
as  their  time,  energy,  or  money  that  might  be  given  to  the  community.  Once  given,  these  
units  are  increased  by  a  small  amount,  divided  equally  by  the  number  of  participants,  
and  then  returned  to  each  player.  To  protect  your  identity  and  to  encourage  you  to  play  
as  realistically  as  possible,  the  games  will  be  played  anonymously.  The  community  
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benefits  most  if  every  player  gives  generously.  However,  because  the  goods  are  shared,  
an  individual  will  personally  benefit  even  if  they  contribute  nothing  to  the  group.  
Different  versions  of  these  games  have  been  played  and  studied  many  times  and  are  
believed  to  show  levels  of  trust  and  cooperation  among  participants.  In  the  context  of  a  
session  the  whole  group  benefits  if  every  elder  participates  at  a  high  level.  However,  
given  the  many  other  demands  in  the  typical  elder’s  life,  there  are  times  when  elders  are  
tempted  to  allow  others  to  bear  more  of  the  work.  
Benefits  and  risks:    While  much  attention  has  been  directed  to  the  importance  of  
pastors  in  leading  congregations,  far  less  study  has  been  directed  towards  elders  and  the  
ways  in  which  sessions  lead  congregations.  It  is  my  hope  that  this  research  will  help  
denominational  and  congregational  leaders  in  the  PC(USA)  learn  more  about  how  to  
create  the  conditions  in  which  cooperation  may  flourish.  Although  I  do  not  anticipate  
any  risk  to  you  for  participating  in  this  study,  you  are  always  free  to  leave  the  study  at  
any  point  for  any  reason.  I  will  not  use  your  name  or  the  specific  name  of  your  
congregation  in  the  thesis.    
Questions:    Please  ask  me  questions  now  or  at  any  point  during  my  research.  
Feel  free  to  contact  me  by  phone  or  email.  503.957.9111  and  kse4@duke.edu.  You  may  
also  contact  my  faculty  advisor  Greg  Jones:    919.660.3537  greg.jones@div.duke.edu.    
  
If  you  would  like  to  participate,  please  fill  in  the  lines  below:  
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________________________________    _____________________________  
   _____________  
Signed  Name              Printed  Name              
   Date     
     207  
Appendix  E:    Recruiting  Script  
  
Dear  (Pastor  or  Clerk  of  Session),  my  name  is  Ken  Evers-­‐‑Hood,  and  I’m  the  
pastor  of  Tualatin  Presbyterian  Church  in  the  Presbytery  of  the  Cascades  and  a  doctoral  
student  at  Duke  Divinity  School.  As  part  of  my  doctoral  research,  I’m  studying  the  
possible  connections  between  sessions,  trust,  and  church  numerical  decline,  stability,  
and  growth.  I  have  identified  your  session  as  a  possible  participant  in  this  study.  
If  your  session  is  willing,  I  would  need  thirty  minutes  with  them  to  give  
instructions  and  conduct  the  research.  We  would  play  two  games  that  are  versions  of  a  
public  goods  game.  These  games  are  commonly  studied  games  believed  to  show  levels  
of  trust  among  the  groups  playing  them.  The  members  of  your  session  would  play  
anonymously  and  the  name  of  your  congregation  would  not  be  used  in  the  thesis.  All  
members  of  your  session  would  be  provided  with  an  informed  consent  document  and  
will  be  free  to  participate  or  stop  participation  at  any  time.  
I  believe  this  will  be  a  fun  opportunity  for  your  session  to  learn  more  about  
themselves  and  participate  in  a  study  that  might  benefit  the  entire  denomination.  If  you  
are  interested,  I  will  be  happy  send  you  more  information  and  schedule  a  date  to  meet  
with  you.  
  
Many  thanks,  Ken  Evers-­‐‑Hood  
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